Hall v. McCoy

• Decision Date: 16 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 7:99-CV-0039.,CIV. A. 7:99-CV-0039.
• Citation: 89 F.Supp.2d 742
• Parties: Barry HALL, Plaintiff, v. K. McCOY, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, John Doe # 3, John Doe # 4, and John Doe # 5, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

89 F.Supp.2d 742

Barry HALL, Plaintiff, v. K. McCOY, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, John Doe # 3, John Doe # 4, and John Doe # 5, Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 7:99-CV-0039.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division.

February 16, 2000.

Barry Hall, Pound, Pro se.

Christopher Garrett Hill, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for K. McCoy, Sgt., defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILSON, Chief Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Barry Hall ("Hall"), an inmate at Red Onion State Prison in Pound, Virginia, brings this action against K. McCoy ("McCoy") and John Does # 15, correctional officers at Red Onion (collectively, the "officers"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hall alleges that the officers subjected him to excessive force in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and seeks monetary damages.¹ The officers move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) to dismiss the action on the ground that Hall failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For reasons stated below, the court grants the officers' motion and dismisses the case without prejudice.

I.

Since this matter raises essentially procedural questions, only a short summary of the facts alleged by Hall is necessary. In the early morning of January 6, 1999, Hall was placed in the B-4 recreational yard at Red Onion for a one-hour period of recreation. Upon entering the yard, Hall was accosted by another inmate and the two began to fight. An unknown correctional officer observed the fight, fired a warning shot, and verbally ordered Hall and his counterpart to lie on the ground. Both inmates complied with the order and the fight ended. A number of officers then arrived at the yard and McCoy ordered Hall toward the recreation yard door. When Hall reached the door, several officers handcuffed and leg-shackled him. After he was shackled, McCoy told the officers, "this is the second time that we have had to shoot at this son of a bitch .... Take him to his cell and deal with him." At that time several officers shoved Hall face-first into a cement wall, and another officer struck Hall in the side of his head with an open hand, driving Hall's head into the wall. Several officers then dragged Hall up a flight of steel stairs to Hall's cell, and upon arriving at the cell, the officers pinned Hall to his bed with Hall's head and neck twisted awkwardly underneath his body. As a result of the officers' conduct, Hall suffered extreme pain, various minor injuries, and emotional distress.

Red Onion has a grievance procedure for inmates who have complaints against correctional officers. The grievance procedure does not, however, allow for money awards to successful claimants. Hall filed his complaint in this court on June 4, 1999, and has not availed himself of the Red Onion grievance procedure.

II.

This case presents two questions, both unresolved in this circuit: (1) whether 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which requires prisoners bringing action "with respect to prison conditions" under § 1983 to exhaust administrative remedies, applies to claims of excessive force; and if so, (2) whether such remedies must be exhausted even if the prisoner seeks only monetary damages and the administrative remedy does not provide for monetary relief. The court finds that § 1997e(a) applies to excessive force claims, and that Hall must exhaust his administrative remedies even though the Red Onion prison grievance procedure is incapable of offering him monetary relief. The court will consider the questions of exhaustion and futility separately.

A.

Section 1997e(a) was enacted as part of the PLRA, and provides:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Hall contends that the phrase "with respect to prison conditions" does not extend to allegations of excessive force. Neither the Supreme Court not any circuit has considered this question, and the district courts that have addressed it are divided, some finding that § 1997e(a) contemplates excessive force claims² and others holding to the contrary.³

Since this question is one of statutory construction, analysis properly begins with the plain meaning of the statutory language; if the plain meaning is unambiguous, the court's task is finished and the statute must be applied according to its plain meaning. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990); Patten v. United States, 116 F.3d 1029, 1035 (4th Cir.1997). However, if the operative statutory language is ambiguous, the court must refer to the statute's "legislative history, prior interpretations, related statutes, and the underlying congressional purpose and public policy considerations" to ascertain its purpose. United States v. Jackson, 759 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir.1985).

The text of § 1997e(a) does not itself provide an answer to this question. Although the plain meaning of the phrase "prison conditions" can be understood to encompass excessive force claims, see Johnson v. Garraghty, 57 F.Supp.2d at 326, a number of courts have interpreted the phrase to refer only to "medical treatment, food, clothing, and the nature and circumstances of the housing available in prison." Carter, 1999 WL 14014, at *3. See also Wright, 54 F.Supp.2d at 203-04; Baskerville, 1998 WL 778396, at *3; White, 19 F.Supp.2d at 313-15; Johnson, 1998 WL 292421, at *3; Rodriguez, 992 F.Supp. 592 at 592-93. The court concludes that the language of of § 1997e(a) is facially ambiguous, a decision buttressed by the split between the district courts that have addressed this question. The court must therefore look to secondary sources to determine the text's meaning.

Section 1997e does not define "prison conditions." However, § 3636(g)(2) of Title 18, enacted as part of the PLRA to address suits by prisoners for injunctions and other forms of prospective relief, defines the phrase "civil actions with respect to prison conditions" as "any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3636(g)(2). A natural reading of this definition clearly encompasses excessive force claims as "effects of actions by government officials" on the lives of prisoners. This definition applies with equal force in interpreting the phrase "prison conditions" in § 1997e(a), since it is a "well-established canon of statutory construction that words have the same meaning throughout a given statute." Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir.1997); see Russo v. Trifari, Krussman, & Fishel, Inc., 837 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir.1988) ("Construing identical language in an single statute in para materia is both traditional and logical.").

This interpretation of § 1997e(a) finds further support in the legislative history and overall purpose of the PLRA. A review of the legislative history surrounding the PLRA indicates that "Congress was primarily concerned about the rising number of lawsuits filed by prisoners and the perception that most of these suits were frivolous." Cruz, 80 F.Supp.2d at 113.⁴ A broad, mandatory administrative exhaustion requirement effectuates the principal goal of the PLRA by relieving the judiciary of the burden of addressing frivolous excessive force claims. Additionally, requiring exhaustion will render less burdensome those excessive force cases which do reach the district courts, since the prison grievance system will have produced preliminary fact-findings and an organized record,⁵ and an absolute exhaustion requirement is "particularly sensible because excessive force claims typically come packaged ... with other, related claims indisputably subject to § 1997e(a)." Johnson v. Garraghty, 57 F.Supp.2d at 327. To allow a prisoner to bring an excessive force claim directly to district court while directing the prisoner's other, related claims to a prison grievance procedure would unnecessarily bifurcate and complicate the litigation process—precisely the outcome that the PLRA was designed to forestall.

Courts that have interpreted § 1997e(a) to exclude excessive force claims have relied principally on two justifications, both of which this court finds unpersuasive. First, the courts cite to an earlier version of the PLRA which provided in relevant part:

[I]n any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interest of justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.

In addition to providing the district court with discretion in determining whether to require administrative exhaustion, this language also differs from the present version of § 1997e(a) in that it does not include the phrase "with respect to prison conditions." Some courts have drawn from the addition of this language into the present § 1997e(a) that Congress reduced the scope of the statute, and therefore that including excessive force claims in the current statute would not give a "real and substantial effect" to the amendment. White, 19 F.Supp.2d at 314. The fact that Congress limited the scope of § 1997e(a) to actions brought "with respect to prison conditions" does not necessarily mean, however, that excessive force claims are the subset of cases to...