Hampton v. State, 57625

• Citation: 495 S.W.2d 638
• Decision Date: 11 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 57625,No. 1,57625,1
• Parties: Robert HAMPTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 638

495 S.W.2d 638

Robert HAMPTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 57625.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 11, 1973.

Harold I. Elbert, Stanley T. Bjurstrom, St. Louis, for appellant.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

HIGGINS, Commissioner.

Appeal (taken prior to January 1, 1972) from denial, after evidentiary hearing, of motion under Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., to vacate and set aside judgments of conviction and sentences to seven years' imprisonment, entered upon pleas of guilty to charges of robbery, first degree, by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, and assault with intent to kill with malice aforethought.

The transcript shows the following:

Walter L. Brady, Jr., a lawyer of some sixteen years' experience specializing in criminal trial practice, was appointed to represent Robert Hampton in the spring of 1970, on the charges in question. Originally, Mr. William Cramer had been appointed to represent defendant. He sought help from Mr. Brady and Mr. Brady was appointed cocounsel with Mr. Cramer.

Both Mr. Brady and Mr. Cramer visited their client in the city jail on at least three occasions together. They discussed the case and learned that defendant had not made any statements. They did not discuss 'whether he had been advised by the police of his Miranda constitutional rights' because no statement was involved. They discussed the complaining witness and learned that defendant knew him and had seen him on the evening in question. They were advised that defendant was taken to Homer G. Phillips Hospital where he was identified by the complaining witness. He did not have a lawyer at the time. They discussed the charges; the nature and extent of the penalty, five years to life imprisonment, or to impanel a jury to consider the death penalty; and his prior conviction. They advised that negotiations for guilty pleas would be in his best interest and he authorized them to take those steps.

Mr. Brady was present with his client when he pleaded guilty. Judge Meyer asked him an extensive number of questions, i.e., whether he had been advised of the range of penalties, whether he understood that guilty pleas were an admission of guilt, whether he had been threatened; whether he was told of his right to jury trial and to confrontation of witnesses, and to determine that the court would not be bound by any recommendations on penalties. Defendant never advised Mr. Brady that he had been beaten by police.

Robert Hampton acknowledged the assistance of Mr. Brady at the time he pleaded guilty. He was arrested in January, 1970, while running between Washington and Olive on Vandeventer. When he failed to stop, 'they called me a bunch of names and jumped on me * * * and hit me in the eye with a nightstick.' They took him into custody around 9:00 p.m., and about fifteen minutes later presented him to the victim, Willie Moore, in the surgery department at Homer G. Phillips Hospital. Willie identified him as his assailant by nodding his head. Defendant acknowledged that he was the man who stabbed Willie. Prior to the confrontation with Willie, he was not told he had rights to a lawyer and to remain silent. He did not give any statement. After identification, his eye was treated and on the same evening he was taken to the 9th District Police Station. He was not there advised of his rights; he made no statement.

Defendant acknowledged visits from his lawyers. He discussed his case with them, particularly Mr. Brady, and was advised of his right to trial, the probability of more time from a jury because of his prior record, the nonexistence of any statement, and the lack of a lawyer at the hospital. He said the latter probably did not matter 'because of the dude. He said the man knowed me anyway.'

Defendant further acknowledged explanation of the consequences of pleading guilty. He recalled admitting the offenses charged upon the occasion of his guilty pleas and the recital of facts of the offenses including use of a knife. He remembered questions from Judge Meyer and being told by the court that by pleading guilty he 'waived' his rights.

Defendant further acknowledged he had never been placed in a lineup, and that he had counsel upon arraignment following indictment.

While defendant was on the stand, Judge Meyer and Mr. Elbert established the grounds asserted for relief as: 'One, that he (defendant) was not advised of his constitutional rights at any time before or after his arrest. * * * And, two, that he did not have counsel at this confrontation * * * at Homer G. with one Willie, the victim.' There was no contention that his guilty pleas were other than voluntarily made, and defendant acknowledged that he did not claim that anyone forced him to plead guilty. For that reason, it was agreed that there was no reason to go into the proceedings that occurred at the time of the guilty pleas.

'THE COURT: As I understand it, there's no question but that Mr. Brady advised him of his rights and advised him adequately to enable him to intelligently decide to plead guilty. As I understand it, there are only two grounds: (1) that he was not advised of his constitutional rights prior to this confrontation with Willie; and (2) that he did not have counsel at the time of this confrontation.

'MR. ELBERT: That's correct.'

The charges arose from an incident in the early evening of January 17, 1970; the guilty pleas were entered April 15, 1970. Subject motion was filed June 3, 1971; the hearing now transcribed was accorded October 28, 1971.

Counsel were granted leave to file suggestions and, on November 19, 1971, the court filed the decision:

'The Court finds and believes from the evidence adduced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on January 17, 1970, Movant was apprehended by police while he was running on Vandeventer Avenue between Washington and Olive Streets, at approximately nine p.m. and taken immediately to Homer G. Phillips Hospital; that there he was subjected to a one-on-one confrontation with one Willie Moore, the victim in the two offenses to which Movant entered his pleas of guilty; that Willie Moore had been stabbed. While it cannot be accurately determined from the evidence the exact time that had lapsed between the stabbing of Willie Moore and the one-on-one confrontation referred to above, the Court finds that it was so soon after the stabbing that Willie Moore was still in the emergency room, surgery department, of Homer G. Phillips Hospital.

'The Court further finds that Movant was not advised of any of his constitutional rights prior to said one-on-one confrontation at Homer G. Phillips Hospital nor was he provided with counsel at said confrontation.

'The Court rules, however, that neither the failure to advise Movant of his constitutional rights prior to the confrontation complained of, nor the failure to provide Movant with counsel at that time were violative of Movant's constitutional rights and that therefore such failures do not constitute grounds for vacating or setting aside the judgments and sentences imposed.

'Assuming without admitting that this Court is in error in so ruling, that Court further rules that by entering of guilty pleas, Movant waived his right to attack the judgments and sentences imposed.

'Accordingly, Movant's application for relief under Supreme Court Rule 27.26 is hereby denied.'

Appellant charges the court erred: I. In denial of relief 'because the failure to provide appellant with counsel and to advise him of his constitutional rights prior to presenting him to Willie at Homer Phillips Hospital was violative of appellant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution'; and II. '* * * in ruling that by entering guilty pleas appellant waived his right to attack the judgments and sentences imposed against him because his guilty pleas have no effect on...