Hampton v. Scales

Decision Date05 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. COA15–1335.,COA15–1335.
Citation789 S.E.2d 478,248 N.C.App. 144
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
Parties Duron Lamar HAMPTON, Plaintiff, v. Andrew T. SCALES, Defendant.

The Law Office of Charles M. Putterman, P.C., Raleigh, by Charles M. Putterman, for plaintiff-appellant.

Poyner Spruill LLP, Charlotte, by E. Fitzgerald Parnell, III, T. Richard Kane, and J.M. Durnovich, for defendant-appellee.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Duron Hampton (plaintiff) appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Andrew Scales (defendant) on plaintiff's claim of legal malpractice against defendant. Defendant previously represented plaintiff on eight charges of second-degree rape and one charge of crime against nature. On appeal plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment against him, on the grounds that the evidence before the trial court presented a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether defendant's representation of plaintiff on these charges met the applicable standard of care. We conclude that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant and that its order should be affirmed.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 30 June 2011, Sharon Thomas reported to Albemarle Police Officer Star Gaines that her fifteen-year-old daughter "Tina"1 had been having sex with a twenty-one year old man whom Tina identified as "Run Run." Plaintiff has admitted that he was previously known by the nickname Run Run. Detective Cindi Rinehart investigated Ms. Thomas's allegation. During this investigation, Tina was evaluated at the Butterfly House Children's Advocacy House ("Butterfly House"), where she was interviewed by Registered Nurse Amy Yow, a licensed forensic interviewer and a certified sexual assault nurse examiner. Nurse Yow first conducted a videotaped interview of Tina, during which Tina told Nurse Yow that she had previously had sexual relations with three men, whom she identified as "DeShawn," "Frankie," and "Cameron." At the end of the videotaped portion of the interview, Nurse Yow and Tina were joined by certified nurse midwife Rebecca Huneycutt, who performed a comprehensive physical examination of Tina. As Nurse Yow, Nurse Huneycutt, and Tina walked to the examination room, Tina told the two nurses that she had also had sex with plaintiff, whom she identified as Run Run. Officer Gaines, Detective Rinehart, Nurse Yow, and Nurse Huneycutt each executed an affidavit averring that Tina had stated that she had sex with plaintiff. In addition, Detective Rinehart obtained a statement from D.H., a friend of Tina's, in which D.H. stated that Tina had called D.H. on more than ten occasions to talk about having sexual intercourse with plaintiff.

Detective Rinehart also reviewed Tina's school records. In 2002, when Tina was six years old and in kindergarten, testing indicated that her I.Q. was around 64 and she was classified by the school system as being an "educable mentally disabled" student. When Tina was reevaluated in 2009, she was classified as having a "mild" intellectual disability. In her interview with Nurse Yow, Tina reported that she was in a "special class" at school.

On 14 February 2012, arrest warrants were issued charging plaintiff with eight charges of second-degree rape, in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–27.3,2 and one charge of crime against nature in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–177. The charges of second-degree rape alleged that plaintiff had engaged in intercourse with a person who is mentally disabled. These warrants were served on plaintiff while he was in the Stanly County jail on other charges. After plaintiff was charged with these offenses, he sent a note to Detective Rinehart asking her to obtain "a good plea offer" that would enable plaintiff to be released from jail and return to his wife and child.

On 2 March 2012, defendant was appointed by the Court to represent plaintiff on these charges. Plaintiff sent several notes to defendant. None of the letters in the record that were written by plaintiff to defendant include any assertion by plaintiff that he was factually innocent of the charged offenses or that he wanted a jury trial. Instead, all of plaintiff's notes urgently requested defendant to negotiate a plea bargain that would enable plaintiff to be released from jail as soon as possible. For example, on one occasion plaintiff wrote the following to defendant:

Sir, I am not trying to fight these charges in no way. I have a wife and daughter at home that desperately need me. You are the best attorney for this case. I just want to plea out. These charges are from last year before I went to prison, and I'm truly a changed person with responsibilities. I was attending college before these new charges. I am no longer breaking laws, getting in all kinds of mess.... I'm asking for you [to] please get my life back. This is it for me. My family is my everything. Please move speedily on a plea of any kind of probation. I'll take it.

Defendant was successful in negotiating a plea bargain with the prosecutor and on 27 April 2012, plaintiff pleaded guilty to one charge of taking indecent liberties in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–202.1 (2014), a Class F felony. Plaintiff entered a guilty plea pursuant to N.C. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). "A defendant enters into an Alford plea when he proclaims he is innocent, but intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt." State v. Chery, 203 N.C.App. 310, 314, 691 S.E.2d 40, 44 (2010) (citation omitted). In exchange for plaintiff's guilty plea, the prosecutor dismissed the eight charges of second-degree rape and the charge of crime against nature. Plaintiff was released from jail, placed on probation, and required to register with the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry. Additional details about the charges against plaintiff will be discussed below, as relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

About a year after pleading guilty to taking indecent liberties, plaintiff obtained a signed statement from Tina stating that she and plaintiff had not had any sexual contact. Plaintiff retained defendant to prepare a motion for appropriate relief, and Mr. Patrick Currie was appointed to represent plaintiff in court. A hearing on plaintiff's motion for appropriate relief was conducted by Judge Anna Wagoner on 13 May 2013, at which testimony was elicited from Ms. Thomas and Tina in support of plaintiff's contention that in 2011 Tina had falsely accused him of having sexual relations with her. On 24 May 2013, Judge Wagoner entered an order granting plaintiff's motion for appropriate relief, setting aside his guilty plea, dismissing all charges against plaintiff related to sexual contact with Tina, and removing plaintiff from the Sex Offender Registry.

On 24 July 2014, plaintiff filed the instant suit against defendant seeking damages for legal malpractice and asserting that defendant had been negligent in his representation of plaintiff on the criminal charges discussed above. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had failed to "properly investigate" the charges against him and had mistakenly told plaintiff that during the videotaped portion of Tina's interview she named plaintiff as one of the men with whom she had sex. Plaintiff did not identify any specific damages, but alleged generally that as a "direct and proximate result" of defendant's negligence plaintiff had "sustained pecuniary damages, mental anguish and emotional distress[.]" Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on 1 July 2015. Following a hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court entered an order on 13 July 2015 granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff has appealed to this Court from the summary judgment order entered against him.

II. Standard of Review

Pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 56(c) (2014), summary judgment is properly entered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1 Rule 56(e) requires that evidence presented to the trial court on a motion for summary judgment must be admissible at trial. " ‘When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’ " Ron Medlin Constr. v. Harris, 364 N.C. 577, 580, 704 S.E.2d 486, 488 (2010) (quoting In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) ).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that there is no triable issue of material fact. This burden may be met "by proving that an essential element of the opposing party's claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim."

DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 355 N.C. 672, 681, 565 S.E.2d 140, 146 (2002) (quoting Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989) ) (other citation omitted). " [O]nce the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.’ " Pacheco v. Rogers & Breece, Inc., 157 N.C.App. 445, 448, 579 S.E.2d 505, 507 (2003) (quoting Gaunt v. Pittaway, 139 N.C.App. 778, 784–85, 534 S.E.2d 660, 664 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810 (2001) ).

In the course of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, " [a] verified complaint may be treated as an affidavit...

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