Department of Transp. v. Brown
| Decision Date | 17 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. S95G1856,S95G1856 |
| Citation | 471 S.E.2d 849,267 Ga. 6 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. BROWN |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Dept of Law, George P. Shingler, Asst. Atty. Gen., C. Latain Kell, Staff Atty., State Law Dept., Susan J. Levy, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Decatur, for Dept. of Transp.
William C. Lanham, Johnson & Ward, Atlanta, for Mildred C. Brown.
Clark H. McGehee, Johnson & Ward, Atlanta.
Craig T. Jones, David William Boone, David Wm. Boone, P.C., Billy E. Moore, Atlanta, for amicus appellee.
This case arose from a fatal intersection collision. The Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) designed and constructed an extension of Georgia Highway 365, converting it to a four-lane, divided highway. The plans called for the installation of a traffic light signal to control traffic in both directions at the intersection where the collision involved here occurred, but DOT rejected a bid for the installation of the traffic lights. Rather than delay the opening of the intersection, DOT erected temporary stop signs to control traffic in both directions on the cross-road, and made the new Hwy. 365 temporarily a through highway without any traffic control signals. Anika Colbert was killed when the car in which she was a passenger was struck by a dump truck while the car was crossing Hwy. 365 after failing to stop at the stop sign.
Mildred C. Brown, administratrix of the estate of Anika Colbert, brought a wrongful death action against DOT and others. DOT moved for summary judgment and, at trial, for a directed verdict based on the design standard and discretionary function exceptions to OCGA § 50-21-24, the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA). 1 DOT also moved for a directed verdict based on the public duty doctrine. All motions for directed verdict and summary judgment were denied, and the jury awarded $1,505,000 in damages. That amount was reduced to $1,000,000, the statutory limit of recovery under the GTCA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. DOT v. Brown, 218 Ga.App. 178, 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995). We granted DOT's petition for certiorari, and having determined that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's judgment, we affirm that of the Court of Appeals.
1. The Court of Appeals held that the discretionary function exception does not apply when the design standards exception applies. DOT complains that the ruling, based on the principle of statutory construction that the particular controls over the general, destroys the discretionary function exception in suits against DOT. The preferable analysis, and one which does not invalidate any exception, is the analysis employed by the Court of Appeals as an alternative basis for its ruling: the discretionary function exception applies only to policy decisions and does not address the design and operational decisions on which the allegations of negligence are based in this case.
In determining the scope of the discretionary function exception, we need not consider previous cases involving discretionary versus ministerial decisions because the legislature included in this statute the definition of discretionary function or duty: "a function or duty requiring a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of action based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors." OCGA § 50-21-22(2). The key to this issue is the difference between design and operational decisions and policy decisions. We note with approval the decisions from other jurisdictions, cited by the Court of Appeals, holding that the discretionary function exception is limited to basic governmental policy decisions. The Court of Appeals was correct in noting that the decision to build the road involved here was a policy decision. Where and whether to install traffic lights were design decisions. When to open the intersection, and whether to open it without traffic lights are operational decisions, and the decision to use stop signs only for the cross-road was a design decision.
The scope of the discretionary function exception urged by DOT, which would include any decision affected by "social, political, or economic factors," is so broad as to make the exception swallow the waiver....
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