Hamill v. City of Carmel

Decision Date18 October 2001
Docket NumberNo. 29A05-0012-CR-564.,29A05-0012-CR-564.
Citation757 N.E.2d 162
PartiesJonathan HAMILL, Appellant-Defendant, v. CITY OF CARMEL, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Thomas Hamill, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Douglas C. Haney, Carmel City Attorney, Carmel, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

MATTINGLY-MAY, Judge.

Jonathan Hamill appeals the decision of the Hamilton Superior Court enforcing a money judgment for $175.00. This appeal arises after a trial de novo held in the Superior Court, which trial Hamill requested after a proceeding in the Carmel City Court where he was found in violation of City Ordinance 8-02, speeding. Hamill contends a failure of personal jurisdiction requires vacation of the money judgment against him.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 12, 1999, Hamill was driving westbound on 96th Street in Carmel, Indiana. Officer Schmidt of the Carmel Police Department activated his radar unit and determined that Hamill was traveling 51 m.p.h. in a posted 30 m.p.h. zone. Officer Schmidt briefly detained Hamill and served him with a complaint and summons to appear in Carmel City Court to respond to the speeding violation.

Hamill did not appear for the initial hearing in Carmel City Court. He later filed an appearance and Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the City Court did not have jurisdiction over his person due to insufficient service of process. The City Court denied his Motion, and after a hearing, entered judgment for the City on the speeding ticket. Hamill requested a trial de novo in the Superior Court under Ind. Trial De Novo Rule 2, Trial De Novo Following Judgment In City or Town Court. Hamill was found to have violated the ordinance, and judgment for the City was entered in the amount of $175.00.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the trial court, sua sponte, entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, the specific findings control only with respect to the issues they cover and the general judgment will control as to the issues upon which the court has not found. Catellier v. Depco, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 75, 77 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). We may not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The general judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained upon any legal theory by the evidence introduced at trial. Id. In our review, we will consider only the evidence that is most favorable to the trial court's judgment and will not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Hamill asserts "[t]he entry of a money judgment against Hamill is void and must be set aside because the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Hamill." (Br. of Appellant at 4.) He lists five deviations from the statute that he argues render the Complaint and Summons a nullity: 1) failure to check the box for "Information and Summons" (Ind.Code § 9-30-3-6(a)) or "Complaint and Summons" (Ind.Code § 9-30-3-6(b)) listed on the speeding ticket as an election between the two available statutory forms combined in one instrument; 2) failure by the officer at the scene to indicate the day of the week of the hearing setting on the matter; 3) the use of boxes rather than blanks and a "misleading numerical description of `day/month/year' which is misread by the average citizen as `month/day/year' on the ticket form." (Br. of Appellant at 10); 4) failure to obtain Hamill's signature on the ticket at the scene of the stop along with the absence of the warning "YOUR SIGNATURE IS NOT AN ADMISSION OF A VIOLATION"; and 5) the officer's failure to sign the instrument in front of a deputy clerk.

Ind.Code § 9-30-3-6(b) provides, in relevant part, that:

(b) In civil traffic cases, the complaint and summons shall be in substantially the following form:

In the ____ Court of ______ County Cause No. ______ Docket No. ______ Page No. ______ State of Indiana SS: No. ______ County of ________________ COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS The undersigned having probable cause to believe and being duly sworn upon his oath says that On the ____ Day of ______, 19__ at ______ Name _________________________________________ Last First Middle Street _________________________________________ City _______ State _________ Zip Code ___ Race _________ Sex ________ Age ___ D.O.B __________ HT _______ WT ______ Oper. Lic. # ____________ St. _______ Did Unlawfully Operate Veh. Color ___________ Veh. Yr. ______ Veh. Make ___________ Veh Lic. Yr. _____ Veh. Lic. St. ________ Veh Lic. # ________ Upon _________________________________________ A PUBLIC STREET OR HIGHWAY IN _________________________________________ COUNTY, INDIANA, AND COMMIT THE OFFENSE OF _________________________________________ CONTRARY TO THE FORM OF THE ( ) STATE STATUTE ( ) LOCAL ORDINANCE IN SUCH CASE MADE AND PROVIDED. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE _________________________________________ I.D. No. __________ Div. Dist. __________ POLICE AGENCY _________________________________________ _________________________________________ Subscribed And Sworn to Before Me (Deputy Clerk) _________________________________________ _________________________________________ This ______ Day of _______, 19__ COURT APPEARANCE I PROMISE TO APPEAR IN _________________________________________ _________________________________________ COURTROOM _________________________________________ _________________________________________ ADDRESS: _________________________________________ _________________________________________ ON ____ THE ____ DAY OF ____, 19__ AT ______ M. OR BE SUBJECT TO ARREST. SIGNATURE _________________________________________ "YOUR SIGNATURE IS NOT AN ADMISSION OF A VIOLATION"

The complaint and summons shall consist of four (4) parts:

(1) the original copy, printed on white paper, which shall be the abstract of court record for the Indiana bureau of motor vehicles;
(2) the court copy, printed on white paper;
(3) the police record, which shall be a copy of the complaint, printed on pink paper; and
(4) the summons copy, printed on white stock.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

Hamill contends, despite the explicit language of the statute requiring the complaint and summons to be in "substantially" the statutory form, that strict compliance with this statute is required for effective service of process and valid personal jurisdiction1 of the trial court. It is not, and we find the City substantially complied with the statutory requirements.

We noted in Ford v. State, 650 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), that...

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    ...to assure the reasonable objectives of the [statute and] regulation are met.” ( See DLGF's Mem. at 1 (citing Hamill v. City of Carmel, 757 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied ).) See also DLGF's Mot. Intervene ¶¶ 5-6.) “An interpretation of a statute [or regulation] by an admin......
  • Davis v. State
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    • 19 de abril de 2017
    ...means compliance to the extent necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute are met." Hamill v. City of Carmel , 757 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). And the reasonable objectives of this statute are to "inform the offender of the nature of the traffic violation and to ......
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    ...the word “substantially” as used in the statute, strict compliance with the statutory form is not required. Hamill v. City of Carmel, 757 N.E.2d 162, 164–65 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Rather, substantial compliance, which has been defined as “compliance to the extent necessary to ass......

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