Baker v. Norris
Decision Date | 12 April 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 06-830.,06-830. |
Citation | 369 Ark. 405,255 S.W.3d 466 |
Parties | Charles Alan BAKER, Appellant, v. Larry NORRIS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Charles Alan Baker, Little Rock, AR, pro se.
Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Laura Shue, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Pro se appellant Charles Alan Baker appeals from the circuit court's order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief brought against appellee Larry Norris, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction. His sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the circuit court's order.
A review of the record reveals that Baker's plea hearing was held in the Monroe County Circuit Court on August 4, 2004. At that hearing, the circuit court read aloud the following charges against Baker: possession of a controlled substance with intent, class Y; possession of a controlled substance, class B; possession of a firearm by a certain person, class B; escape in the second degree, class C; and attempted capital murder, class A. The prosecutor then presented its motion to the circuit court, in accord with plea negotiations:
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, the State has a motion subject to plea negotiations. State moves to nolle prosequi counts 1, 3, 4 and 5. Leaving Count 2, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia with Intent to Manufacture, Class B felony.
Following the circuit court's inquiry as to whether there were any objections, counsel for Baker stated that there were none and that "[t]hat is our understanding." The following colloquy then took place:
The circuit court then addressed Baker:
. . . .
The circuit court then inquired of Baker as to whether he had discussed the potential penalties and his right to a jury trial:
And finally, the circuit court inquired of Baker as to the facts and whether he did, in fact, commit the offense and also sentenced him in accordance with his negotiated plea:
. . . .
Subsequent to the hearing, a judgment and commitment order was entered on August 5, 2004, reflecting that Baker entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401 (Pamph.No. 2, Sept. 2002), and that he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. On August 30, 2004, the Department of Correction completed a time computation card that only reflected Baker's prior conviction for criminal conspiracy. It indicated that he was eligible for transfer on January 4, 2005, and had a discharge date of December 2, 2009.
On October 29, 2004, an amended judgment and commitment order was entered by the circuit court, reflecting that Baker had negotiated a plea of guilty to the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-403 (Pamph.No. 2, Sept. 2002), and sentencing him to 180 months' imprisonment. (Emphasis added.) On November 9, 2004, the Department of Correction completed another time computation card, which reflected the addition of his drug paraphernalia conviction. Accordingly, Baker's new eligibility date for transfer was August 18, 2013, and his discharge date was computed to be February 17, 2018.
On March 29, 2006, Baker filed an affidavit in support of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. In it, he claimed that on August 4, 2004, he agreed to enter a guilty plea to the charge of criminal conspiracy to manufacture and delivery and possession of methamphetamine. He stated that he was told that he would be sentenced and that he would plead guilty to the charge under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401 and that he was advised that he would receive a fifteen-year sentence to be served concurrently with a prior conviction. He claimed that he was told that he would be required to serve only one-half of his sentence, minus statutory credits for good time, and that he would receive 533 days of credit for time served. He specifically stated that he "was never informed by [his] trial counsel, the prosecuting attorney, o[r] the trial court before or at the guilty plea trial that [he] would be pleading guilty to a A.C.A. § 5-64-403 violation that [w]ould require [him] to serve 70% of [his] sentence before being parole eligible." Finally, he asserted that neither he nor his counsel was present "when the trial court changed the nature of the sentence origionally [sic] imposed and amended the judgment so that [his] conviction would be pursuant to § 5-64-403 rather than under the statute, A.C.[A]. 5-64-401 that [he] agreed to plead guilty to[,]" nor did they receive notice that the order would be changed.
On March 30, 2006, Baker filed his petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. In it, he claimed that the Monroe County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to amend his judgment and commitment order without notice to him and without him being afforded the right to be present and represented by counsel. He further asserted that the amended judgment and commitment order clearly prejudiced him by altering the nature and degree of his punishment. In addition, he claimed that because he had already pled guilty to a violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401, the amended judgment and commitment order convicting him under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-403 violated his double-jeopardy rights. For these reasons, he claimed, the amended judgment and commitment order was invalid on its face.
On April 19, 2006, the Attorney General's Office, on behalf of appellee Norris, filed a motion to dismiss Baker's petition. In it, the State conceded that the original judgment and commitment order did list the incorrect code section under which Baker was sentenced. However, the State asserted, the statutory reference was a clerical error, which was corrected by the amended judgment and commitment order to properly reflect the offense to which Baker actually pled guilty. Based on the clerical nature of the correction, the State averred that Baker's petition for habeas relief should be dismissed with prejudice, as he did not challenge the facial invalidity of the amended judgment and commitment order and because the jurisdiction of the circuit...
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...8, 534 S.W.3d 136. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris , 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007). A circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes. Lo......
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