Hamilton v. Csx Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005-CA-000454-MR.,2005-CA-000454-MR.
• Citation: 208 S.W.3d 272
• Parties: James S. HAMILTON, Appellant, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

208 S.W.3d 272

James S. HAMILTON, Appellant, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellee.

No. 2005-CA-000454-MR.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

November 9, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James L. Hamilton, Jonah Lee Stevens, Pikeville, KY, for appellant.

James E. Cleveland, III, Ashland, KY, Donald H. Combs, Pikeville, KY, for appellee.

Before HENRY and SCHRODER, Judges; EMBERTON,¹ Senior Judge.

OPINION

HENRY, Judge.

James S. Hamilton appeals from a judgment and jury verdict of the Pike Circuit Court in favor of CSX Transportation, Inc. as to Hamilton's suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. Upon review, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Hamilton began his employment with CSX in 1973 working as a brakeman before later becoming an engineer. His complaint maintained that as a result of the nature of his more than 30 years of employment with CSX at a mine loadout facility, he suffered a number of physical injuries due to repeated exposure to poorly designed locomotives and peculiar loading situations. Hamilton was specifically diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and an injury to his right shoulder. He has undergone carpal tunnel release surgery on both hands and has been advised that he would benefit from an arthroscopic decompression of his right shoulder.

After extensive discovery, trial commenced on the matter on January 10, 2005, with the case finally being presented to the jury for consideration on January 13, 2005 following a four-day trial. The predominant issues before the jury were whether Hamilton's injuries arose out of his employment with CSX and whether CSX was negligent in failing to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work pursuant to FELA. The jury returned with a verdict in favor of CSX, and on January 24, 2005, the trial court entered a judgment reflecting the jury's decision. Hamilton subsequently filed post-trial motions to amend or vacate the verdict or — in the alternative — to grant a new trial, but those motions were denied by the trial court in a February 23, 2005 order. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Hamilton first argues that the instructions tendered to the jury incorrectly stated the law and were confusing, misleading, and biased in favor of CSX. He initially contends that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on "causation" under FELA, and that — consequently — it was impossible for the jury to fairly and accurately apply the law in this case. The instruction in question — titled "Interrogatory No. 1" — reads as follows: "Do you believe from the evidence that the Defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc., was negligent and failed to provide the Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work, and if so, was that failure a substantial cause of Plaintiff's injuries?" Nine members of the jury answered this question with a "No" and consequently reached a verdict for CSX.

Alleged errors regarding jury instructions are considered questions of law that we examine under a de novo standard of review. Reece v. Dixie Warehouse and Cartage Co., 188 S.W.3d 440, 449 (Ky.App. 2006). "Instructions must be based upon the evidence and they must properly and intelligibly state the law." Howard v. Commonwealth, 618 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Ky. 1981). "The purpose of an instruction is to furnish guidance to the jury in their deliberations and to aid them in arriving at a correct verdict. If the statements of law contained in the instructions are substantially correct, they will not be condemned as prejudicial unless they are calculated to mislead the jury." Ballback's Adm'r v. Boland-Maloney Lumber Co., 306 Ky. 647, 652-53, 208 S.W.2d 940, 943 (1948).

What constitutes "negligence" under FELA "is a federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state and local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law formulating and applying the concept governs." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1027, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949). It is well-established that FELA plaintiffs have a lower standard of proof than plaintiffs in ordinary negligence cases. See Harbin v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.1990). A key difference between a statutory FELA action and a common law negligence action is that in order to satisfy the causation element in a FELA action, a plaintiff need only show that the employer "in whole or in part" caused his or her injury. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 507, 77 S.Ct. 443, 449, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). The United States Supreme Court has specifically described the FELA plaintiff's burden as follows: "Under this statute, the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Id., 352 U.S. at 506, 77 S.Ct. at 448. Accordingly, FELA actions are "significantly different" from the ordinary negligence claim. Id., 352 U.S. at 509-10, 77 S.Ct. at 450.

We further note that "for practical purposes the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more than the single question whether negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit. The burden of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the jury may with reason make that inference." Id., 352 U.S. at 508, 77 S.Ct. at 449. "It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee's contributory negligence." Id., 352 U.S. at 506, 77 S.Ct. at 448. As noted by Hamilton, Rogers remains the seminal case on causation under FELA, and has been cited to in this context by the U.S. Supreme Court as recently as 2003. See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261 (2003).

Hamilton argues that Interrogatory No. 1's use of the words "substantial cause" as the required standard for causation was incorrect. We agree. Given the aforementioned text of Rogers, it is clear that the causation instruction given by the trial court was an erroneous one. Nothing within that case suggests that a plaintiff must show "substantial cause" to prevail in a FELA case. Indeed, if anything, it holds exactly the opposite. A similar instruction was rejected as error in Denton v. Southern Ry. Co., 854 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. Ct.App.1993). There, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the trial court's instruction that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff only to the extent that its negligence was a "substantial contributing factor" to the plaintiff's injuries was reversible error because "the employee's burden to prove causation is slight." Id. at 888; see also Parker v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 263 Cal.App.2d 675, 678, 70 Cal.Rptr. 8, 10 (Cal.Ct.App.1968) ("The negligence of the employer need not be the sole cause or even a substantial cause of the ensuing injury."); Snyder v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 521 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct.App.1973) ("In a conventional case of actionable negligence, the conduct causing harm to another must be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. In a FELA action, on the other hand, only slight negligence need be shown, so that the risk of non-persuasion is much less than required for recovery in an ordinary negligence action."); Cwick v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 167 A.D.2d 962, 962, 562 N.Y.S.2d 302, 303, (N.Y.App.Div.1990) ("[T]he court denied each request and charged that any negligent act is a proximate cause if a defendant's conduct is a `substantial factor' in bringing about the harm. . . . That charge is appropriate for ordinary negligence but not for Jones Act liability."); McKillip v. Union Pac. R. Co., 11 Wash.App. 829, 525 P.2d 842, 844 (1974) ("The negligence of the employer need not be even a substantial cause of the ensuing injury.").

Accordingly, the question becomes whether the error here is of such a prejudicial nature that it merits a new trial. "In this jurisdiction it is a rule of longstanding and frequent repetition that erroneous instructions to the jury are presumed to be prejudicial; that an appellee claiming harmless error bears the burden of showing affirmatively that no prejudice resulted from the error." McKinney v. Heisel, 947 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Ky.1997). "It is only in a case which is clear and free of all doubt on the point that an instruction which is erroneous can be said by the court to have been without prejudicial effect on the minds of some of the jurors." Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Buckles, 298 Ky. 681, 684, 183 S.W.2d 965, 966 (1944). We also note that when we "cannot determine from the record that the verdict was not influenced by the erroneous instruction, the judgment will be reversed." Prichard v. Kitchen, 242 S.W.2d 988, 992 (Ky.1951).

CSX argues that, even assuming that Interrogatory No. 1 was erroneous, Hamilton is not entitled to a new trial because the instructions, as a whole, correctly advised the jury of the law. "Where an instruction, taken as a whole, fairly and properly expresses the law applicable to the case, no just ground for complaint exists, even though an isolated or detached clause or expression is in itself inaccurate or incomplete." Speith v. Helm, 301 Ky. 451, 455-56, 192 S.W.2d 376, 378 (1946). As CSX further indicates, this view was also set forth by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tyree v. New York Cent. R. Co., 382 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.1967), a case relied upon by both parties and another FELA action in which jury instructions were in issue. Specifically, the Court there stated:

In considering the correctness and adequacy of a charge to the jury, it should be taken as a whole and read in its entirety; that is, each...