Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 June 1989
• Citation: 543 N.Y.S.2d 18,541 N.E.2d 18,73 N.Y.2d 629
• Parties: , 541 N.E.2d 18 Margaret A. SHEEHY, et al., Appellants, v. BIG FLATS COMMUNITY DAY, INC., et al., Defendants, and American Legion Ernest Skinner Memorial Post 1612, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 18

543 N.Y.S.2d 18

73 N.Y.2d 629, 541 N.E.2d 18

Margaret A. SHEEHY, et al., Appellants, v. BIG FLATS COMMUNITY DAY, INC., et al., Defendants and American Legion Ernest Skinner Memorial Post 1612, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 6, 1989.

[541 N.E.2d 19] James B. Reed, for appellants.

[73 N.Y.2d 631] William S. Yaus and Patricia M. Curtin, Binghamton, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

Penal Law § 260.20(4), which makes it a crime for anyone but a parent or guardian to furnish alcoholic beverages to a person who is under the legal purchase age, does not give rise to an implied private right of action in favor of such a person who has been injured as a result of his or her own consumption of alcohol. Accordingly, since recovery under traditional common-law tort principles is also precluded on this record, this minor plaintiff's complaint against the party that furnished her with alcohol was properly dismissed.

On the evening of June 24, 1983, plaintiff Margaret Sheehy, who was then 17 years old, attended the "Big Flats Community Days" celebration, an outdoor event that was sponsored by defendant Big Flats Community Days, Inc. (Big Flats). According to the allegations in her complaint, Sheehy was served several beers in a beer tent operated by defendant American Legion Ernest Skinner Memorial Post 1612 (American Legion). Sheehy claimed that she had not been asked for proof of her age before she was admitted to the tent or served. At the time of the incident the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages in New York was 19 (Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 [former (1) ], as amended by L.1982, ch. 159, § 1).

An affidavit submitted by one of Sheehy's witnesses alleged that she entered the American Legion beer tent for the second time just before midnight and was served additional beers, although she was staggering and was visibly intoxicated. She then crossed the highway and entered the bar operated by defendant Driscoll's Tavern, Inc. (Driscoll's), where she was served another alcoholic beverage. When Sheehy attempted to cross the highway and return to the grounds of the "Community Days" celebration, she was struck by an automobile and severely injured.

Sheehy commenced the present action against Big Flats, American Legion and Driscoll's, claiming that their conduct in serving her alcoholic beverages in violation of law was the proximate cause of the accident. Defendant American Legion, the only defendant involved in this appeal, denied the factual allegations in Sheehy's complaint, alleging instead that plaintiff had been asked for proof of her age before having been served and that she had displayed a false driver's license. Defendant also claimed that Sheehy had immediately been told to leave the beer tent after she was recognized by someone who knew her true age.

In response to American Legion's motion for summary judgment, Supreme Court dismissed Sheehy's asserted causes of action against that defendant. ¹ Viewing the complaint's allegations and the supporting submissions in the light most favorable to Sheehy, the court nevertheless concluded that neither her common-law claim nor the claim based upon a violation of Penal Law § 260.20(4) ² was legally maintainable. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the existence of a recently enacted statute providing for civil liability in cases involving the provision of alcoholic beverages to individuals under the legal purchase age (General Obligations Law § 11-100) precluded an inference that the Legislature intended a judicially created right of recovery based upon the Penal Law provision (137 A.D.2d 160, 163-164, 528 N.Y.S.2d 213). The court then granted Sheehy leave to appeal to this court, certifying the following question of law: "Did this court err as a matter of law in affirming the order of Supreme Court partially granting a motion by defendant American Legion * * * for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it?"

The primary issue on this appeal, an issue on which there has been some disagreement among the Appellate Divisions (compare, 137 A.D.2d 160, 528 N.Y.S.2d 213, supra, with Stambach v. Pierce, 136 A.D.2d 329, 527 N.Y.S.2d 145), is whether a private right of action for damages exists under Penal Law § 260.20(4). At the time of Sheehy's accident, that statute imposed criminal penalties on any person, other than a parent or guardian, who "gives or sells or causes to be given or sold any alcoholic beverage * * * to a child less than nineteen years old" (Penal Law § 260.20[4], as amended L.1982, ch. 159, § 4). ³ Since the statute does not make express provision for civil damages, recovery under Penal Law § 260.20(4) may be had only if a private right of action may fairly be implied.

Of central importance in this inquiry is the test set forth in Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 451 N.E.2d 459; see also, CPC Intl. v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 514 N.E.2d 116. Under that test, the essential factors to be considered are: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme (CPC Intl. v. McKesson Corp., isupra, at 276-277, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 514 N.E.2d 116; Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, supra, 59 N.Y.2d at 329-331, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 451 N.E.2d 459). It was the third prong of this test that led to a rejection of a private right of action in CPC Intl. v. McKesson Corp. (supra), one of the more recent applications of the Burns Jackson analysis. We reach the same result here.

In this case, there is no doubt that the first, and perhaps most easily satisfied prong of the Burns Jackson test has been met. The statutory provision criminalizing the provision of alcoholic beverages to those under the legal purchase age (Penal Law § 260.20[4], which is located within the Penal Law article dealing with offenses against children and incompetents (Penal Law art. 260), was unquestionably intended, at least in part, to protect such individuals from the health and safety dangers of alcohol consumption, dangers of which their limited experience provides little warning (see, People v. Arriaga, 45 Misc.2d 399, 401, 257 N.Y.S.2d 66; Governor's Mem of Approval, 1985 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., at 3288, quoted in Hechtman, 1985 Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law § 260.20, 1989 Cum.Ann. Pocket Part, at 87; see also, People v. Martell, 16 N.Y.2d 245, 247, 264 N.Y.S.2d 913, 212 N.E.2d 433). Plaintiff, who was under the legal purchase age at the time of her accident, was clearly within this category.

Similarly, it cannot be denied that recognition of a private right of action for civil damages would, as a general matter, advance the legislative purpose. In making the provision of alcohol to individuals under the legal purchase age a crime, the Legislature plainly intended to create a deterrent for those who might, intentionally or carelessly, engage in the proscribed conduct. Obviously, permitting civil damage suits for injuries arising from the same conduct would also further this deterrent goal.

These conclusions, however, do not end the inquiry. In addition to determining whether Sheehy was within the intended protected class and whether permitting her claim would advance the legislative goal, we must, "most importantly, [determine] the consistency of doing so with the purposes underlying the legislative scheme" (Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, supra, 59 N.Y.2d at 325, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 451 N.E.2d 459 [emphasis supplied]. For, the Legislature has both the right and the authority to select the methods to be used in effectuating its goals, as well as to choose the goals themselves. Thus, regardless of its consistency with the basic legislative goal, a private right of action should not be judicially sanctioned if it is incompatible with the enforcement mechanism chosen by the Legislature or with some other aspect of the over-all statutory scheme (see, CPC Intl. v. McKesson Corp., supra, 70 N.Y.2d at 276, 277, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 514 N.E.2d 116).

In this case, in addition to establishing criminal penalties for the provision of alcoholic beverages to individuals under the legal purchase age, the Legislature has deliberately adopted a scheme for affording civil damages to those injured by the negligent or unlawful dispensation of alcohol. General Obligations Law § 11-101 (the Dram Shop Act), which applies only to commercial alcoholic beverage sales (D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896), expressly provides for a right of action by any person "injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise by any intoxicated person" against the person who unlawfully sold or assisted in the procuring of the intoxicated person's alcohol. However, this statute has been held not to authorize recovery in favor of the individual whose intoxication resulted from the unlawful sale (see, e.g., Mitchell v. The Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 338, 340-341, 280 N.Y.S.2d 113, 227 N.E.2d 21; Reuter v. Flobo Enters., 120 A.D.2d 722, 503 N.Y.S.2d 67; Allen v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772, appeal dismissed 66 N.Y.2d 915, 498 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 489 N.E.2d 773; Matalavage v. Sadler, 77 A.D.2d 39, 432 N.Y.S.2d 103; Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, 19 A.D.2d 523, 240 N.Y.S.2d 277, affd. 14 N.Y.2d 792, 251 N.Y.S.2d 30, 200 N.E.2d 212).

Even more to the point, General Obligations Law § 11-100, which was enacted in 1983, provides for recovery against a person who knowingly caused a young person's intoxication by furnishing alcoholic beverages, with or without charge, "with knowledge or reasonable cause to...