Hall v. State

• Decision Date: 13 November 1919
• Citation: 78 Fla. 420,83 So. 513
• Parties: HALL v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

83 So. 513

78 Fla. 420

HALL v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

November 13, 1919

Error to Circuit Court, Walton County; A. G. Campbell, Judge.

Marion Hall was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

If in the examination of jurors upon their voir dire in a criminal case it appears that a certain juror is unqualified, but the court refuses to sustain the defendant's challenge for cause, who afterwards excuses the juror by a peremptory challenge, the court's ruling will not be regarded as harmful error.

The question of the qualification of a veniremen is a judicial one, and is addressed to the court's discretion; any alleged error in the court's ruling upon a juror's qualification therefore should be made affirmatively to appear, and that it was harmful to the defendant, to constitute reversible error.

The admission in evidence of a photograph of a house at which a homicide was committed and a photograph of the interior of the room in which it was committed, which photograph showed white spots indicating the places upon the floor where the persons fell who were shot, is not erroneous, where such photographs do not themselves constitute a picture version or interpretation of the character of the actual occurrence.

It is not error for the court in the trial of a criminal cause to admit in evidence the defendant's voluntary and noncommittal account or statement to the sheriff of the transaction upon which the charge against the defendant rests.

Where in a prosecution for murder the sanity of the defendant at the time of the alleged crime is a material issue, it is proper to receive in evidence the opinions of nonexpert witnesses as to the defendant's mental condition when such opinions are based upon facts, circumstances, and transactions in the defendant's life observed and noted by the witnesses, who should detail such facts circumstances, and transactions in their testimony.

Where nonexpert witnesses are offered in behalf of defendant as to his mental condition, and such witnesses can recall no facts in the defendant's life tending to show insanity, but are permitted to express their opinions concerning his insanity the court's action in allowing such evidence to be introduced at defendant's request will not constitute reversible error, where he instructs the jury that it is admitted 'for what it is worth.'

A charge, requested by defendant, which conveys the idea that if the jury, considering any portion of the evidence necessary to a conviction, entertain a reasonable doubt as to its verity, they should acquit him, is erroneous.

The 'reasonable doubt' which the law provides shall acquit a defendant is one that arises in the minds of the jury after considering, comparing, and weighing all the evidence in the case.

Where the court charges the jury correctly upon reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence, it is not error to refuse an instruction in behalf of the defendant that he is presumed to be innocent, and that presumption goes to the jury as independent evidence.

It is not error for the trial court to refuse requested instructions which are substantially covered by charges which the court has given.

A requested instruction, which conveys the idea that the rule of reasonable doubt applies to each individual juror and segregates the jury as a body into individual parts and requires each one to be free from reasonable doubt before the jury can return a verdict, is erroneous.

In a prosecution of a person for murder where the sanity of the accused at the time of the commission of the alleged offense is a material issue, the doctrine of irrosistible impulse or moral insanity is not recognized in this state as a defense.

Drunkenness as an excuse for the commission of an unlawful act is no defense, and mitigates no degree of unlawful homicide, except murder in the first degree, where drunkenness may be so complete as to eliminate the possibility of entertaining a premeditated design to kill, unless as a result of drunkenness there is a fixed or settled frenzy or insanity either permanent or intermittent.

A requested instruction, which is designed to direct the jury's attention to any particular witness or set of witnesses, segregate them from the entire body of witnesses or to separate any fact from all the material facts sought to be established, and give such witness or witnesses or fact undue prominence or importance, either for the purpose of disparaging the witnesses or strengthening the testimony, is erroneous.

A requested instruction, which directed the jury when a state witness exhibited bias or ill will towards the defendant or gave evidence that the jury did not believe, they should nevertheless weigh the evidence of such witness in the light of such bias or ill will, was correctly refused.

An instruction, which directed the jury to acquit the defendant if the jury did not believe that the defendant had understanding or intelligence to commit murder by reason of being intoxicated, was properly refused.

Intoxication as an excuse for the commission of murder in the first degree does not apply to murder in the other degrees.

Evidence examined, and found sufficient to support the verdict.

COUNSEL Sollie & Sollie, of Ozark, Ala., and Daniel Campbell & Son, of De Funiak Springs, for plaintiff in error.

Van C. Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and D. Stuart Gillis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

ELLIS J.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of the murder of Arnold Mitchell in the circuit court for Walton county during January of 1919, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He seeks here a reversal of the judgment on writ of error.

There are over 133 assignments of error numbered from 1 to 131, two numbers, 87 and 106, being repeated. Many of the assignments of error are duplications. Assignments from 7 to 58 are repeated in assignments numbered from 62 to 111, which attack the court's refusal to give certain requested instructions to the jury. Assignments numbered from 118 to 131 attack the charge given by the court. Other assignments of error attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and the court's rulings in the admission and rejection of evidence.

The facts in the case are few. The circumstances of the homicide which were exceptionally harsh to the point of brutality are practically undisputed in any detail. The defense was that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or some intoxicating liquor to that degree where it could legally be said that he was insane, and therefore irresponsible for his act, or was incapable of entertaining a premeditated design to take the life of the deceased or any person, and therefore could not be guilty of murder in the first degree.

On the night of December 25, 1918, Charlie Carter, father-in-law to the deceased, who was living with him at the time, gave a party at his home, at which many people in the neighborhood attended. Dancing was continued late into the night. It was observed that whisky, in bottles, large and small, was plentiful, and that the defendant drank some of it, although the matter of his soberness or intoxication was disputed. Sometime during the late evening the defendant, who had been dancing with a certain lady guest, left the room during the dance, and his place was taken by Alvin Miller for the remainder of that dance, or set, as it was called. Soon another set was begun, and the defendant returned to the room and claimed the lady with whom he had been dancing for a partner. It was explained to him that the set which was on when he left had been finished, and the one now on was a new one. This explanation seemed not to please the defendant, who appeared to entertain the idea that his dignity, gallantry, or bravery was impugned. He directed his resentment toward Arnold Mitchell, who had invited the lady to dance with him and whose invitation had been accepted. This lady, observing the displeased and resentful man, sought to pacify his feelings and restore his composure by offering to dance with him, and turned from Arnold Mitchell with that purpose. This action seemed to have the contrary effect, for the defendant immediately drew his revolver, AND, AFTER SHOOTING DOWN CHARLIE CARTER, the host of the evening, Who seemEd to be in the way of defendant's anger, he caught the deceased in the collar with one hand, fired the pistol into his body, and, while the victim was on the floor, his head being supported by his wife, the defendant walked around the body and fired several more bullets into it, remarking as he left the room, 'By God, I reckon you will dance now,' or, 'I guess, by God, you are dead now.' Just before the defendant fired the first time he said, 'Arnold Mitchell, G----- d----- you; I am going to kill you.'

There was much evidence as to the defendant's habits of drink but as to his intoxication on the night of the homicide the evidence was conflicting. The evidence of the man's insanity was sought to be established by witnesses in the neghborhood and vicinity, who had known him for years and observed his conduct. These witnesses said in substance that the defendant had drunk whisky since he was about 15 years old, that of late years he had consumed more than usual; that when he was not drinking 'he didn't act so curious'; that since he had been drinking so heavily of late 'he acted like a different man'; that as the years went on the defendant's habit of drinking intoxicating liquors became 'worse and worse,' and he acted 'less like a man in his mind.' One witness, Sell Knowling, who was first cousin to the defendant and who was with him a great deal, a kind of companion, or comrade, said that the defendant was a ...