Hampton v. Pa. R. Co., s. 24, 28.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1935
• Docket Number: Nos. 24, 28.,s. 24, 28.
• Citation: 179 A. 101
• Parties: HAMPTON et al. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. et al. CLEMENT v. SAME.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

179 A. 101

HAMPTON et al.

v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. et al.

CLEMENT

v. SAME.

Nos. 24, 28.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 17, 1935.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, CASE, DONGES, and HEHER, Justices, and KAYS, Judge, dissenting in part.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Suits by Luler Hampton, administratrix ad prosequendum of Charles Hampton, deceased, and by Herbert Clement, against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and another. From the judgments, the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Wall, Haight, Carey & Hartpence, of Jersey City, for appellants.

Richard J. Mackey, of New York City, for respondents.

PERSKIE, Justice.

Case No. 24 (Hampton v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company et al.) is a representative suit under our Death Act. Chapter 287, P. L. 1913, p. 586; Cumm. Supp. to Comp. St. 1911-1924, pp. 927, 928, § 55—8. During the trial of this cause the judge permitted the witness George F. Salter, an insurance actuary, to testify from mortality tables, the authenticity of which was not challenged [Notto v. Atlantic City R. R. Co., 75 N. J. Law, 826, 69 A. 968, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1138, 127 Am. St. Rep. 835], as to the expectancy of life of the deceased and his widow. There was no objection to this testimony. The trial judge also permitted the same witness, over objection and exception, to testify as to the expectancy of life of the three children of the decedent and widow, who were of the ages of 16, 14, and 12 years, respectively. The testimony was that the expectancy of life of these children, based on the mortality tables, was in the order of their ages above stated. 44.3, 45.7, and 47.3 years, respectively.

Appellants urge, but offer no authority in support thereof, that the admission of this testimony constituted reversible error. We do not think so.

It is fundamental that evidence is admissible when it is relevant, material, and competent. Apfelbaum v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 169 A. 677, 12 N. J. Misc. 62.

In the case of Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. Law, 646, 40 A. 634, this court, considering the propriety of the admission of the Carlisle Table of Mortality, held that standard mortality tables may be used, in a judicial proceeding, to aid in determining the probable duration of human life; that they do not furnish an absolute rule of computation; they, however, may help to form the judgment. But the authenticity of the mortality table used must be established by competent evidence. Notto v. Atlantic City R. R. Co., supra. And this court in the case of Dickerson v. Mutual Grocery Co., 100 N. J. Law, 118, 124 A. 785, by Mr. Justice Parker, extended the admissibility of mortality tables (Carlisle Table of Mortality and the chancery table based thereon) to damage suits at law, in other than those involving death, and where the probable duration of life of a living plaintiff is a factor in the appraisal of damages, subject, however, to proper precautionary instructions, i. e. explanation and limitation of the evidential force and value of such testimony, by the trial judge to the jury. Again, this court in Auer v. Sinclair Refining Co., 103 N. J. Law, 372, by Mr. Justice Trenchard, held on page 375, 137 A. 555, 557, 54 A. L. R. 623: "* * * in a damage suit at law the rule is that an expert witness may make use of the Carlisle table of mortality for the purpose of showing the average expectancy of human life, or the present value of the alleged loss of income based on that expectancy, when, as here, such matters are factors in the appraisal of damages. Camden, Etc., Railroad Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. Law, 646, 40 A. 634; Notto v. Atlantic City Railroad Co., 75 N. J. Law, 826, 69 A. 968, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1138, 127 Am. St. Rep. 835; Dickerson v. Mutual Grocery Co., 100 N. J. Law, 118, 124 A. 785; Steinbrunner v. Pittsburgh, etc., Railroad Co., 146 Pa. 504, 23 A. 239, 28 Am. St. Rep. 806; Shover v. Myrick, 4 Ind. App. 7, 30 N. E. 207." Compare Apfelbaum v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, supra; Hendershot v. New York, S. & W. R. Co. 138 A. 206, 5 N. J. Misc. 727, 732; Mandel v. Public Service Transp. Co., 147 A. 920, 7 N. J. Misc. 954.

On these well-established principles of law we approach the concrete problem presented: What were the determinative factors in appraising the damages sustained by the children? The pertinent provision of the Death Act, supra, is as follows: "* * * and in every such action, the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such...