Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State

Citation278 So.3d 545
Decision Date18 April 2019
Docket NumberNo. SC18-683,SC18-683
Parties HALIFAX HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, etc., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, and Katherine M. Clemente of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Appellants

Martin B. Goldberg, Jason A. Coe, Jonathan L. Williams, Nicholas A. Ortiz, and Christopher K. Smith of Lash & Goldberg LLP, Miami, Florida; and Raoul G. Cantero of White & Case LLP, Miami, Florida for Appellees

Clifford B. Shepard of Shepard, Smith, Kohlmyer & Hand, P.A., Maitland, Florida, for Amici Curiae Florida League of Cities, Florida Association of Counties, Inc., Florida Association of Special Districts, County of Volusia, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, City of Deltona, City of Largo, City of Safety Harbor, Osceola County, and Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority

Kimarie R. Stratos, Maria R. Caldera, and Mallory L. Gold of Memorial Healthcare System, Hollywood, Florida, for Amicus Curiae South Broward Hospital District d/b/a Memorial Healthcare System

LAWSON, J.

Halifax Hospital Medical Center, a special tax district, appeals a circuit court judgment denying validation of revenue bonds. We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const., and affirm, holding that Halifax is not authorized to carry out the project for which it sought to issue the bonds.

BACKGROUND

Halifax was created by a special act of the Legislature in 1925. Ch. 11272, Laws of Fla. (1925); ch. 79-577, § 2, Laws of Fla. Since that time, Halifax's enabling act has undergone many revisions and amendments. Ch. 79-577, 79-578, 84-539, 89-409, 91-352, 2003-374, Laws of Fla. Halifax's current enabling act is chapter 2003-374, Laws of Florida, and section 3 of this act constitutes Halifax's charter. Halifax's charter provides geographic boundaries for Halifax within Volusia County, grants Halifax certain authority to "establish, construct, operate, and maintain ... hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities and services," and authorizes Halifax to issue bonds "for the purposes set forth in this act." Ch. 2003-374, § 3(1), (5), (8).

In the proceedings below, Halifax sought validation of bonds that it intended to issue for the purpose of financing the construction of a hospital outside the geographic boundaries established in the special act. The proposed hospital would have been located in Deltona, Florida, and operated by Halifax with the expectation that Deltona residents would constitute the majority of the hospital's patients. Before filing the complaint for bond validation, Halifax agreed to undertake this project by entering into an interlocal agreement with the City of Deltona pursuant to section 163.01, Florida Statutes (2017), the Interlocal Act.1 An intervenor challenged Halifax's complaint for bond validation, arguing that Halifax lacks the authority to operate a facility in Deltona because Deltona is outside Halifax's geographical boundaries. The circuit court agreed and denied the complaint for bond validation. Halifax appealed that ruling to this Court, invoking our mandatory jurisdiction to review final orders entered in proceedings for the validation of bonds. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.; § 75.08, Fla. Stat. (2017). Consistent with its arguments below, Halifax and its amici argue that Halifax possesses authority to operate a hospital anywhere it desires outside its boundaries so long as there is a demonstrated need for the facility and so long as Halifax demonstrates that it can do so profitably, thereby increasing revenue available to serve the needs of the district. In the alternative, Halifax contends that the interlocal agreement it entered with City of Deltona pursuant to the Interlocal Act serves as a sufficient grant of authority to build and operate the hospital.

ANALYSIS

As a "special tax district," ch. 2003-374, §§ 1, 3(1), 3(16), Halifax has only the powers granted to it by legislative enactment, either expressly or by necessary implication. See Bd. of Comm'rs of Jupiter Inlet Dist. v. Thibadeau , 956 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ("[I]ndependent special districts are created by the legislature, and, like agencies, their powers are limited to those granted them." (citations omitted) ); State, Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist. , 424 So.2d 787, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ("An agency has only such power as expressly or by necessary implication is granted by legislative enactment."); see also City of Cape Coral v. GAC Utils., Inc. of Fla. , 281 So.2d 493, 496 (Fla. 1973). Because the scope of Halifax's authority is a matter of statutory construction, we review the issue de novo. City of Parker v. State , 992 So.2d 171, 175-76 (Fla. 2008).2

Statutory Analysis

A court's determination of the meaning of a statute begins with the language of the statute. Lopez v. Hall , 233 So.3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018) (citing Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ). If that language is clear, the statute is given its plain meaning, and the court does not "look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction." City of Parker , 992 So.2d at 176 (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health , 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005) ).

The General and Special Laws Defining the Scope of Halifax's Authority

Our analysis necessarily begins with chapter 189, Florida Statutes, the general law authorizing special districts. In addition to serving as the common authority for special districts in general, chapter 189 is expressly cited as the foundation for Halifax's creation in the special law creating Halifax. Ch. 2003-374, § 1, Laws of Fla.

Chapter 189 "provide[s] general provisions for the definition, creation, and operation of special districts." § 189.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). According to chapter 189, a special district is "a unit of local government created for a special purpose, as opposed to a general purpose, which has jurisdiction to operate within a limited geographic boundary and is created by general law, special act, local ordinance, or by rule of the Governor and Cabinet." Id. § 189.012(6) (emphasis added). Because the very essence of a chapter 189 "special district" is statutorily prescribed as operation within "a limited geographic boundary," § 189.012(6), that inescapably becomes the default authority for all special districts. In other words, although the Legislature certainly can grant a special district authority to operate outside of its defined geographic boundary, that extraordinary grant of authority would need to be express and unambiguous—clear enough to demonstrate that the Legislature has created a special district that will operate with a power not generally contemplated for chapter 189 special districts.

Chapter 2003-374 does not contain an express grant of authority for Halifax to operate hospitals outside the geographic boundaries established for the district and, when the relevant language is considered as a whole, only authorizes Halifax to operate within the district. Chapter 2003-374 provides in relevant part:

The district may establish, construct, operate, and maintain such hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities and services as are necessary. The hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities and services shall be established, constructed, operated, and maintained by the district for the preservation of the public health, for the public good, and for the use of the public of the district . Maintenance of such hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities and services in the district is hereby found and declared to be a public purpose and necessary for the general welfare of the residents of the district.

Ch. 2003-374, § 3(5) (emphasis added). Halifax seeks to isolate the first sentence of this provision, arguing that because the first sentence does not expressly limit its authority to "construct, operate, and maintain" medical facilities to the district's geographic boundaries, it acts as a grant of authority to do so outside of its boundaries.3 As already discussed, that reading would be contrary to chapter 189, and clearly insufficient to overcome the general rule stated in that chapter—which is that special districts are created to operate within their defined geographic boundaries.

In addition, it would be inappropriate to isolate the first sentence from the rest of the paragraph. Trafalgar Woods Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Cape Coral , 248 So.3d 282, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ("[U]nder a longstanding fundamental principle applicable to statutes and ordinances, ‘words, phrases, clauses, sentences and paragraphs of a statute may not be construed in isolation[.] Rather, the sentence must be read in the context of the entire provision." (citation omitted) ). Specifically, the second sentence references the "hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities" authorized for construction, operation, and maintenance (in the first sentence), and explains that these facilities are being authorized "for the use of the public of the district." More importantly, the first sentence itself only authorizes Halifax to construct, operate, and maintain facilities "as are necessary." Necessary to what? Read in context, these words can only reasonably be understood to mean necessary to fulfillment of the public purpose for which the district is being created, which the third and last sentence explains as follows: "Maintenance of such hospitals, medical facilities, and other health care facilities and services in the district is hereby found and declared to be a public purpose and necessary for the general welfare of the residents of the district ." (Emphasis added.) Read together, this language is plain: it grants Halifax the authority to construct, operate, and maintain health care facilities within its district, which is defined according to the...

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