Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. City of Lowell
| Decision Date | 24 February 1931 |
| Parties | THE HAMILTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. CITY OF LOWELL. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
October 10, 1930.
Present: RUGG, C.
Tax, Abatement "person aggrieved"; Assessment: list; On machinery. Estoppel. Receiver. Practice, Civil, Complaint under G.L.c 59, Section 65, Exceptions. Sale.
Where both parties save exceptions at a hearing of a complaint for the abatement of a local tax under G.L.c. 59, Section 65, and separate bills of exceptions are filed, it is a needless expense and troublesome increase in the bulk of papers presented to this court for both bills to include a copy of the report of a commissioner; if the parties can not agree as to a division of the expense of a single printing of such report, the court can make an order as to such division. Per RUGG, C.J.
Receivers were appointed of a corporation owning land and a factory thereon. They made an agreement to sell the physical property of the corporation, conveyance to be made in March of a certain year and the purchaser to assume and pay the taxes assessed for that year. The conveyance was not made until shortly after April 1. The taxes assessed on April 1 were paid in part by the purchaser and in part by persons to whom the purchaser sold the property. The purchaser brought a complaint under G.L.c. 59, Section 65, in the name of the corporation. Held that
(1) The corporation was a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute: the primary obligation to pay the taxes rested upon it, since it was the owner of the property on April 1;
(2) The complaint properly could be prosecuted in the name of the corporation by the purchaser as the person beneficially interested;
(3) The corporation was the proper party to file with the assessors a true list of its property subject to taxation as foundation for the abatement proceedings;
(4) Payment of the tax by the purchaser and the persons to whom he had sold the property was an authorized payment in behalf of the corporation and constituted adequate compliance with G.L.c. 59,
It was inferred by this court that the receivers of the corporation above described had authority to file the list above described.
G.L.c. 59, Section 68, does not require that a tax be paid previous to the filing of a complaint relative thereto under Section 65, but merely that it appear at the hearing of the complaint that the tax has been paid.
Proceedings for abatement of taxes, although in the nature of actions at law, are prescribed throughout by statute, and the rules as to procedure in actions at common law are not applicable. Per RUGG, C.J.
The factory of the corporation above described contained machinery which had been used for many years in manufacturing. Owing to financial difficulties, the receivers ceased manufacturing and closed the factory about six months previous to April 1, but the machinery was not dismantled, nor was the integrity of the factory as a manufacturing entity substantially affected. On April 1 the machinery remained susceptible of use for manufacturing as before. The list filed with the assessors by the receivers contained a detailed enumeration, description and valuation of the machinery, with a statement that the "entire plant has not been operated since . . . [the previous October], and due consideration should be given the fact that the machinery has not produced any material and has actually been of no value." Held, that
(1) In the circumstances, the corporation was not estopped by the filing of the list to contend that the machinery was not subject to taxation;
(2) In the circumstances, the machinery on April 1 was taxable under G.L.c. 59, Section 18, Second, as amended by St. 1924, c. 321,
A correct decision by the Superior Court will be affirmed by this court although the reason stated for it by the trial judge is incorrect.
COMPLAINT under G.L.c. 59, Section 65, filed in the Superior Court on June 11, 1928.
The complaint was referred to a commissioner and afterwards was heard by T.J. Hammond, J., upon his report and other evidence, material portions of which are described in the opinion. The judge denied, among other rulings requested by the defendant, a ruling as follows:
The judge also ruled that the complainant was bound with respect to the taxability of its machinery by the fact that the machinery was included in the list filed with the assessors; and ordered judgment for the complainant in the sum of $53,753.15. Both parties alleged exceptions.
B.E. Eames, for the plaintiff.
H.V. Charbonneau, City Solicitor, (P.J. Reynolds with him,) for the defendant.
This is a complaint under G.L.c. 59, Section 65, by way of appeal from the refusal of the assessors of the defendant to abate taxes assessed as of April 1, 1927, upon the land, buildings and machinery of the complainant. The case, after being referred to a commissioner, was heard upon his report and other evidence by a judge of the Superior Court.
Both parties alleged exceptions and filed separate bills of exceptions. In each is printed the comprehensive and long report of the commissioner. This was a needless expense and a troublesome increase in the bulk of the papers. A single copy of that report would have been better. The parties doubtless could have agreed as to the division of the expense of printing it. If not, the court could have made an order as to such division. Barrell v. Globe Newspaper Co. 268 Mass 99 .
The first contention of the defendant is that the complainant is not a "person aggrieved" by the taxes assessed upon it or by the refusal of assessors to abate that tax within the meaning of G.L.c. 59, Sections 59, 64, 65, and hence cannot prevail. The facts pertinent to the determination of that contention are these: The complainant, once a highly prosperous manufacturer of cotton goods, had fallen into financial distress. After numerous ineffectual attempts at rehabilitation, receivers were appointed, manufacturing was discontinued, and the receivers were authorized to accept an offer of $700,000 for the physical property. See Boucher v. Hamilton Manuf. Co. 259 Mass. 259 , where proceedings touching that matter are set forth. Shortly after the decree of the Superior Court authorizing the sale, and pursuant thereto, an agreement was made for the sale, conveyance to be made on or before March 15, 1927. The purchaser, however, declined to go through with the transaction until litigation involving the validity of that decree had been determined by the Supreme Judicial Court; but on April 14, 1927, the day following the rescript affirming the decree, the conveyance was made. The deed, drafted before but not delivered until after April 1, made no mention of taxes for 1927. The obligation as between the parties to pay the taxes assessed as of April 1, 1927, was in truth assumed by the purchaser. In October, 1927, a petition for abatement of the taxes in the name of The Hamilton Manufacturing Company, signed by its receivers, was filed with the board of assessors of the defendant. This petition was denied. On June 8, 1928, the Superior Court allowed the petition of the purchaser for leave to prosecute the present proceeding in the name of the complainant but upon the understanding that it would be done at no expense to the receivers and that the assets in their hands were not thereby to be subjected to any financial obligation.
The words "person aggrieved" in these sections of the tax law "mean one whose pecuniary interests are or may be adversely affected." Hough v. North Adams, 196 Mass. 290 , 291. Essex Co. v. Lawrence, 214 Mass. 79 , 87. We are of opinion that the complainant was a person aggrieved in this sense. It was the owner of record and the owner in fact of the property upon which the assessment was laid. The tax was rightly assessed. One of several causes might have prevented the performance of the agreement for the sale of the property. The decree authorizing the sale might have been reversed by the full court. The purchaser might have been disabled financially from carrying it out. The agreement might have been abrogated by the parties. The property might have been destroyed in substantial part. Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221 . The agreement between the seller and the buyer of the property that the latter should assume and pay the taxes was in no way binding upon the collector of taxes. He was not a party to it. Whether he could under any circumstances become a party to such an agreement need not be considered. The primary obligation to pay the taxes rested upon The Hamilton Manufacturing Company. But for the receivership, the collector of taxes might have brought an action at law against that company to collect the amount due for taxes. G.L.c. 60, Section 35. It would be the duty of the court in the receivership proceedings, upon proper representation or intervention by the collector of taxes, to order the taxes paid by the receivers. Waite v. Worcester Brewing Co. 176 Mass. 283. Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Kelsey, 209 Mass. 416 . Boston v. Turner, 201 Mass. 190 , 195, and cases cited. G.L.c. 206, Section 31. The real estate was subject, after the first of April, to the lien for the payment of the taxes. The rights and obligations arising from agreement between the complainant and the purchaser were of no legal interest to the collector...
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