Hall v. Summit Contractors, Inc.

Decision Date08 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-709.,03-709.
Citation356 Ark. 609,158 S.W.3d 185
PartiesCleo HALL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of James A. Neasley, Deceased v. SUMMIT CONTRACTORS, INC., Henry Winberry, A J Winberry, Joe Parker, David Wall, Richard Carey, HRH Safety & Health Systems, Inc., and John Does 1-50.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Eugene J. Mazzanti, Little Rock, for appellant.

Anderson, Murphy & Hopkins, L.L.P., by: Scott D. Provencher, Little Rock, for appellee HRH Safety and Health Systems.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Alston Jennings, Jr., Little Rock, for appellee Summit Contractors.

TOM GLAZE, Justice.

This is an appeal from a wrongful-death case. In January of 1997, James Arthur Neasley, a resident of Pulaski County, was working at the construction site of an apartment complex in Memphis, Tennessee. Appellee Summit Contractors was the contractor at the site. On January 16, Neasley was erecting trusses on the top of the building under construction when he fell to the ground and sustained injuries that required the removal of his kidney, partial removal of his colon, and exploratory abdominal surgery. Neasley died from complications from his injuries on February 7, 1997.

On November 12, 1999, Neasley's mother, appellant Cleo Hall, filed a wrongful-death suit in Pulaski County Circuit Court against Summit Contractors and a number of John Doe defendants. By way of a second amended complaint, filed on October 30, 2000, Hall added HRH Safety and Health Systems ("HRH") as a defendant. HRH had contracted with Summit Contractors to develop and implement a safety program at the construction site where Neasley was working at the time of his accident. A fourth amended complaint added breach-of-contract claims against HRH.

On November 14, 2001, HRH filed a motion for summary judgment,1 alleging, among other things, that because the accident and injuries occurred in Tennessee, Hall's action was barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations governing wrongful-death lawsuits. HRH contended that Hall's initial complaint was time barred because she did not file her complaint until almost three years after Neasley's accident; her second amended complaint, adding HRH, was not filed until more than three and a half years after Neasley's death.

The trial court granted the summary-judgment motions filed by HRH and Summit, finding that Tennessee's one-year limitations period applied and barred Hall's action, rather than Arkansas' three-year statute of limitations governing wrongful-death claims. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-202 (1987). Because Hall had outstanding claims against other defendants, she requested, and the trial court agreed to enter, an order certifying Hall's interlocutory appeal of the order granting summary judgment. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Hall raises the following three points for reversal: 1) her claims against HRH and Summit are not barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations; 2) her cause of action is not barred by the application of the Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitation Act, particularly § 16-56-202; and 3) her second amended complaint was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations provided by the Arkansas wrongful-death statute.

Our standard of review for summary judgment cases is well established. Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stephens v. Petrino, 350 Ark. 268, 86 S.W.3d 836 (2002); City of Barling v. Fort Chaffee Redev. Auth., 347 Ark. 105, 60 S.W.3d 443 (2001). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try the issues, but to determine whether there are any issues to be tried. BPS, Inc. v. Parker, 345 Ark. 381, 47 S.W.3d 858 (2001).

As noted above, Hall challenges the trial court's finding that, under § 16-56-202, Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations was applicable, rather than Arkansas' three-year statute. Section 16-56-202 provides in pertinent part that, "if a claim is substantially based... [u]pon the law of one (1) other state, the limitation period of that state shall apply." § 16-56-202(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Commissioners' Comment to this section notes that the Act "treats limitation periods as substantive, to be governed by the limitations law of a state whose law governs other substantive issues inherent in the claim. This is true whether the limitation period of the substantively governing law is longer or shorter than that of the forum's law." Comment to § 16-56-202. Thus, if Hall's claim was "substantially based" on the law of Tennessee, under § 16-56-202, her claim would be barred by that state's one-year statute of limitations.

Tennessee's applicable statute of limitations is found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1), which provides that "[a]ctions for... injuries to the person" shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. Tennessee cases have been clear for more than a century that this statute of limitations applies to wrongful-death actions. See Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332 (Tenn.2001); Gosnell v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984); Jones v. Black, 539 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn.1976); Whaley v. Catlett, 103 Tenn. 347, 53 S.W. 131 (1899).

Clearly, the wrongful-death claim was substantially based on Tennessee law: the construction job where Neasley went to work was in Tennessee; Neasley, who lived in Arkansas, purposely went to Tennessee to take part in the construction job; the accident that caused Neasley's death took place in Tennessee; and any negligence that led up to that accident occurred in Tennessee. In sum, it is readily apparent that the lawsuit was substantially based on Tennessee law, and therefore subject to Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations.

We note that the Arkansas General Assembly repealed the Arkansas Limitations Act by enacting Act 310 of 1999; however, that change is of no import. Here, Neasley died in February of 1997. At the time when our state legislature repealed its Limitations Act (Act 310 was approved on February 25, 1999), Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations had already expired; Hall's wrongful-death claim was therefore time-barred in that state. This court has held that the legislature may retroactively increase the length of a statute-of-limitations period to cover claims already in existence, but it "may not expand a limitation period so as to revive a claim already barred." Chunn v. D'Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 847 S.W.2d 699 (1993) (emphasis added); Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992). In Johnson, supra, this court explained the reason for this rule as follows:

[W]e have long taken the view, along with a majority of the other states, that the legislature cannot expand a statute of limitation so as to revive a cause of action already barred. Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6, 164 S.W. 752 (1914); Couch v. McKee, 6 Ark. 484 (1846). In Wasson v. State ex. rel. Jackson, 187 Ark. 537, 60 S.W.2d 1020 (1933), this court wrote:

In most jurisdictions it is held that, after a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense, and neither a constitutional convention nor the Legislature has power to divest that right and revive the cause of action. Where title to property has vested under a statute of limitation, it is not possible by an enactment to extend or revive the remedy since this would impair a vested right in the property.

Id. at 538, 60 S.W.2d at 1020-21 (quoting 6 R.C.L., p. 309).

Johnson, 308 Ark. at 203-04, 823 S.W.2d 883 (emphasis added).

As noted above, § 16-56-202 was still in effect at the time of Neasley's accident and death. Therefore, because the claim was substantially based on Tennessee law, the Tennessee statute of limitations applied to the claim. Once that one-year statute of limitations expired in February of 1998, the defendants in this case had "a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense," Johnson, supra, and the legislature's subsequent repeal of the Limitations Act could not revive a claim that was already time-barred.2

Hall raises an...

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