Hall v. Ault
| Decision Date | 24 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 32899,32899 |
| Citation | 240 Ga. 585,242 S.E.2d 101 |
| Parties | Wayne F. HALL v. A. L. AULT, Commissioner, et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Elizabeth J. Coleman-Stroup, Richard K. Greenstein, Steven Gottlieb, Atlanta, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., G. Steven Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellees.
Appellant was employed by the Department of Corrections as a security guard at a halfway house. The department proscribed a dress code for such employees which forbade the wearing of blue jeans on duty. Appellant was warned several times of violations of the dress code. After continued violations, he was discharged for insubordination. He appealed to the State Personnel Board and, after hearing, the board found in favor of the department. The Fulton Superior Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the State Personnel Board using as the standard of review the "any evidence rule." Appellant contends the courts should have applied the "substantial evidence" test.
This court granted certiorari to review the question of what standard of review should be applied by a superior court in an appeal from an administrative decision of the State Personnel Board.
The standard of review to be applied by the courts is set forth in Code Ann. § 40-2207.1(m), which provides, inter alia: (Emphasis supplied.)
The language of Code Ann. § 40-2207.1(m) and Code Ann. § 3A-120(h) is identical in all material particulars and the Court of Appeals has twice before construed the clearly erroneous standard of the Administrative Procedure Act to be the same as the "any evidence rule." Dept. of Human Resources v. Holland, 133 Ga.App. 616, 211 S.E.2d 635 (1974); Ga. Real Estate Commission v. Hooks, 139 Ga.App. 34, 227 S.E.2d 864 (1976).
This court in construing the "clearly erroneous" standard of the Civil Practice Act contained in Code Ann. § 81A-152 said: "Accordingly, assuming but not deciding that the findings of fact contended for by the appellants would have been authorized by the evidence presented on the trial, yet, where the facts found by the trial court were authorized by the evidence such findings will not be set aside." Brook Forest Enterprises v. Paulding County, 231 Ga. 695, 203 S.E.2d 860 (1974).
The statute giving appellant a right to judicial review states, in part: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to the weight of the evidence on the questions of fact." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the statute prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the board are supported by "any evidence."
The trial court did not err in confining its scope of review to the "any evidence" standard, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except HALL, J., who dissents.
I dissent, because I do not believe that the phrase "(c)learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record," Code § 40-2207.1(m)(4), is the equivalent of the "any evidence" test. The cases 1 in which the Court of Appeals held that the "any evidence" test is to be applied under the same language in the Administrative Procedure Act, Code § 3A-120, should be overruled.
The "clearly erroneous" standard first mentioned in the crucial phrase is not the same as the "any evidence" test. The United States Supreme Court has established the meaning of the "clearly erroneous" standard: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). This test provides a broader scope of review than the "substantial evidence" test used in reviewing agency decisions under the federal Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 619-620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). The "substantial evidence"...
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