Means v. Industrial Commission
Decision Date | 24 October 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 11242--PR,11242--PR |
Citation | 110 Ariz. 72,515 P.2d 29 |
Parties | Ruth MEANS, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Phelps Dodge Corporation, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Whitehill, Berger & Karp, P.C., by David D. West, Tucson, for petitioner.
William C. Wahl, Jr., Chief Counsel The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix, for respondent.
Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes, P.C., by Stephen W. Pogson and Richard L. Levin, Phoenix, for respondent employer.
Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel State Compensation Fund, Phoenix, for respondent carrier.
This is a petition for review of a decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, 19 Ariz.App. 484, 508 P.2d 371 (1973), which affirmed an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona denying compensation to the petitioner Ruth Means.
We consider only one question and that is: May an annulment be obtained on grounds which constitute an impediment rendering the marriage void or voidable if the same grounds are available by statute as the basis for obtaining a divorce?
The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. Prior to April 1965 the petitioner and Lyle Lloyd Means were husband and wife. Mr. Means died as the result of an industrial accident and petitioner was awarded an Industrial Commission award pursuant to statute:
§ 23--1046(A)(2) A.R.S.
On 26 December 1969 petitioner participated in a marriage ceremony and she thereafter applied for and was awarded two years' compensation in one lump sum pursuant to the above quoted statute. Petitioner later secured an annulment of this marriage based upon the impotency of her new 'husband.' There is no doubt that the ground alleged, as the findings of the hearing officer suggest, constituted an impediment to the marriage which would normally render it void. The statutory grounds for annulment are:
'Superior courts may dissolve a marriage, and may adjudge a marriage to be null and void when the cause alleged constitutes an impediment rendering the marriage void.' § 25--301 A.R.S.
And our divorce statute in force at the time of the decree of annulment stated:
'A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be granted:
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In an early case of this court we held:
1
And:
'* * * when a widow who is entitled to compensation under the Arizona law has remarried and received a lump settlement of the award, a legal annulment of the marriage will entitle her to have the original award reinstated upon tendering back the amount she has received as lump settlement.
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* * * We think it is clear that the legislature used the word 'void' in our annulment statute as referring to marriages which were subject to ratification or disaffirmance by the injured party, as well as those which could not be ratified, including specifically in 1887, as a ground for annulment, marriages of the class to which that of the beneficiary belongs, but that in 1901 it determined, for reasons best known to itself, that physical impotency should no longer be a ground for annulment, but rather for divorce.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Com., 54 Ariz. 1, 7--8, 6, 12--13, 91 P.2d 700, 703, 702, 705 (1939).
In the instant case, after the decree of annulment, the petitioner tendered back the lump sum settlement and asked that her benefits be reinstated. Hallford v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ariz. 40, 159 P.2d 305 (1945); State Compensation Fund v. Reed, 12 Ariz.App. 317, 470 P.2d 465 (1970); State Compensation Fund v. Foughty, supra. The Industrial Commission in denying the reinstatement, relied on Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Com., supra, that impotency could not be used as a ground for annulment.
A marriage may be annulled when the false representation or concealment is such that the fundamental purpose of the injured party in entering into the marriage is defeated. The majority view is that courts under general equity powers have inherent jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate actions for annulment of marriage, irrespective of statute.
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