Hamilton v. Cannon

• Decision Date: 21 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. S96Q1285,S96Q1285
• Citation: 482 S.E.2d 370,267 Ga. 655
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 970 HAMILTON et al. v. CANNON et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 370

482 S.E.2d 370

267 Ga. 655, 97 FCDR 970

HAMILTON et al. v. CANNON et al.

No. S96Q1285.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 21, 1997.

L. David Wolfe, Wolfe & Steel, P.C., Stephen C. Andrews, David J. Maslia, Bodker, Ramsey & Andrews, P.C., Atlanta, for Matthew Hamilton et al.

Thomas C. Alexander, Jones, Cork & Miller, Macon, Shawn Marie Story, Smith, Welch, Studdard & Brittain, McDonough, George M. Peagler, Jr., Ellis, Easterlin, Peagler, Gatewood & Skipper, Americus, John T. Croley, Jr., Fitzgerald, William Thomas Prescott, Jones, Cork & Miller, Macon, for Charles Cannon et al.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

The mother, child and administrator of the estate of Kim Orlena Hamilton brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia asserting state and federal causes of action arising out of Hamilton's death at a city swimming pool in Montezuma. Plaintiffs named as defendants Macon County, its sheriff, one of its deputy sheriffs, the City of Montezuma, the manager of the city swimming pool, and a lifeguard at that pool.

Construed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs as the respondents on motion for summary judgment, Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991), the record reveals that Hamilton collapsed as she exited the waters of a City of Montezuma swimming pool. The lifeguard at the pool caught her and placed her on the deck where a pool patron began administering CPR. There was testimony indicating that Hamilton was responding to the CPR. An emergency telephone call was placed and a Macon County deputy sheriff arrived on the scene. The deputy ordered everyone to clear away and the pool patron applying CPR complied, thus ceasing her CPR efforts. CPR was resumed when the city police chief arrived and was continued by emergency medical technicians until doctors pronounced Hamilton dead at the hospital emergency room.

In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that the county defendants were liable based upon the affirmative act of gross negligence allegedly committed by the deputy sheriff when he interrupted a private rescue attempt without providing a meaningful alternative. Plaintiffs asserted the city defendants were liable based upon the negligent hiring, training, and supervision of the pool staff; the failure to control horseplay at the pool which led to Hamilton being thrown into the water; and the failure to intercede after the deputy sheriff interrupted the private rescue effort. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants based on its application of the public duty doctrine in City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993). Plaintiffs appealed that ruling and, in Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525 (11th Cir.1996), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals submitted four state law questions for resolution by this Court. The questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit are:

(1) Does the "public duty doctrine" established in City of Rome apply outside the police protection context and in the circumstances of this case?

(2) Does the City of Rome public duty doctrine apply to affirmative acts of negligence, such as those alleged in this case, in addition to failures to act?

(3) Does the "reliance prong" of the City of Rome special relationship test require an objective manifestation of assent by the plaintiff, or may assent be inferred from the reliance of others or from the circumstances of this case?

(4) Does the City of Rome special relationship test apply when a law enforcement officer acts with gross negligence in performing duties at the scene of an emergency, as is alleged in this case, such that the officer would not otherwise be shielded from liability by OCGA § 35-1-7?

1. In City of Rome, supra, this Court addressed whether the municipality and a member of its police department were liable to plaintiff, an assault victim, for the failure to respond to an emergency call made by members of the victim's family who had telephoned police when they learned a man they feared posed a threat of harm to the plaintiff's safety was at the plaintiff's home. This Court adopted the public duty doctrine to hold that a municipality may not be held liable for its failure to provide police protection based on a general duty to protect the public. Id. at 28, 426 S.E.2d 861. This Court recognized that a municipality may be held liable for a failure to provide police protection where the plaintiff can show the existence of a special relationship that could be established by a three-prong test set forth in the opinion. Id. at 29, 426 S.E.2d 861. Applying that special relationship test, we held that the municipal defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff's evidence failed to establish one of the required prongs.

This Court subsequently addressed the public duty doctrine in Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6(3), 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996), an opinion rendered two months after the Eleventh Circuit certified the questions in this case. This Court rejected the DOT's assertion that it had no liability in the absence of a special relationship between the DOT and the plaintiff's decedent, a car collision victim. This Court unanimously ruled that "[o]ur decision in [City of Rome ] was directed squarely and only at the duty owed by a governmental entity to provide police protection to individual citizens" and that the nature of that case "warrants limitation of the public duty doctrine adopted in [City of Rome ] to the situation involved there." Id. at 8(3), 471 S.E.2d 849.

Our opinion in Brown is conclusive as to the first certified question from the Eleventh Circuit: the public duty doctrine adopted in City of Rome is limited to the situation in that case and thus does not apply outside the police protection context. Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative.

2. Our resolution of the first question renders it unnecessary for us to address the remaining questions, all of which are premised upon the extension of the public duty doctrine outside the police protection context.

Questions answered.

All the Justices concur, except FLETCHER, P.J., and SEARS and HINES, JJ., who dissent.

FLETCHER, Presiding Justice, dissenting.

Although an argument can be made for limiting the public duty doctrine to police nonfeasance, no one on this court has made it. Instead, in an answer that is shorter than the question raised, the majority decides that the public duty doctrine is limited to the "police protection context." The opinion offers no explanation or support for its holding other than a citation to a case that also states a result without any persuasive reasoning. The complex issues connected with the public duty doctrine deserve a more thoughtful discussion. Because the majority unnecessarily and unwisely limits the public duty doctrine, I dissent.

THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC DUTY

1. In City of Rome v. Jordan, ¹ this court addressed whether city police officers owed a duty to a sexual assault victim to respond to an emergency request for help. Adopting the public duty doctrine, we held that a municipality may not be liable for its failure to provide police protection based on a general duty to protect the public. Instead, a special relationship between the injured party and the governmental tortfeasor must exist that sets the individual apart and engenders a special duty owed to that individual by the municipality. To establish a special relationship, the plaintiff must show "(1) an explicit assurance by the municipality, through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality that inaction could lead to harm; and (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured party on the municipality's affirmative undertaking." ² Applying the special relationship test to the facts in Jordan, we concluded that the City of Rome was entitled to summary judgment because Patricia Jordan failed to show that she relied on police to dispatch a vehicle to her home in response to telephone calls that others made from another house.

The decision in Jordan gave two reasons for adopting the public duty doctrine. First, the special relationship requirement restricted the government's liability for the actions of third parties in a way similar to the restriction of a private party's liability for the actions of a third party. ³ Second, providing police protection is " 'a resource- allocating function that is better left to the discretion of the policy makers.' " ⁴ Thus, we adopted the doctrine to protect public employees from unreasonable liability and to protect governments from unreasonable interference with policy decisions. ⁵

The majority opinion today ignores both reasons for adopting the public duty doctrine. Unlike other states that have adopted the public duty doctrine, this court limits it to the police protection context. This result excludes other public employees who are charged with protecting the general public from the actions of third persons in emergency situations, such as firefighters. It also exposes police officers to liability when their actions fall "outside the police protection context," whatever that term means. It apparently does not cover many routine actions that police officers undertake to protect the public, including the deputy sheriff's exercise of crowd control in this case.

Moreover, the majority's reliance on Department of Transportation v. Brown ⁶ as its sole authority is unpersuasive. In a one-paragraph discussion, this court declined in Brown to apply the public duty doctrine to allegations that the Georgia Department of Transportation was negligent in designing and operating a highway. Although there were myriad ways to distinguish Jordan, this court stated that "the essential difference" in Jordan was "the involvement of third parties whose behavior may be unpredictable." ⁷ In a cursory analysis, the decision...