Hallford v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, Civil 4793

• Decision Date: 11 June 1945
• Docket Number: Civil 4793
• Citation: 63 Ariz. 40,159 P.2d 305
• Parties: JEWEL BERTIE HALLFORD, widow of William Isaac Hallford, Petitioner, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, and RAY GILBERT, FRED E. EDWARDS and EARL G. ROOKS, as members thereof, Respondents
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

159 P.2d 305

63 Ariz. 40

JEWEL BERTIE HALLFORD, widow of William Isaac Hallford, Petitioner, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, and RAY GILBERT, FRED E. EDWARDS and EARL G. ROOKS, as members thereof, Respondents

Civil No. 4793

Supreme Court of Arizona

June 11, 1945

APPEAL by certiorari from an award of The Industrial Commission of Arizona.

Award affirmed.

Mr Stephen B. Rayburn, and Mr. H. M. VanDenburgh, for Petitioner.

Mr David P. Jones, and Mr. H. S. McCluskey, for Respondent Commission.

Morgan J. Stanford, C. J., and LaPrade, J., concur.

OPINION

Morgan J.

On November 29, 1941, the respondent Industrial Commission made an award to petitioner, the widow of William Isaac Hallford, for a monthly payment until her death or remarriage, and a payment in one sum of $ 1663.20, in the event, and at the time, of her remarriage. On November 14, 1942, the petitioner married one Wade V. Williams. The respondent paid her a lump sum as provided in its award. On February 17, 1943, petitioner filed in the superior court of Maricopa County a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Williams, alleging that the marriage was null and void for the reasons following:

". . . said marriage is null and void, and of no effect in that the defendant was guilty of misrepresenting his condition in life, and that he stated to plaintiff that he was making sufficient money to support plaintiff, and that he would continue to make a home for her and support plaintiff.

"That immediately after the date of said marriage, defendant moved into the home of plaintiff and refused to provide funds with which plaintiff could secure the necessities of life, and that it was necessary for plaintiff not only to support herself, but also to support the defendant, and that defendant wholly fails to make any effort to carry out the promises which he made to plaintiff, and that the statements of defendant were false and fraudulent.

"That upon learning that defendant had misrepresented his condition in life, and that he had misrepresented the fact that he could and would support plaintiff, plaintiff caused defendant to remove himself from her home, and that plaintiff has ever since said date refused to maintain marital relations with the defendant."

On March 23, 1943, the superior court entered decree annulling the marriage of petitioner and Williams, based upon the following findings:

". . . and the court, being fully advised in the premises, finds the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and finds specifically that the plaintiff's complaint states a valid and subsisting cause of action for annulment of marriage, and that the plaintiff has proved all the material allegations of her complaint, by competent evidence duly corroborated."

The petitioner made application to respondent to reinstate her monthly payments, filing therewith the decree of annulment, and offering to tender back the lump sum settlement. Upon the hearing, the commission concluded that the superior court was without jurisdiction in entering the decree of annulment and ordered that petitioner's application to have the original award reinstated be denied. From this award petitioner has appealed.

Whether or not the award was properly made rests upon the force and effect of the decree of annulment. Unless the judgment is void, it is binding upon the commission and may not be attacked collaterally. On the other hand, a void judgment is no judgment at all and may be attacked in a collateral proceeding. This court has repeatedly stated that three elements must occur or a judgment is void upon its face, and hence subject to be attacked at any time. These elements are (1) jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case, (2) of the persons involved in the litigation, and (3) to render the particular judgment given. Brecht v. Hammons, 35 Ariz. 383, 278 P. 381; Maricopa County v. Bloomer, 52 Ariz. 28, 78 P.2d 993; Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 84 P.2d 575. In the Brecht case [35 Ariz. 383, 278 P. 382] it was said,

". . . When, however, the facts are admitted in the pleadings, and the court's determination is based upon an error as to the law arising out of the admitted state of facts, its decision is not conclusive, and the judgment, in case the decision was in error, is subject to collateral attack. . . .

". . . There was no issue of fact for the trial court to determine on that point, and its conclusion that it had jurisdiction was one of law alone, and since the face of the record shows affirmatively that the court did not and could not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the case, the judgment was void, and not merely voidable."

Again, in the Hill case [52 Ariz. 561, 84 P.2d 580] it was said,

". . . It is settled by the decisions of this court and others that jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter is not only essential to a valid judgment but that the court have jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment it did enter. . . ."

In the case at bar there is no dispute as to the facts. The defendant failed to appear or defend. The judgment discloses that it is based upon the facts alleged in the complaint. If, under these conceded facts, as a matter of law the court had no power to grant a decree of annulment, the decree is void under the decisions above cited. The power of the superior courts to annul a marriage is found in Section 27-801, Arizona Code Annotated 1939:

"The superior courts may dissolve a marriage, and may decree the...