Haltiwanger v. Barr

• Decision Date: 15 February 1972
• Docket Number: No. 19370,19370
• Citation: 186 S.E.2d 819,258 S.C. 27
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Jon Franklin HALTIWANGER, Respondent, v. Capers G. BARR, III, as Administrator of the Estate of David D. Brunant, Appellant.

Page 819

186 S.E.2d 819

258 S.C. 27

Jon Franklin HALTIWANGER, Respondent, v. Capers G. BARR, III, as Administrator of the Estate of David D. Brunant, Appellant.

No. 19370.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 15, 1972.

Joseph R. Young, of Young, Clement & Rivers, Charleston, for appellant.

Thomas D. Wise, of Way, Burkett & Wise, Charleston, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

This tort action was brought by the respondent to recover from the appellant for property loss and personal injuries received in an automobile collision on November 16, 1968. The respondent moved for summary judgment as to liability, which was granted. The question of the amount of actual damages was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for $64,000. Thereafter the appellant moved for a new trial or a new trial Nisi in the alternative, both of which were refused. This appeal followed.

The property damages and injuries were sustained when appellant's intestate, David D. Brunant, crossed three lanes and the median of a four-lane highway and crashed head-on with the respondent's vehicle. The impact was so violent that both cars were completely demolished. Brunant was killed instantly, and the respondent sustained serious injuries, including a permanent injury to his back.

The sole issue for determination by this Court is whether the verdict was so excessive as to show capriciousness and prejudice on the part of the jury.

The complaint alleged 'serious and permanent personal injuries.' It also alleged and sought recovery for the loss of an 18 foot boat, a motor, a trailer, and items of personal property.

As we review the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in failing to hold that the verdict was the result of prejudice and caprice, we keep in mind the fact that it became the duty of the jury to estimate, as best it could, the future damages which are reasonably certain to accrue to the respondent. The trial was respondent's only day in court as relates to any claim against the appellant arising out of the unfortunate collision. We also keep in mind the fact that the issue is, in the first analysis, one for the trial judge who heard all of the testimony and was in a better position to rule upon it than is this Court.

We held in Nelson v. C. & W. Carolina Rwy. Co., 226 S.C. 516, 86 S.E.2d 56 (1955):

'. . . (T)his court will not undertake to set aside a verdict because its amount is such as to indicate merely undue liberality on the part of the jury. The power in such case to set it aside, or reduce it by granting a new trial Nisi, rests with the trial judge alone. It is only when the verdict is so grossly excessive as to indicate that the jury was moved by passion or prejudice or other considerations not founded on the evidence and the constructions of the trial court, that it becomes the duty of this court, as well as of the trial court, to set it aside absolutely.'

Under the facts as revealed by the record before us, we refuse to disturb the verdict.

The respondent was 32 years of age, married, and had three children at the time of the collision. He enjoyed generally good health. He was regularly employed as a repairman and maintenance man for a duplicating machine concern, at a salary of $570 per month. In his work he was required to carry a 35-pound bag of tools, and to move various machines ranging from 35 to 700 or 800 pounds. After the accident he was fired because of his inability to carry on his usual duties, but was later rehired on a trial basis. He has no other training or skill which might allow him to pursue other specialized occupations.

In determining whether the amount of the verdict resulted from prejudice and caprice we keep in mind that it is the duty of the jury to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses.

Respondent testified that he was hospitalized for four days following the collision. Thereafter, he saw doctors frequently. On August 2, 1970, he returned to the hospital for 21 days; about one and one-half to two weeks of this time he was in traction. He continues to suffer and wears a back brace about one-half of the time. He is not able to do his work as well as previously, and is limited in his usual activities. He testified to property loss in the amount of $3635, medical expense of $1376, and loss of income of $1020, for a total of $6031.

Doctors Siegling and Pauling, orthopedic specialists, testified that the respondent's condition is permanent. They indicated that traction provides only temporary relief and recurrences of pain should be expected.

Dr. Siegling, utilizing widely recognized American Medical Association...