State v. Maisonet-Maldonado

• Decision Date: 10 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC19-1947,SC19-1947
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Jose MAISONET-MALDONADO, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

308 So.3d 63

STATE of Florida, Petitioner,

v.Jose MAISONET-MALDONADO, Respondent.

No. SC19-1947

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 10, 2020

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Andrew Mich and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defenders, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent

POLSTON, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Maisonet-Maldonado v. State , 283 So. 3d 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), in which the Fifth District certified the following question of great public importance:

DOES THE "SINGLE HOMICIDE" RULE FOUND IN HOUSER V. STATE , 474 SO. 2D 1193 (FLA. 1985), PRECLUDE SEPARATE CONVICTIONS OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE AND FLEEING AND ELUDING CAUSING SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH THAT INVOLVE THE SAME VICTIM?

Maisonet-Maldonado , 283 So. 3d at 863. For the reasons explained below, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision of the Fifth District.¹

I. BACKGROUND

In 2010, Jose Maisonet-Maldonado stabbed his girlfriend, Berlitz Alvelo, and ran over her with a car, resulting in her death. After fleeing the scene, Maisonet-Maldonado was quickly pursued by law enforcement officers. He then led police on a dangerous, high-speed chase that ended when he crashed into another vehicle. The vehicle's driver, James Laconte, sustained serious injuries, while the vehicle's passengers, Amanda Taylor and Francesca Jeffrey, were killed.

A jury convicted Maisonet-Maldonado of one count of first-degree murder with a weapon for the murder of Ms. Alvelo, three counts of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death, and two counts of vehicular homicide. Amanda Taylor and Francesca Jeffrey were each named as the victim for one count of fleeing and eluding causing serious bodily injury or death and one count of vehicular manslaughter. Maisonet-Maldonado's convictions were upheld by the Fifth District in 2014. Maisonet-Maldonado v. State , 149 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). In 2016, Maisonet-Maldonado filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging, among other things, that his convictions for vehicular homicide and fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Noting that each offense contained a unique element, the lower court denied Maisonet-Maldonado's motion. Maisonet-Maldonado appealed.

On appeal, the Fifth District concluded that Maisonet-Maldonado's convictions were prohibited under the single homicide rule, which prohibits dual convictions for a single homicide under two different statutes. Relying on our decision in Houser v. State , 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985), the Fifth District held that the single homicide rule "prohibits his convictions ... for vehicular homicide and fleeing and eluding causing serious injury or death that involve the same victim." Maisonet-Maldonado , 283 So. 3d at 862. Accordingly, the Fifth District reversed the postconviction order and certified the question currently before us.

II. ANALYSIS

Because the statutory language of section 775.021, Florida Statutes (2010), clearly states the intent of the Legislature to punish each available offense and does not provide an exception for offenses arising from a single death, we conclude that section 775.021 supersedes our decisions establishing the single homicide rule and that our decision holding otherwise, State v. Chapman , 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993), was wrongly decided.² Accordingly, we recede from Chapman , answer the certified question in the negative, and quash the Fifth District's decision in Maisonet-Maldonado .

A. Double Jeopardy Principles and the Single Homicide Rule

"As this Court has explained, both the United States and Florida Constitutions contain double jeopardy clauses that ‘prohibit[ ] subjecting a person to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense.’ " State v. Shelley , 176 So. 3d 914, 917 (Fla. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Valdes v. State , 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009) ). But "there is no constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction as long as the Legislature intends to authorize separate punishments." Valdes , 3 So. 3d at 1070. "The prevailing standard ... is whether the Legislature ‘intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.’ " Id. (quoting Gordon v. State , 780 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes , 3 So. 3d at 1077 ).

" ‘[A]bsent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, application of the Blockburger [v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) ] "same-elements" test pursuant to section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes [,] is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are double-jeopardy violations.’ " Shelley , 176 So. 3d at 917 (alterations in original) (quoting Gaber v. State , 684 So. 2d 189, 192 (Fla. 1996) ).

Section 775.021(4) provides:

(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.

(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of construction are:

1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.

2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.

3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.

§ 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2010). "The statute expresses the legislative intent that defendants be charged with every offense that arises out of one criminal episode unless an exception applies." Gil v. State , 118 So. 3d 787, 792 (Fla. 2013). "Subsections (b)(1)-(3) have been described as setting forth ‘exceptions to the Blockburger same-elements test,’ Gaber , 684 So. 2d at 192, because even if the offenses are separate under that test, dual convictions are barred if the offenses meet the criteria in one of the exceptions." State v. Florida , 894 So. 2d 941, 945 n.2 (Fla. 2005), receded from on other grounds by Valdes , 3 So. 3d at 1077.

In Houser v. State , 474 So. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (Fla. 1985), this Court held that convictions for DWI manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter were prohibited under double jeopardy principles, despite being separate offenses under a Blockburger analysis. Observing that the codified Blockburger test was only a "tool[ ] of statutory interpretation," the Houser Court established what would come to be known as the single homicide rule, that dual convictions for offenses resulting from a single death were prohibited in Florida. Id. at 1196. The Court concluded that it should "resolve[ ] all doubts in favor of lenity" and follow the presumption that the Legislature did not intent to punish a single homicide under two different statutes. Carawan v. State , 515 So. 2d 161, 170 (Fla. 1987) (describing Houser ). This Court later reaffirmed the single homicide rule in Carawan , in which it held that dual punishments for attempted manslaughter and aggravated battery arising from a single act were similarly prohibited. Id. Embracing the rule of lenity in the context of double jeopardy, the Carawan Court found that "Florida's lenity requirement constitute[d] a rule of construction coequal to the Blockburger test codified in section 775.021(4)" and reconciled the two by concluding that the rule of lenity prevailed "where there [was] a reasonable basis for concluding the legislature did not intent multiple punishments." Id. at 168.

The Legislature, however, disagreed with our decision in Carawan and, in 1988, enacted an amendment to section 775.021, Florida Statutes, to clarify that the principle of lenity should not be applied in a double jeopardy analysis. Ch. 88-131, § 7, Laws of Fla. ("The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent."); State v. Smith , 547 So. 2d 613, 616-17 (Fla. 1989) (explaining the 1988 amendment changes). Nonetheless, in Chapman , when addressing whether the Legislature's disavowal of Carawan and the principle of lenity affected the single homicide rule, this Court concluded that the 1988 amendment did not supersede Houser and that the single homicide rule was still the law in Florida. 625 So. 2d at 839 ("We see nothing more in the 1988 amendment than that it was intended to limit the rule of lenity and to override [ Carawan ]. Especially, we do not read the amendment as an overruling of Houser ...." (citations omitted)). Faced with a plain reading of section 775.021, however, we now conclude otherwise.

"A court's determination of the meaning of a statute begins with the language of the statute." Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State , 278 So. 3d 545, 547 (Fla. 2019) (citing Lopez v. Hall , 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018) ). If the language of the statute is clear, "the statute is given its plain meaning, and the...