Hall v. Kelley
| Decision Date | 19 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-738,CV-19-738 |
| Citation | 596 S.W.3d 1,2020 Ark. 123 |
| Parties | Luther X. HALL, Appellant v. Wendy KELLEY, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Luther X. Hall, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
Luther X. Hall appeals from the denial and dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl. 2016) in the county where Hall is incarcerated. Because Hall stated no ground in the petition on which the writ could issue under Arkansas law, we affirm the circuit court’s order.
Hall was convicted by a jury of two counts of capital murder. He was also convicted of one count of second-degree murder in a separate trial. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on the capital-murder charges and to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction. The cases were consolidated on appeal, and we affirmed. Hall v. State , 276 Ark. 245, 634 S.W.2d 115 (1982). At the time of his conviction for capital murder in June 1981, the trial court signed and filed the judgment that sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without parole, and a commitment order was issued by the clerk of the court to the Arkansas Department of Correction.
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Hall alleged that the judgment of conviction for capital murder was void because the judgment was signed by the presiding judge over thirty days after his conviction was handed down by the jury and because the presiding judge had not signed the commitment order issued by the clerk to the Department of Correction. The circuit court denied the petition concluding that Hall had not presented sufficient evidence to provide probable cause to believe that he was detained without lawful authority.
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon , 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Foreman v. State , 2019 Ark. 108, 571 S.W.3d 484. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris , 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007). When the circuit court has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and also has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court has authority to render the judgment. Johnson v. State , 298 Ark. 479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989).
Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his actual innocence and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or other evidence of probable cause to believe that he or she is illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). Proceedings for the writ are not intended to require an extensive review of the record of the trial proceedings, and the circuit court’s inquiry into the validity of the judgment is limited to the face of the judgment. McArthur v. State , 2019 Ark. 220, 577 S.W.3d 385. Unless the petitioner can show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the judgment was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Fields v. Hobbs , 2013 Ark. 416, 2013 WL 5775566.
Hall reiterates on appeal the allegations raised in his habeas petition and contends that the circuit court erred by rejecting his claims that the judgment is void due to the unsigned commitment order and the delay between the date of his conviction and the date the judgment was signed and filed. Hall argues that Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 22-317 (Repl. 1962) mandated that all orders from a circuit court "shall" be signed and "shall become effective when entered of record in the county where such action was filed." Hall asserts that under this statute, the trial court was required to sign the commitment order. Hall further contends that under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2(b)(2), a judgment or decree is entered when it is filed "irrespective of when it is recorded in the judgment record book." According to Hall, because the commitment order was not signed by the trial judge and did not bear a file mark, it is void under section 22-317 of the Arkansas statutes and Administrative Order No. 2, which, according to Hall, voided the judgment as well. The allegations cited above fail to state a claim for issuance of the writ. Section 22-317 of the Arkansas statutes pertains to orders entered by circuit courts either by consent of the parties or after a nonjury trial when the court takes the matter under advisement after the regular term of court has expired. This is made clear by Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 22-318 (Repl. 1962):
The purpose of this Act [§§ 22-314–22-318] is to better facilitate the disposition of court matters where the services of a jury are not required, and to expedite by consent of interested parties and counsel legal matters and actions which otherwise would be delayed until the regular convening of a term of court to save the costs of the same.
In view of the Act’s stated purpose, section 22-317 of the Arkansas statutes does not apply to an order of commitment issued in conjunction with a judgment of conviction that was entered following a trial by jury. Furthermore, Hall was convicted in 1981, and Administrative Order Number 2, which contains the language relied on by Hall, was not in effect until 1999. See In re Administrative Order No. 2 , 338 Ark. App'x 812 (1999). Finally, the same issue was raised and rejected in an appeal from the denial of a habeas petition in which this court found that there is no statutory requirement that the trial judge sign a commitment order. Henderson v. White , 2011 Ark. 361, 2011 Ark. 361 (per curiam).
Hall further contended that the judgment is void because it was entered over thirty days after his conviction. At the time of his capital-murder conviction, Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 43-2301 (Repl. 1977) and Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.4 provided that a judgment of the court may be postponed to a date not more than thirty days after a trial and conviction. This second claim for relief likewise fails to establish grounds for issuance of the writ. The written judgment was signed and entered "then as now," or nunc pro tunc, over thirty days after the jury returned its verdict. This court has concluded that entry of a judgment after thirty days has elapsed does not void the judgment because neither the controlling statute nor Rule 36.4 is mandatory as the statute and the rule specify that a judgment "may" be postponed and because the nunc pro tunc entry of judgments has long been the practice in Arkansas. Hoke v. State , 270 Ark. 134, 603 S.W.2d 412 (1980).
Hall also claims that the failure to sign the commitment order and the delay in signing the judgment violated his right to due process and equal protection. Assertions of trial error and due-process violations do not implicate the facial validity of a trial court’s judgment or jurisdiction and are not cognizable in habeas proceedings. Rea v. Kelley , 2019 Ark. 339, 588 S.W.3d 715. Halls’s equal-protection claim is likewise an assertion of trial error that is not cognizable in habeas proceedings. See Collier v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 170, 2018 WL 2251147.
Finally, Hall asserts that the circuit court erred when it failed to conduct a hearing on his habeas petition or to make sufficient findings in the order denying it. A hearing is not required if the petition does not allege either of the bases of relief cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Philyaw v. Kelley , 2015 Ark. 465, 477 S.W.3d 503. Hall’s argument that the circuit court failed to make sufficient findings is also unavailing. Pursuant to Rule 37.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the circuit court "shall make written findings to that effect, specifying any part of the files, or records that are relied upon to sustain the court’s findings," and the failure to do so is reversible error except in cases where it can be determined from the record that the petition is wholly without merit. Henington v. State , 2012 Ark. 181,...
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