Hall v. Western Travelers Accident Association

• Decision Date: 03 July 1903
• Docket Number: 13,145
• Parties: THOMAS L. HALL v. WESTERN TRAVELERS ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

96 N.W. 170

69 Neb. 601

THOMAS L. HALL v. WESTERN TRAVELERS ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION

No. 13,145

Supreme Court of Nebraska

July 3, 1903

ERROR to the district court for Douglas county: WILLARD W SLABAUGH, DISTRICT JUDGE. Affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Thomas L. Hall, for plaintiff in error.

Harry E. O'Neill and W. O. Gilbert, contra.

ALBERT C. BARNES and GLANVILLE, CC., concur.

OPINION

ALBERT, C.

The defendant is a body corporate, organized under the laws of this state, for the purpose of creating and maintaining "a mutual fraternal insurance association, for the benefit of those who become its members." On the 28th day of February, 1894, one William R. Parks became a member of the association and received a certificate of membership, which, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

"This certifies that William R. Parks is while in good standing a member of the Western Travelers' Accident Association, and is entitled to all its benefits under the provisions on the back of this certificate, and named in the constitution and by-laws, and subject to the warranties, contained in the application for membership."

The provisions on the back of the certificate are:

"Payments will be made: For injuries received through external, violent and accidental means and resulting in death, loss of hands, both feet or both eyes, $ 5,000; permanent bodily disability, $ 2,500; loss of one foot, one hand or one eye, $ 1,250; temporary bodily disability, $ 25 per week, for a period not to exceed fifty-two weeks."

On the back of the certificate there is also a clause making the constitution and by-laws of the association, the application for membership and the certificate the contract between the association and the certificate holder. In his application for membership, the assured expressly agreed to accept membership "subject to the provisions and limitations of the constitution and by-laws of the association, now in force or that may be hereafter adopted." At the date of the certificate, the constitution expressly provided for its revision and amendment. Afterward, the association duly adopted the following amendment to its constitution:

"The association shall not be liable for disappearances nor shall the association be liable for injuries occasioned, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by any of the following acts, or causes, occurring while so engaged or affected: Disease, bodily and mental infirmity, hernia, orchitis, fits, vertigo."

On the 28th day of December, 1901, and after the adoption of said amendment, the assured, in a fit of vertigo, fell, and through the external, violent and accidental means, received bodily injuries which, independently of all other causes, wholly disabled him for a period of one week. He then made claim for indemnity under his certificate, and duly complied with the rules and regulations of the association in that behalf. Thereafter, he assigned his claim for indemnity to the plaintiff in this case. The association refused to pay the claim, and the plaintiff brought this action to recover it. The case was submitted to the district court on a stipulation of the parties, and judgment given for the defendant. The plaintiff prosecutes error to this court.

By agreement of the parties, the sole question presented to this court is: whether the amendment to the constitution excepting injuries received as a result of vertigo from the class for which the association would pay indemnity, is binding on a certificate holder whose certificate was issued before such amendment was adopted, but whose injury occurred thereafter. That a member of a mutual insurance company, who accepts membership subject to such provisions of the constitution as are then in force or may be thereafter adopted, is bound by a reasonable amendment to the constitution, subsequently adopted, is no longer an open question in this state. In Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kinney, 64 Neb. 808, 90 N.W. 926, this court, speaking through OLDHAM, C., say:

"An examination of many adjudged cases on this question leaves no doubt in our mind that under a great weight of authority a member of a mutual insurance company, who agrees in his application to be bound by subsequent by-laws of his association, will, when such subsequent by-laws are reasonable, and enacted under properly delegated authority, be bound by those subsequently enacted in the same manner that he is bound by those in existence at the time his certificate of membership is issued."

The following authorities support the doctrine just stated Hobbs v. Iowa Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 82 Iowa 107, 47 N.W. 983; Borgards v. Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co., 79 Mich. 440, 44 N.W. 856; Hughes v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows' Mutual Life Ins. Co., 98 Wis. 292, 73...