Hampton v. Hobbs, 96-3524

• Decision Date: 13 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-3524,96-3524
• Parties: Lee HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ron HOBBS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1281

106 F.3d 1281

65 USLW 2584

Lee HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ron HOBBS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-3524.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Feb. 13, 1997.

Michael I. Kanovitz, Stites & Harbison, Louisville, KY, Eric M. Jaegers (argued and briefed), Louisville, KY, for Lee Hampton.

Lee Hampton, Orient, OH, pro se.

Todd R. Marti (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, OH, for Ron Hobbs.

Jacob M. Lewis (argued), Richard A. Olderman (briefed), U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, for U.S.

Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; ENGEL and COLE, Circuit Judges.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Chief Judge.

Lee Hampton, a prisoner, initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest and retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant and dismissed the case. Hampton filed a timely notice of appeal from that order and subsequently filed a motion with this Court to proceed in forma pauperis. This Court raised several issues regarding the constitutionality of the fee requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L.No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (amending in forma pauperis provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915), and appointed counsel to address the following matters:

(1) Whether the filing fee requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 violate a prisoner's right of access to the courts.

(2) Whether the filing fee requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 violate a prisoner's First Amendment rights.

(3) Whether the filing fee requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 violate a prisoner's Fifth Amendment guarantee of Equal Protection.

(4) Whether the filing fee requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 violate a prisoner's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process.

(5) Whether the filing fee requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.

Hampton's fee status was held in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal.

The merits of Hampton's suit are not before us today. The sole issue for us to consider concerns the constitutionality of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's fee provisions, and the facts upon which Hampton's action is based are not germane to the resolution of that issue. Accordingly, a sketch of the relevant provisions of the Act is the only background necessary.

Section 1915(a)(2) requires that "a prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action without prepayment of fees" must: (1) file an affidavit stating the prisoner's assets and that the prisoner is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor, and (2) submit a certified copy of the prisoner's trust fund account statement for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a)(2). Section 1915(b)(1) provides the following:

Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of--

(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's account; or

(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(1). Thus, although all prisoners are required to pay an initial partial filing fee, payment of this fee is made only when funds exist. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner must make monthly payments equal to 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account, but payments will be extracted only in months when the prisoner's trust fund account exceeds ten dollars ($10). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(3).

Despite the requirements of the aforementioned sections, section 1915(b)(4) provides that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(4). The Act's fee requirements are further tempered by section 1915(f)(1), which allows judgment to be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit. Thus, prisoners can recoup their costs if their claim is successful. Moreover, the Act does not affect an inmate's ability to seek relief in state court or through state grievance procedures.

I. Right of Access to the Courts

While the constitutional source of the right of access to the courts is somewhat nebulous, "the parameters of the doctrine are relatively clear." Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1003 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973, 113 S.Ct. 1415, 122 L.Ed.2d 786 (1993). "Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (citing Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941)). " '[M]eaningful access' to the courts is the touchstone," Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2444, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974)), and courts must determine whether "inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful," Id. at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495. See also Lewis v. Casey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).

The fee requirements placed on prisoners under the Prison Litigation Reform Act do not deprive them of adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts. While the amendments to section 1915 require the prisoner to pay an initial partial filing fee and monthly payments thereafter, those requirements are tempered significantly by the other provisions of the Act. The Act requires a court to collect the initial fee only when "funds exist." Therefore, a prisoner without funds will not be denied access to a federal court based on his poverty. Congress made this point explicit in subsection (b)(4) of the statute, which provides that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).

Moreover, once the initial filing fee is paid, the payments are slight. The Act requires a prisoner to pay the monthly charge of 20 percent of his preceding month's income only if the account exceeds ten dollars ($10). If the prisoner has less than ten dollars ($10) in his account, no payment is required for that month. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(2). Furthermore, if a prisoner is successful in his suit, the Act allows judgment to be rendered for costs, which could return any funds remitted to the court by the prisoner and absolve him of any future payments.

Although no evidence has been provided concerning the hardship to prisoners subjected to this Act, Hampton has not argued that he, nor prisoners in general, would be unable to afford a fee assessed under the Act. In fact, the Act and a prisoner's lack of other significant expenses support the United States' assertion that the fee provisions will not result in any real hardship above that faced by the average citizen considering whether to bring a lawsuit. Indeed, when the time for a payment arises under the Act, the amount due from a prisoner is based on a fraction of a prisoner's assets. Moreover, it is important to note that prisoners are in the custody of the state and have the "essentials of life" provided at government expense. Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 523 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153, 102 S.Ct. 1023, 71 L.Ed.2d 309 (1982) ("A prisoner is assured of the necessities of life, housing, food, clothing and medical care at state expense. His financial needs are thus not similar to those of a person in ordinary life."). Accordingly, the burden placed on prisoners by the fee requirements is slight and does not preclude adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts.

This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that prisoners asserting civil claims in federal court have never been guaranteed a "free ride." We have previously upheld the constitutionality of assessments of costs against indigent prisoners. In Weaver v. Toombs, 948 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir.1991)--a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deprivation of various constitutional rights--we addressed indigent prisoners' claim that an order taxing costs in the amount of $128 and allowing the costs to be satisfied by direct resort to plaintiffs' prison accounts violated the prisoners' right of access to the courts, equal protection, and due process. Although the Prison Litigation Reform Act overrules the procedural aspects of Weaver, our constitutional analysis of the imposition of costs in that case remains instructive. We upheld the constitutionality of the assessment and found, as to the prisoners' access claim:

Plaintiffs were simply not denied access to federal court, and whether or not they proceed originally in good faith is immaterial to the question of access. Their alleged "constitutional right to file a non-frivolous suit" was not precluded, nor was their right to pursue what they perceived to be a non-frivolous appeal abridged.

Id. at 1009. We noted that the possibility that such costs will be imposed on prisoners " 'assure[s] that litigants will be required to assess the relative merits and risks of litigation before they proceed.' " Id. at 1008 (quoting Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir.1981), cert....