Hamilton v. City of Jackson

• Decision Date: 31 March 1930
• Docket Number: 28323
• Citation: 127 So. 302,157 Miss. 284
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HAMILTON et al. v. CITY OF JACKSON

127 So. 302

157 Miss. 284

HAMILTON et al. v. CITY OF JACKSON

No. 28323

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 31, 1930

Division B

1. CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE. Statute. Alienation. Construction.

Statute relating to conveyances held to remove all restraints on transfer of real estate (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 2421). The statute referred to, Code 1906, section 2762 (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 2421), provide that any interest in land may be conveyed to vest immediately or in future by writing signed and delivered, and that such writing shall have effect to transfer according to its terms, the title of the person signing and delivering it with all its instruments, as fully and perfectly as if it were transferred by feoffment with livery of seizin, notwithstanding there may be an adverse possession.

2 REVERSIONS. Property conveyed. Fee-simple title.

Where grantors conveyed property to be held by grantee as long as it should be used for waterworks purposes, and later delivered warranty deed to another, city claiming under both deeds owned fee-simple title (Hemingway's Code 1927 section 2421).

3 ESTOPPEL. Warranty. Grantors' remaining interest. Heirs. Where grantors' remaining interest passed under warranty deed as to grantors, it passed also as to their heirs.

HON. V J. STRICKER, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Hinds county, First district HON. V. J. STRICKER, Chancellor.

Suit by the city of Jackson against R. B. Hamilton and others. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Franklin, Easterling & Rosenthal and Luther Manship, all of Jackson, for appellants.

The words in the habendum of the deed, so long as it should be so used, etc., unquestionably constitute a conditional limitation, and not an estate upon condition subsequent. The distinction between the two is so obvious as to need no comment.

2 Washburn Real Property, 25, 26, 27; Smith, Exec. Int., 21 C. J., 930; Magness v. Kerr, 254 P. 1012, 51 A.L.R. 1470; 2 Washburn on Real Property (5 Ed.), 458; Mobile J. & K. Ry. Co. v. Kamper, 88 Miss. 817, 41 So. 513; Hill v. Western Vermont R. R. Co., 32 Vt. 68; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 116 Ind. 356, 19 N.E. 141; Railway Co. v. Geisel, 119 Ind. 77, 21 N.E. 470; 3 Thompson on Real Property, sec. 2116.

The right of reverter in the deed from the Hamiltons to the water works company was not subject to conveyance or alienation.

3 Thompson on Real Property, sec. 2117; Vaughn v. Langford, 81 S.C. 282, 15 Ann. Cas. 91; Blount v. Walker, 31 S.C. 13, 27, 285 S.E. 804; Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. (S. C.) 265; Deas v. Horry, 2 Hill Eq. (S. C.) 244; Pearce v. Killian, McMull Eq. (S. C.) 231; 23 R. C. L. 1104, sec. 8; 2 C. J. 1017; Prall v. Burchart, 18 A.L.R. 992; Hart v. Lake, 273 Ill. 60, 112 N.E. 286; North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 624, 126 Am. St. Rep. 189, 85 N.E. 267; 21 C. J., 1018; McNeer v. McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 19 L.R.A. 256, 32 N.E. 681; Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 52 L.R.A. 75, 79 Am. St. Rep. 246, 58 N.E. 602; 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 624; Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 37 L.R.A. 794, 45 N.E. 359.

The mere possibility of reverter such as is contained in the deed from Hamilton to the Water Works Company is not any estate in land and is not alienable or durable.

Nicoll v. New York & E. R. Co., 2 N.Y. 121; Vail v. Long Island R. R. Co., 106 N.Y. 287, 60 Am. Rep. 449, 12 N.E. 607; Powers v. Bullwinkle, 33 S.C. 293, 11 S.E. 971; North v. Graham, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 627; Challis on Law of Real Property, p. 63; 1 Preston, Estates, 441, 484; Magness v. Kerr, 51 A.L.R. 1466; Walsingham case, 2 Plowd. 557; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct v. Chandler, 9 Allen 159, 168, 169; First Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 174, 15 L.R.A. 231, 29 N.E. 524; Cruise's Dig., Title 1, par. 80; 4 Kent, Com. 10; I Washb. Real Property (6 Ed.), pars. 164, 165; Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, pars. 31 (3), 32; Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray 42, 50, 63 Am. Dec. 725; Chandler v Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 125 Mass. 544, 547; Parish v. Gilmanton, 11 N.H. 293; Rigney v. Lovejoy, 13 N.H. 247, 251; Gurnsey v. Edwards, 26 N.H. 224, 230; Orr v. Hadley, 36 N.H. 575, 579; Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, 42 L.R.A. 98, 68 Am. St. Rep. 427, 50 N.E. 650; Venable v. Wabash Western R. Co., 112 Mo. 103, 18 L.R.A. 68, 20 S.W. 493; Mills, Em. Dom. (2 Ed.), par. 71; Bouvier v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 60 L.R.A. 754, 757 and 758; First Universalist Society v. Boland, 15 L.R.A. 231; Askley v. Warner, 11 Gray, 43; Atty.-Gen. v. Merrimack Mfg. Co., 14 Gray 586, 612; Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast, 5 Gray, 17; Fifty Associates v. Howland, 11 Met. 99, 102; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90, 105; 1 Washb., Real Property (3 Ed.), 79; 2 Washb., Real Property (3 Ed.), 20, 21; 4 Kent Com., 126, 127, 132, note; 2 Crabb, Real Property, pars. 2135, 2136; 2 Flint, Real Property, 230-232; Shep. Touch. 121, 125; Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96; Gillespie v. Broas, 23 Barb. 371; State v. Brown, 27 N.J.L. 13; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. 335; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. R. Co., 94 Ill. 83, 93; 2 Bl. Com. 109, 154, 155; 1 Cruise Dig., Title 1, pars. 72-76; 2 Flint, Real Property, 136-138; Preston, Estates, 431, 441; Challis, Real Prop., 197-208; Challis, Real Prop., 31, 63-65, 153, 174, 198, 200, 212; Preston, Estates, 431, 471; 2 Plowd. 413; Shep. Touch. 120; 2 Washb., Real Prop., 20, 579; 4 Kent. Com., 10; Smith v. Harrington, 4 Allen, 566, 567; Gray, Perp., pars. 33, 34, 39; Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448; French v. Old South Soc. 106 Mass. 479; Gray, Perp., pars. 305, 312; Vaughn v. Langford, 81 S.C. 282, 16 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 92.

W. E. Morse and Green, Green & Potter, all of Jackson, for appellee.

The possibility of reverter having finally reached the city, or having been extinguished, through subsequent warranty, and other conveyances, its title was perfected to the estate in fee, and discharged thereby from the particular condition by which it had theretofore been limited.

Magness v. Kerr, 51 A.L.R.; 55, Lin. 232; 77 Mass. 43; 21 Tex. Civ. App. 604; 108 Ga. 634; 11 Gray (Mass.) 43; 76 Va. 140; 23 Wis. 181; 59 Pa. St. 340; 8 Allen (Mass.) 594; 14 Mass. 491; 46 S.W. 586; 51 Miss. 412.

The deed from Fannie B. Hamilton to the Light, Heat & Water Company conveyed (1) a fee-simple title; but if not, then (2) when Fannie B. Hamilton conveyed by warranty deed to A. J. Hackett, the conditional limitation in her vested, was divested (a) by warranty; or (b) by grant or (c) by mesne conveyance to the city, in possession, as a release.

Fox v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 124 So. 323; Harvey v. Jordan, 111 Miss. 556, 71 So. 824; Morse v. Jordan, 92 So. 690, 129 Miss. 598; Goosey v. Goosey, 48 Miss. 210; Robinson v. Payne, 58 Miss. 690; Hart v. Gardner, 74 Miss. 156; 20 So. 877; Dunbar v. Aldrich, 79 Miss. 698, 31 So. 341; Massey v. Whitaker, 126 Miss. 99, 88 So. 518.

Appellee's contention is, first, that there is no conflict between the granting and the habendum clause, but under both a fee-simple title passed, but if there is a conflict, then that the granting clause controls.

Massie v. Whitaker, 88 So. 519, 126 Miss. 99; Barksdale v. Barksdale, 45 So. 617, 92 Miss. 166; Dunbar v. Aldridge, 79 Miss. 706, 31 So. 341; Monypenny v. Monypenny, 9 H. L. Cas. 146.

Bailey v. Lloyd, 5 Russ. 344; Young v. Smith, 35 Beav. 90, 69 E. C. L. 750; Dickson v. Wildman, 183 F. 398, 403; Robinson v. Paine, 58 Miss. 692; Hart v. Gardner, 74 Miss. 157, 20 So. 877; Hall v. Eastman, Gardiner & Co., 43 So. 5.

While it is perfectly true that there is a distinction between a limitation and a condition subsequent, yet insofar as the divesting of these estates is concerned, the principle here applicable is precisely the same.

Thornton v. Natchez, 88 Miss. 19, 41 So. 498.

To give the right of reverter through the courts, it should be expressed in the instrument that, by devotion of the land to a purpose other than that indicated, the whole estate should revert to the grantor and his heirs.

Soria v. Harrison County, 96 Miss. 114, 50 So. 443; Thornton v. Natchez, 88 Miss. 1, 41 So. 498; Thornton v. Natchez, 129 F. 84; Thornton v. Natchez, 197 U.S. 620; Thornton v. Natchez, 212 U.S. 559; Vicksburg Lodge v. Grand Lodge, 76 So. 575, 116 Miss. 214; N. O., G. N. R. R. Co. v. Belhaven Heights Co., 84 So. 181, 122 Miss. 213; Railroad Co. v. Kamper, 88 Miss. 817, 41 So. 513; Y. & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Lakeview Traction Co., 100 Miss. 281, 56 So. 393; Kent v. Stevenson, 90 So. 242, 127 Miss. 529.

A covenant real of warranty, when annexed to an assurance by feoffment, fine, or common recovery, had not only the ordinary and personal effect of rebutting or repelling the grantor or his heirs from claiming the land, as by force of the estoppel of the deed, but also the much higher operation actually to transfer and pass to the grantee any estate in the land which the grantor may afterwards have acquired.

Rawles Cov't of Title, 319 et seq.; 2 Th. Co. Lt. 353, and N. B. 1; Id. 457; Shepp. Touchst. 204, 210; Burtners v. Keran, 24 Grat. 66; Rawle, Cov't of Title, 320; Bigelow on Estoppel, 337, 360-363; Doe v. Oliver, 5 M. & R. 202; S. C., 2 Smith 511, 514, et seq.; Doswell v. Buchanan, 3 Leigh, 365, 407; Gregory v. People, 80 Va. 357; Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 821; Garner v. Garner, 78 So. 623; 2 Blackstone's Com. 303; Nixon v. Carco, 28 Miss. 426; Aldridge v. Kincaid, 2 Litt. 391; Challis. Real Property (3 Ed.) 76; 116 So. 738; Finkbine Lbr. Co. v. Saucier, 150 Miss. 432; Wills Act, 7 Will, 4; 1 Vict., ch. 26, sec. 33; Farnsworth v. Kimball et al. (1924, Maine), 91 A. Rep. 954; Justice v. May (1917, Ky.), 195 S.W. 98; McClure v. Dee et al. (1902, Iowa), 88 N.W. 1093; Rawle on Covenants for Title (5 Ed.), chap. 11, sec. 238; Kaiser...