Hall v. Director
| Decision Date | 08 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:08-cv-01825-GMN-GWF |
| Parties | CECIL LAMAR HALL, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Before the court for a decision on the merits is an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Cecil Lamar Hall, a Nevada Prisoner. ECF No. 47.
On January 26, 2006, Hall entered a guilty plea to one count of lewdness with a minor under the age of 14. Pursuant to pre-plea negotiations, the parties agreed to a stipulated sentence of ten years to life, with the State retaining the right to argue at the time of sentencing. The guilty plea agreement provided that Hall would be subject to lifetime supervision and that he would be required to register as a sex offender if released from custody.
On February 8, 2006, Hall's court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea based on a letter in which Hall claimed that "voices in his head" told him to "take the deal" and that he had been pressured into the agreement. Based on thecompetency evaluations of two court-appointed mental health experts, the state district court concluded that Hall had failed to establish incompetence. The court also found no evidence and coercion or duress. Accordingly, the motion was denied.
On June 8, 2006, Hall was sentenced to a term of life in prison with the possibility of parole after 10 years in accordance with the guilty plea agreement and the plea negotiations. The court entered its judgment of conviction on June 20, 2006. Hall appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court denied Hall's appeal on May 9, 2007, with the remittitur issuing on June 5, 2007. On March 5, 2008, Hall filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state district court. The petition was denied by the district court on May 21, 2008. Hall appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision on November 14, 2008 with a clerk's certificate issuing in lieu of remittitur on December 11, 2008.
On December 24, 2008, Hall filed the federal petition for writ of habeas corpus that initiated this proceeding. On May 27, 2009, the Federal Public Defender (FPD) appeared on behalf of Hall and, on February 22, 2010, filed an amended petition. On July 1, 2011, the State filed its motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion. On August 15, 2011, Hall filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion to stay this proceeding so he could return to state court and exhaust his unexhausted claims.
On January 1, 2012, this court granted the motion for a stay. On August 10, 2011, Hall filed his second post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state district court. On January 18, 2013, the state court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the second post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. Hall appealed.
On October 15, 2014, the Nevada Supreme Court entered its order affirming the state district court's denial of the petition. The court found his petition was procedurally barred by Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.726(1) (timeliness) and 34.810(2) (successiveness).
This case was re-opened on February 5, 2015. Hall filed his second amended petition on May 6, 2015. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss certain claims in the petition, which the court granted in part, dismissing Grounds Two(c), Three, and Five as time-barred. The remaining claims have been fully-briefed and are before the court for a decision on the merits.
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review under AEDPA:
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. "[A] federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) () (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"[A] federal court may not second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 ().
Because de novo review is more favorable to the petitioner, federal courts can deny writs of habeas corpus under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review rather than applying the deferential AEDPA standard. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010).
In Ground One, Hall claims that his conviction and sentence are unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intentionally, or voluntarily. In support of this claim, he alleges that his lowintellectual functioning, his cognitive impairments, his psychiatric illness, and his physical limitations made it impossible for him understand, and voluntarily enter into, the guilty plea agreement. He also alleges that he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea. In addition, he contends that his attorney coerced him into entering the guilty plea.
Under federal law, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. U.S. v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A guilty plea must represent "a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoted source omitted). Advice for a guilty plea does not require a description of every element of the offense. Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). The court looks to what a defendant reasonably understood at the time of the plea. U.S. v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1986). The record must demonstrate that the defendant understands that he is waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right to confront accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); see also United States v. Anderson, 993 F.2d 1435, 1438 (9th Cir.1993) ().
The guilty plea agreement Hall signed on January 26, 2006, described the consequences of entering a guilty plea, including a mandatory sentence of life with possibility of parole after a minimum of ten years and lifetime supervision as a sex offender. ECF No. 20-13, p. 2-4. The agreement also notified Hall of the rights and privileges he was waiving by entering a plea of guilty, including his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right to confront accusers. Id., p. 4-5. Finally, the agreement also confirmed that Hall was signing the agreement voluntarily after consulting with his attorney. Id., p. 5-6.
At his plea canvass that same day, Hall confirmed in open court that he had committed the acts supporting the charge of lewdness with a child under the age of 14. ECF No. 20-12, p. 4. He also confirmed the he was entering a guilty plea "freely and voluntarily." Id., p. 4-5.
Prior to entering his guilty plea, Hall was examined by Dr. Gregory Brown, M.D., at defense counsel's request, to determine whether Hall was competent to...
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