Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company v. Saxey

• Citation: 32 S.W. 1106,131 Mo. 212
• Parties: Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company v. Saxey et al., Appellants
• Decision Date: 26 November 1895
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

32 S.W. 1106

131 Mo. 212

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company v. Saxey et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

November 26, 1895

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. L. B. Valliant Judge.

Affirmed.

John F McDermott for appellants.

(1) The plaintiff's petition is in the nature of an information in a criminal case. State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo.App. 413; Life Ass'n v. Boogher, 3 Mo.App. 173; Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Co., 110 Mo. 500. (2) The plaintiff's petition is in the nature of an information in a criminal case, and, being such, violates defendant's constitutional rights to trial by jury. Section 28 of article 2 of constitution provides: "The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate." State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo.App. 413; Life Ass'n v. Boogher, 3 Mo.App. 173; Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Co., 110 Mo. 500; Cable Co. v. Kansas City, 29 Mo.App. 89. (3) Jurisdiction of equity must not be extended to restraint of crime. State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo.App. 413; Life Ass'n v. Boogher, 3 Mo.App. 173; Cable Co. v. Kansas City, 29 Mo.App. 89; Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Co., 110 Mo. 500. (4) There is a complete and adequate remedy at law under section 3783, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889. (5) This proceeding is in violation of the defendants' constitutional rights as set forth in section 12 of article 2, constitution of Missouri, which provides: "That no person shall be proceeded against criminally otherwise than by indictment, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; in all other cases offenses shall be prosecuted criminally by indictment or information as concurrent remedies." (6) The defendants' right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the country is invaded. See section 22 of article 2 of constitution of Missouri, which provides that: "In criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to appear in person and by counsel to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf at a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the country." Life Ass'n v. Boogher, 3 Mo.App. 173; State v. Uhrig, 14 Mo.App. 413; Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Co., 110 Mo. 500.

Silas B. Jones for respondent.

(1) Injunction is the proper remedy to prevent injury to, or destruction of, one's lawful business by the wrongful conduct of others. The general ground for the jurisdiction of equity in such case is, that the injury can not be fully compensated by an action of law. In such case the damages are incapable of any fair estimation. Railroad v. City of Springfield, 85 Mo. 674; Railroad v. Railroad, 69 Mo. 65; Gloessner v. Anheuser-Busch Ass'n, 100 Mo. 508; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131. (2) In such case where the injury is of a continuous nature, jurisdiction in equity attaches also to prevent the vexation and harassment of continued disturbances, and to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Carroll v. Campbell, 108 Mo. 550; Railroad v. Railroad, 69 Mo. 65. (3) That a court of equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain the publication of a libel, or the uttering of a slander, injurious to one's business, stands upon peculiar grounds; and is an exception to the general rule, that equity will restrain wrongful acts, which are destructive of a plaintiff's lawful business. Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Co., 110 Mo. 492; Gas Co. v. Gas Co., 100 Mo. 501. (4) Courts of equity do not interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of crime; but this is subject to the limitation that the contemplated crime is unconnected with violations of private right. State v. Schweickardt, 109 Mo. 496; 1 High on Inj., secs. 20, 27. (5) The jurisdiction of equity to restrain wrongful acts destructive of property rights is not ousted, because the acts sought to be restrained may amount to an infraction of the criminal law, and subject the wrongdoer to prosecution and punishment. Sparhawk v. Railroad, 54 Pa. St. 401; People v. St. Louis, 5 Gilm. 351; 1 High on Inj., sec. 745; Emperor v. Day, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 217; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 551; United States v. Elliott, 64 F. 27; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310. (6) It is common practice for a court of equity to interfere by injunction in cases of private nuisance injurious to a plaintiff's property or business. In such case the jurisdiction is undoubted; and is founded on the ground of restraining irreparable mischief, or of suppressing oppression and interminable litigation, or of preventing multiplicity of suits. Hayden v. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214. (7) A trespass will be enjoined when there is no adequate remedy afforded by an action for damages; and where the injury is to the manufacturing business of plaintiff, there is no adequate remedy by an action at law for damages. Turner v. Stewart, 78 Mo. 480; Bank v. Kercheval, 65 Mo. 682. (8) A court of equity will interfere by injunction to restrain a plaintiff's ex-employees and others, who have banded together to injure or destroy plaintiff's business, by the use of threats of violence toward plaintiff's employees, and by putting such employees in fear of bodily harm, and thereby intimidating them, with the purpose of coercing and compelling them to quit the service of plaintiff; and by the use of like means to deter others from entering plaintiff's service. Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 551; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212; Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595; Brace Bros. v. Evans, 3 R'y and Corp. L. J. 561; Gilbert v. Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357; Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N.Y.S. 264. The federal courts furnish a large number of cases directly in point for this proposition. Casey v. Typographical Union, 45 F. 135; Company v. Miners' Union, 51 F. 260; Blindell v. Hagan, 54 F. 40; Railroad v. Pa. Co., 54 F. 730; United States v. Elliott, 62 F. 801; United States v. Elliott, 64 F. 27; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310.

OPINION

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from the final judgment of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, on a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition which is as follows:

"Plaintiff states that it is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture of shoes in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, at Twenty-first and Locust streets, in said city, at which place its factory for the purpose of its said manufacturing business is located; and plaintiff says that it has in its employ in said manufacturing business in its factory as aforesaid, between eight and nine hundred persons; that all of these persons are at work as operatives in some department or other of said factory; that of these employees as aforesaid a large number, to wit, about two or three hundred are women and girls, and a large number, to wit, about two or three hundred, are young persons, many of them not being of age, and the balance of said operatives are adult men; that all of these persons are engaged in earning a livelihood at the business of this plaintiff aforesaid; and on the other hand this plaintiff requires the service of these persons to successfully carry on its business of manufacturing shoes as aforesaid.

"Plaintiff further states that all of these employees now in the employ of this plaintiff are desirous of continuing in the service of the plaintiff in its said business as aforesaid.

"Plaintiff further states that ten or fifteen days ago some of its employees, including all the defendants herein, except the defendants Thomas Beaty and P. J. McGarry, went out of the employ of this plaintiff on what is commonly called a strike claiming to have some grievance against this plaintiff, and which this plaintiff says was without any reasonable ground to rest upon, and thereupon attempted to inaugurate among the employees of this plaintiff what is commonly called a strike; that thereupon the said defendants, lately employees of this plaintiff, together with the defendants Beaty and McGarry, and divers other persons, unlawfully and wrongfully combined and confederated together to terrorize and thereby by intimidation and threats to prevent the other employees of this plaintiff from peaceably or otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that thereupon all of the defendants hereto, together with their associates and confederates, whose names are at this moment unknown to this plaintiff, began and have constantly pursued a course of threats of personal violence and intimidation and persuasion for the purpose by means of such intimidation and threats and fear to prevent the other employees of this plaintiff from peaceably or otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that all of the said defendants thereto, together with divers and sundry other persons, who are their associates and confederates, have constantly hung about the plaintiff's said factory at the place aforesaid; and upon the streets in close proximity for the purpose of picketing the premises of this plaintiff, and by putting the employees of this plaintiff in fear of bodily injury to thereby keep them from continuing their employment with this plaintiff, and also for the purpose of preventing other persons from entering the employ of the plaintiff; and the said defendants and their associates and confederates as a part of their policy of threats and intimidation, and for the purpose of carrying of their unlawful combination, have gone to the home of divers of the employees of this plaintiff at nighttime and then and there undertaken to induce by persuasion and by intimidation and threats the employees of this plaintiff from further prosecuting their work in plaint...