Hammer v. Am. Kennel Club
Decision Date | 23 December 2003 |
Citation | 1 N.Y.3d 294,771 N.Y.S.2d 493,803 N.E.2d 766 |
Parties | JON H. HAMMER, Appellant, v. AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB et al., Respondents. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Joseph P. Foley, Irvington, Jon H. Hammer, New York City, and Leslie K. Anker for appellant.
Seward & Kissel, LLP, New York City (Dale C. Christensen, Jr., John J. Galban and Jonathan D. Matkowsky of counsel), for American Kennel Club, Inc., respondent. Hartman & Craven LLP, New York City (Debra I. Resnick of counsel), for Brittany Club of America, respondent.
Kellner Chehebar & Deveney, New York City (Douglas A. Kellner of counsel), for Labrador Retriever Club, Inc. and others, amici curiae.
Plaintiff Jon H. Hammer is the owner of a purebred Brittany Spaniel dog with a 10-inch-long natural tail. Defendant American Kennel Club (AKC) sponsors competitions that utilize a breed standard promulgated by defendant American Brittany Club (ABC). The standard penalizes Brittany Spaniels with tails longer than four inches. The issue in this appeal is whether Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 grants plaintiff, who wishes to enter his dog and compete without penalty in breed contests, a private right of action to preclude defendants from using a standard that encourages him to "dock" his Brittany Spaniel's tail. Because we conclude that it would be inconsistent with the applicable legislative scheme to imply a private right of action in plaintiff's favor, we affirm the Appellate Division order dismissing the complaint.
Defendant ABC is the national parent club for Brittany Spaniels and is one of 148 different breed clubs affiliated with defendant AKC. As explained in AKC's official publication, "The Complete Dog Book," members of breed clubs vote to adopt particular standards, which are then submitted to the AKC for approval and use in AKC-sanctioned competitions, such as the Westminster Kennel Club show. According to defendants, these standards represent the "ideal" for each breed and establish guidelines for dog show judges, breeders and purchasers of purebred dogs.
Defendants' standard for Brittany Spaniels provides that dogs should be Notably, unlike other deviations from the standards, such as height and coloration, a longer tail does not disqualify a dog from competition. In 2001, plaintiff commenced this action against defendants for declaratory and injunctive relief. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that the Brittany Spaniel breed standard encourages owners to violate Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, a penal statute prohibiting animal cruelty, because it is cruel to dock a dog's tail. Plaintiff claims that defendants discriminate against him by excluding him from meaningful participation in AKC competitions because he is unwilling to dock his dog's tail. He therefore seeks a declaration that the breed standard violates New York law and an injunction precluding defendants from using the allegedly illegal standard in judging breed competitions.
AKC and ABC moved separately to dismiss the action, arguing that plaintiff lacked standing to secure civil relief for the alleged violation of section 353. Supreme Court consolidated the motions and granted defendants relief, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two Justices dissenting, and we now affirm.
Article 26 of the Agriculture and Markets Law regulates the treatment of animals and contains provisions previously codified in the former Penal Code, Penal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure. Plaintiff relies on section 353 of that article, which states that a person who "cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures,...
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