Hamill v. City of Carmel, No. 29A05-0012-CR-564.

• Docket Nº: No. 29A05-0012-CR-564.
• Citation: 757 N.E.2d 162
• Case Date: October 18, 2001
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

757 N.E.2d 162

Jonathan HAMILL, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
CITY OF CARMEL, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

No. 29A05-0012-CR-564.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

October 18, 2001.

757 N.E.2d 163

Thomas Hamill, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant

Douglas C. Haney, Carmel City Attorney, Carmel, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

MATTINGLY-MAY, Judge.

Jonathan Hamill appeals the decision of the Hamilton Superior Court enforcing a money judgment for $175.00. This appeal arises after a trial de novo held in the Superior Court, which trial Hamill requested after a proceeding in the Carmel City Court where he was found in violation of City Ordinance 8-02, speeding. Hamill contends a failure of personal jurisdiction requires vacation of the money judgment against him.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 12, 1999, Hamill was driving westbound on 96th Street in Carmel, Indiana. Officer Schmidt of the Carmel Police Department activated his radar unit and determined that Hamill was traveling 51 m.p.h. in a posted 30 m.p.h. zone. Officer Schmidt briefly detained Hamill and served him with a complaint and summons to appear in Carmel City Court to respond to the speeding violation.

Hamill did not appear for the initial hearing in Carmel City Court. He later filed an appearance and Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the City Court did not have jurisdiction over his person due to insufficient service of process. The City Court denied his Motion, and after a hearing, entered judgment for the City on the speeding ticket. Hamill requested a trial de novo in the Superior Court under Ind. Trial De Novo Rule 2, Trial De Novo Following Judgment In City or Town Court. Hamill was found to have violated the ordinance, and judgment for the City was entered in the amount of $175.00.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the trial court, sua sponte, entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, the specific findings control only with respect to the issues they cover and the general judgment will control as to the issues upon which the court has not found. Catellier v. Depco, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 75, 77 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). We may not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The general judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained upon any legal theory by the evidence introduced at trial. Id. In our review, we will consider only the evidence that is most favorable to the trial court's judgment and will not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Hamill asserts "[t]he entry of a money judgment against Hamill is void and must be set aside because the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Hamill." (Br. of Appellant at 4.) He lists five deviations from the statute that he argues render the Complaint and Summons a nullity: 1) failure to check the box

757 N.E.2d 164

for "Information and Summons" (Ind.Code § 9-30-3-6(a)) or "Complaint and Summons" (Ind.Code § 9-30-3-6(b)) listed on the speeding ticket as an election between the two available statutory forms combined in one instrument; 2) failure by the officer at the scene to indicate the day of the week of the hearing setting on the matter; 3) the use of boxes rather than blanks and a "misleading numerical description of `day/month/year' which is misread by the average citizen as `month/day/year' on the ticket form." (Br. of Appellant at 10); 4) failure to obtain Hamill's signature on the ticket at the...