Miller v. Subiaco Academy
| Decision Date | 02 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-2025.,05-2025. |
| Citation | 386 F.Supp.2d 1025 |
| Parties | Joffre MILLER, Plaintiff v. SUBIACO ACADEMY and Nicholas Fuhrmann, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Lori A. Watson and Sam Sexton, for Plaintiff.
William A. Waddell, Jr. and Matthew Horan, for Defendant.
Currently before the Court is Separate Defendant Subiaco Academy's (hereinafter "Subiaco") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 2) for failure to bring the cause of action during the applicable statute of limitations. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Response to Subiaco's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) and Subiaco's Reply. (Doc. 15.)
I. Motion to dismiss standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir.1996). A complaint shall not be dismissed for its failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim entitling him to relief. Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking, 140 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.1998). However, we are "free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." See Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir.2002); see also Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1051, 1058 (8th Cir.2002) (). Complaints should be liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor and "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [him or her] to relief." Rucci v. City of Pacific, 327 F.3d 651, 652 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
Plaintiff asserts that his cause of action is viable based on two Arkansas statutes: Arkansas Code Annotated (hereinafter "A.C.A.") § 16-56-130 and A.C.A. § 16-56-120. Subiaco argues that neither of these statutes operate to permit Plaintiff's cause of action to go forward.
A.C.A. § 16-56-130 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other statute of limitations or any other provision of law that can be construed to reduce the statutory period set forth in this section, any civil action based on sexual abuse which occurred when the injured person was a minor, but is not discovered until after the injured person reaches the age of majority, shall be brought within three (3) years from the time of discovery of the sexual abuse by the injured party.
(b)(1) A claim based on an assertion of more than one (1) act of sexual abuse is not limited to the injured party's first discovery of the relationship between any one (1) of those acts and the injury or condition, but may be based on the injured party's discovery of the effect of the series of acts.
(2) It is not necessary for the injured party to establish which act in a series of acts of childhood sexual abuse caused the injury or condition that is the subject of the lawsuit.
(c) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Childhood sexual abuse" means sexual abuse which occurred when the injured person was a minor;
(2) "Minor" means a person of less than eighteen (18) years of age; and
(3) "Time of discovery" means when the injured party discovers the effect of the injury or condition attributable to the childhood sexual abuse.
A.C.A. § 16-56-130. The Statute provides it is applicable to all actions filed on or after its effective date of August 13, 1993.
The Plaintiff argues that his complaint was filed in 2005, after the effective date of the Act. Plaintiff states he only discovered the effect of the injury attributable to the alleged abuse within the past three (3) years and therefore that his claim falls within the provisions of this statute. Plaintiff further argues the United States Supreme Court has held that in all cases except those involving title to property, a legislature can, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, extend or repeal a statute of limitation, even after the cause of action has been barred. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483 (1885). The Arkansas Supreme Court has long held that the legislature may retroactively increase the length of a statute of limitations period to cover claims already in existence; however, it "may not expand a limitation period so as to revive a claim already barred." See Hall v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 356 Ark. 609, 158 S.W.3d 185 (2004); Chunn v. D'Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 847 S.W.2d 699 (1993); Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992). In Johnson, supra, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained the reason for this rule as follows: "[W]e have long taken the view, along with a majority of the other states, that the legislature cannot expand a statute of limitation so as to revive a cause of action already barred." Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6, 164 S.W. 752, (1914); Couch v. McKee, 6 Ark. 484 (1846). In Wasson v. State ex. rel. Jackson, 187 Ark. 537, 60 S.W.2d 1020 (1933), the Arkansas Supreme Court wrote: "In most jurisdictions it is held that, after a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense, and neither a constitutional convention nor the legislature has power to divest that right and revive the cause of action." It is clear to the Court that in Johnson v. Lilly, and recently in Hall v. Summit Contractors, the Arkansas Supreme Court has demonstrated its commitment to the concept that the legislature cannot expand a statute of limitation that would revive a cause of action already time barred notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's position that such an enlargement of a statute of limitations under certain circumstances may not be unconstitutional.
For purposes of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), statutes of limitations are treated as substantive law. See Jinks v. Richland County, S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 465, 123 S.Ct. 1667, 155 L.Ed.2d 631 (2003); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945). Thus, this Court, sitting in diversity, must follow the Arkansas Supreme Court's clear, uninterrupted precedent disallowing the revival of actions that were previously time barred by the expiration of another statute of limitations. Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that a plain reading of the statute evidences a legislative intent militating toward a retroactive application of the 1993 statute to the facts at bar. As of this date, there is no published opinion interpreting A.C.A. § 16-56-130. This Court makes no comment on the plain reading of the instant statute nor its legislative intent, but rather we decide this issue by following the clear Arkansas Supreme Court precedents mandated by the Erie Doctrine. In our case, Plaintiff alleged abuse that occurred between 1976 and 1979 while he was a minor. At the time of the alleged abuse, and at the time the Plaintiff reached his majority, the relevant statute of limitations was A.C.A. § 16-56-116. A.C.A. § 16-56-116 provides:
(a) If any person entitled to bring any action under any law of this state is, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, under twenty-one (21) years of age, or insane, that person may bring the action within three (3) years next after attaining full age, or within three (3) years next after the disability is removed.
(b) No person shall avail himself of any disability unless the disability existed at the time the right of action accrued.
(c) When two (2) or more disabilities are existing at the time the right of action or entry accrued, the limitation prescribed shall not attach until all the disabilities are removed.
The question of "full age" is determined by A.C.A § 9-25-101, which provides in part: Id.
It is apparent that the statute of limitations is tolled when any person who is entitled to bring an action, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action is under eighteen (18) years of age. Inasmuch as it is apparent that Plaintiff became eighteen, or reached "full age" in 1980, any disability of age was removed many years ago. Consequently, the Court is in agreement with Subiaco that Plaintiff's cause of action, tolled under A.C.A. § 16-56-116 until three years after Plaintiff reached the age of majority, became time-barred in 1983 by the terms of the statute. Moreover, in light of the Arkansas Supreme Court precedents recited above, A.C.A. § 16-56-130, enacted in 1993, cannot be used to revive the barred claim.
Based on the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that Plaintiff's claim is time barred by operation of A.C.A. § 16-56-116; and A.C.A. § 16-56-130, enacted in 1993, cannot be used to revive the barred claim. Consequently, the Court shall analyze whether the common law fraudulent concealment doctrine or A.C.A. § 16-56-120 allows Plaintiff's claim to be brought.
III. Common Law Fraudulent Concealment and A.C.A. § 16-56-120
The Court concluded above that A.C.A. § 16-56-116 had the effect of time-barring Plaintiff's Complaint at some point in 1983. The Plaintiff next contends that fraudulent concealment under common law or A.C.A. § 16-56-120 tolls the application of A.C.A. § 16-56-116. A.C.A. § 16-56-120 provides:
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...as tolling a statute of limitation until a plaintiff reaches the "full age" of eighteen, not twenty-one. Miller v. Subiaco Acad., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (W.D. Ark. 2005) ("The question of 'full age' is determined by Ark. Code Ann. § 9—25—101....It is apparent that the statute of limitat......