Hall v. State

• Citation: 26 So.2d 566,248 Ala. 33
• Decision Date: 13 June 1946
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 413.
• Parties: HALL v. STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

26 So.2d 566

248 Ala. 33

HALL v. STATE.

6 Div. 413.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 13, 1946

F F. Windham, of Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

Wm. N. McQueen, Atty. Gen., and Jas. T. Hardin Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

On examination of the witness Kahn, defendant propounded this question:

'I want to ask you about one other question and get the ruling on it. I will ask you, Doctor, if in your opinion based upon the experience and study you have made of him, in your opinion his mind is so defective mentally as to destroy his power to choose between right and wrong, and his free agency was destroyed to such an extent that he was incapable of avoiding the commission of the act in question at the time it was alleged to have been committed?'

The Court sustained the objection of the State to this question and defendant reserved an exception.

GARDNER, Chief Justice.

The appeal is from a judgment of conviction for the offense of rape, with punishment fixed at imprisonment for 23 years. Defendant, recently discharged from the Army, was 23 years of age.

The alleged victim of the assault, Mrs. Verner McKinley, resided in the country beyond Northport and about six miles from the City of Tuscaloosa, where she and her husband had resided alone for some 11 years. While Mr. McKinley was away at work and Mrs. McKinley was alone in the house, about 1:30 p.m. of August 15, 1945, the defendant Louis Hall knocked on the front door and was admitted. It appears that defendant had attended school where Mrs. McKinley had taught in 1936, 1937 and 1938, and she had not seen him since he had left the school in 1938. She states that after some few moments she recognized him as her former pupil; whereupon she opened the door, let him in, and asked him to have a seat.

Mrs. McKinley had been married some 20 years, and had taught school for practically that length of time. She talked to the defendant some time in the house, and states in her testimony that in order to terminate the visit she went into the yard and was followed by this defendant. He made frequent requests for water, and in the course of time--without further detail--Mrs. McKinley became suspicious that perhaps he was there for some ulterior motive. She went back into the house, concealed some money that had been left on the table, gathered her car keys, and went about some household duties, but defendant followed her into the house. Finally, as she started out the back door to go to her car, which was in the garage, her testimony is to the effect that he grabbed her by the throat, choked her, forcibly threw her to the floor, and had intercourse with her; that during this time she was resisting him with all her power while he threatened her and choked her. Getting up from the floor she rushed to her car, with the defendant following her. As he tried to get in the car she placed it in reverse so as to knock him down and escape to her brother-in-law's house, some one mile away.

The evidence is practically without dispute that there were scratches on her face, bruises on her hips and knees, and abrasions on her neck, all of which tended strongly to corroborate her testimony. Upon arriving in her car at the home of her brother-in-law, the State was permitted to prove, and properly so, that Mrs. McKinley made immediate complaint concerning the attack. On direct examination such testimony is confined to the fact of the complaint; and details of the occurrence, including the identity of the person accused, are not proper subjects of inquiry. This is the well-established rule by numerous decisions, quite a number to be found cited in the recent case of Lee v. State, 246 Ala. 69, 18 So.2d 706. This rule was violated in the instant case in that the solicitor was permitted to show by the witness that, in addition to the complaint of the attack, she also named Louis Hall as the accused person.

But to the indictment in the case the defendant plead not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity. And upon the plea of not guilty, he insisted that he was not only present at the time stated by Mrs. McKinley, but that he had intercourse with her and with her consent. Under these circumstances, therefore, we would not be willing, in view of Supreme Court Rule 45, Appendix p. 1022, Vol. II, Code 1940, Tit. 7, to rest a reversal upon this erroneous ruling, as upon a consideration of the whole record it could not be said to have prejudicially affected any substantial right of the defendant.

Mrs. McKinley testified rather fully as to the details of the attack, and the statements to which objections were interposed to the effect that 'he just choked me to death' and that he 'did accomplish his purpose' were but shorthand renditions of facts, the details of which were subsequently given. There was no error in these rulings.

It is quite apparent from the record that the greater reliance for defense was upon the issue of insanity. There was evidence of hereditary taint, both upon the paternal and maternal sides of defendant's family, and defendant testified to confinement in military institutions for the insane while in the Army. He had, prior to his induction in the Army, been in the State institution for the feeble-minded at Tuscaloosa.

But our cases are in accord with the general current of authority that mere weakness of mind, standing alone, does not negative discriminating intelligence as required for responsibility for crime. Dean v. State, 105 Ala. 21, 17 So. 28; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 58, pp. 122, 123; 44 A.L.R. p. 586 et seq.

But upon the question of insanity a wide range of evidence is allowable. 'It has become a maxim of the law that in cases where insanity is relied upon as a defense, 'Every act of the party's life is relevant to the issue.'' Brothers v. State, 236 Ala. 448, 183 So. 433, 435.

Of course, as pointed out in Coffey v. State, 244 Ala. 514, 14 So.2d 122, this broad expression must be understood to carry the necessary limitation that the acts inquired about must throw some light upon the inquiry. The Coffey case furnishes an apt illustration of this limitation.

And our decisions are uniform to the effect that the issue of insanity gives much latitude, both to the defendant and the State, for the introduction of evidence of defendant's acts, declarations, and conduct, prior and subsequent to the alleged crime. Illustrative of subsequent conduct is the recent case of George v. State, 240 Ala. 632, 200 So. 602, where, upon the question of insanity, it was held that the defendant's attempt at suicide subsequent to the alleged crime was admissible. See also Coffey v. State and Brothers v. State, supra, with the numerous authorities therein cited.

This question was given rather lengthy consideration in the early case of McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672, in which the Court observed:

'The court ruled that neither the prisoner's acts nor declarations, after the alleged offense was committed, could be received as evidence of insanity at the time the act was done. In this view we think the judge clearly mistook the law. Insanity, or a diseased state of the mind, must be proved to the jury, like other diseases, or facts, and it is laid down generally, that evidence of the state of his mind, both before and after the act done, is admissible.' The opinion in that case proceeds to answer the argument to the contrary, particularly that based upon the theory the defendant could feign insanity subsequent to the offense. To this argument the opinion replies that the jury are the appropriate judges of the weight to be attached to such evidence. The rule there announced has, as above indicated, been subsequently followed in numerous decisions.

In line with this rule defendant offered to show by the jailer that after the commission of the crime, and while the defendant was incarcerated in the jail, he had a fit of a violent character which required the services of a physician. The Court remarked: 'You are asking about a time since the crime was committed. I will sustain the objection.' Evidence in regard to a defendant having fits appears to have been received without objection in McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672. And we think the...