Hamilton v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole

• Decision Date: 24 July 2014
• Parties: In the Matter of Samuel HAMILTON, Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 1268

990 N.Y.S.2d 714

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05487

In the Matter of Samuel HAMILTON, Appellant,

v.NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 24, 2014.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP, New York City (Christopher L. Filburn of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel), for respondents.

Before: PETERS, P.J., GARRY, ROSE, EGAN JR. and CLARK, JJ.

CLARK, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), entered November 14, 2013 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parole release.

Petitioner has served approximately 30 years on an aggregate sentence of 18 years to life in prison for his conviction of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. The convictions stemmed from a February 1982 incident in which an off-duty police officer was killed by petitioner's accomplice during an attempted robbery. Petitioner made his latest of numerous appearances before the Board of Parole in August 2012, and his request for release was denied. He was ordered to be held an additional 24 months. After the Division of Parole failed to timely respond to his administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and petitioner now appeals.

We affirm. The procedures governing parole are set forth in Executive Law article 12–B. Executive Law § 259–i(5) dictates the scope of our review, providing that “[a]ny action by the [B]oard or by a hearing officer pursuant to this article shall be deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law.” The Court of Appeals has long interpreted that language—in both current and prior statutes—to mean that “so long as the Board violates no positive statutory requirement, its discretionis absolute and beyond review in the courts” (Matter of Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 257, 56 N.E.2d 572 [1944];see Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476–478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000] ). In New York, it is “the ... Board [that] holds the power to decide whether to release a sentenced prisoner on parole” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501). As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]o require the [Board] to act in accordance with judicial expectations ... would substantially undermine the [legislative] decision to entrust release determinations to the [Board] and not the courts” (Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 76–77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225 [1980] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Absent failure by the Board to comply with the mandates of Executive Law article 12–B, “[j]udicial intervention is warranted only when there is a ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501, quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d at 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225;see Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 [2005] ). Thus, as the Court of Appeals further stated in Silmon, “we review whether the Board's decision to deny parole was arbitrary or capricious” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501).¹

Executive Law article 12–B mandates that “[d]iscretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct” (Executive Law § 259–i[2][c][A] ). Rather, the Board must consider whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he [or she] will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his [or her] release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his [or her] crime as to undermine respect for law” (Executive Law § 259–i[2][c][A] ). The decision to grant parole release is discretionary, but the Board is required to consider certain guidelines in making its determination ( see Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501). Those guidelines include the inmate's institutional record (goals and accomplishments, academic achievement, vocational education, training and work assignments, therapy and interaction with staff), release plans, statements by the crime victim, the seriousness of the offense considering type and length of sentence, recommendations of the sentencing court and district attorney, the presentence probation report, mitigating or aggravating factors to the crime, activities following arrest prior to confinement, and prior criminal record (Executive Law § 259–i[2][c][A][i], [iii], [v], [vii], [viii] ).

While the Board is required to detail the reasons for a denial of discretionary release ( seeExecutive Law § 259–i[2][a][i] ), the Court of Appeals has ruled that the “Board need not expressly discuss each of these guidelines in its determination” (Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954, 632 N.E.2d 1277 [1994] ), and we are bound by that ruling. The Court of Appeals has also explained that “the statutory scheme is such that no judicial review of the merits in any case is possible ” (Matter of Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. at 257, 56 N.E.2d 572 [emphasis added] ).² These principles, which are derived from the statute itself, underlie our limited and deferential review of the Board's decisions. Consistent with them, we have ruled that “our role is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors” in reviewing the Board's determination that the violent nature of the crimes for which petitioner was convicted outweighed his exemplary institutional behavior and extensive evidence of rehabilitation ( Matter of Comfort v. New York State Div. of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 1296, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 [2009] ). In that case, we explained that, although we review the Board's ultimate determination on a standard of “irrationality bordering on impropriety” ( Matter of Comfort v. New York State Div. of Parole, 68 A.D.3d at 1297, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ), we cannot “effectively review the Board's weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior” ( id. at 1296, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 [emphasis added] ).

In that regard, the Court of Appeals has held that the Board rationally denied parole release to a petitioner—who “was a productive citizen and model prisoner [and] who enthusiastically engaged in educational and vocational programs, taught other prisoners and wrote about prison life”—based upon the brutality of his crime and his continuing to maintain his innocence of that crime (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501). Similarly, this Court has repeatedly held—both recently and historically—that, so long as the Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute, it is “entitled ... to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime” (Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 [2014],lv. granted23 N.Y.3d 903, 2014 WL 1887296 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992, 992–993, 979 N.Y.S.2d 868 [2014];Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164 [2013];Matter of McCaskell v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 926, 927, 969 N.Y.S.2d 603 [2013];Matter of Vigliotti v. State of N.Y. Exec. Div. of Parole, 98 A.D.3d 789, 790, 950 N.Y.S.2d 619 [2012],lv. dismissed20 N.Y.3d 1034, 960 N.Y.S.2d 347, 984 N.E.2d 322 [2013];Matter of Gonzalez v. Chair, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 1368, 1369, 898 N.Y.S.2d 737 [2010];Matter of Lue–Shing v. Pataki, 301 A.D.2d 827, 828, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96 [2003],lv. denied99 N.Y.2d 511, 760 N.Y.S.2d 102, 790 N.E.2d 276 [2003];People ex rel. McCormack v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 244 A.D.2d 673, 673, 664 N.Y.S.2d 181 [1997];Matter of Walker v. New York State Div. of Parole, 203 A.D.2d 757, 758–759, 610 N.Y.S.2d 397 [1994];Matter of Ittig v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 59 A.D.2d 972, 399 N.Y.S.2d 279 [1977],lv. denied43 N.Y.2d 648, 403 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 374 N.E.2d 630 [1978];but see Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 434, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 [1993],aff'd on other grounds83 N.Y.2d 788, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954, 632 N.E.2d 1277 [1994] [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that the Board may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not outweighing the seriousness of the crime] ).

Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner's institutional behavior and accomplishments are “exemplary,” the Board may place “particular emphasis” on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in denying parole, as long as the relevant statutory factors are considered (Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 A.D.3d at 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758). In so holding, we explained that, despite petitioner's admirable educational and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history, “[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in accordance with the requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety” ( id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). We emphasize that this Court has repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing...