Hancock v. Morgan

• Citation: 17 Tex. 582
• Parties: GEORGE HANCOCK AND OTHERS v. RICHARD S. MORGAN AND WIFE.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1856
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

17 Tex. 582

GEORGE HANCOCK AND OTHERS

v.RICHARD S. MORGAN AND WIFE.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1856.

The homestead exemption, under the constitution, is, if included in any town or city, any town or city lot or lots in value not to exceed two thousand dollars, including the improvements in said valuation.

Where a homestead is situated upon a single town or city lot, and the said lot with all the improvements thereon does not exceed in value the sum of two thousand dollars, the whole is exempt from forced sale, without regard to the uses to which part of the lot may be applied

It would seem that it is not material, in the question of homestead, whether, being town or city lots, they adjoin each other or not, provided they are actually used for the purposes of the homestead, and all, including improvements, do not exceed two thousand dollars in value. [ Post, 593; 19 Tex. 371;21 Tex. 664;30 Tex. 440.]

Appeal from Travis. Tried below before the Hon. Robert J. Townes.

The debt on which the judgment was obtained was contracted after the present constitution of the state went into effect. The lease to Gray was made in October, 1851, for one year, which had not expired at the date of the levy. The judge instructed the jury, without request, as follows:

If the jury believe from the evidence that the homestead of the plaintiffs is situated upon a single lot in a town or city, and that the said lot includes the property levied upon, and if they also believe, from the evidence, that the said lot, with all the improvements thereon, does not exceed in value the sum of two thousand dollars, they will find a verdict for the plaintiffs.

If the jury believe that the said lot, with all the improvements thereon, is of a value exceeding two thousand dollars, they will then ascertain the value of said property and find their verdict accordingly. The jury will also separately find the value of the lot and improvements.

The judge refused to give the following instructions asked by defendant:

1st. That the constitution will only protect from forced sale the ground used and occupied by the claimant in connection with his actual place of residence.

The verdict of the jury was as follows: We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs, and find that there is but one lot with its improvements, and that they are not worth two thousand dollars. We, the jury, find the lot to be worth four hundred dollars, and all the improvements thereon are not worth over $1,500.

The other proceedings are stated in the opinion.

E. R. Peck, for appellants. I. The question of exemption is controlled by two considerations only: 1st. The uses to which the property is appropriated. 2d. The value thereof. If it be used for the homestead purposes and falls within the designated value, then, and then only, is it exempt. The fact that property lies adjacent to, and is connected with the family residence, has no controlling force in determining the question of exemption. “Homestead” by no means implies or includes in its meaning all the lands which the party owned or might own adjacent to his domicile. It means nothing more than the home-place and the lands used for the purposes thereof. (Woodman v. Lane, 7 New Hamp. 241.)

II. The excess of the value of improvements on the homestead property over the sum of five hundred dollars are not exempt from levy and forced sale. (Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13.)

Because, 1st, article 1270, Hart. Dig., act of 1839, and section 22 (judicial department) of the constitution, should be construed together; they are statutes or acts in pari materia, relating to the same thing or class of things. (Smith on Construct. sec. 636 et seq.;United Society v. Eagle Bank, 9 Conn. 469.)

If they are thus construed together the law is clear, certain, definite and specific in its meaning, exempting improvements on the homestead to the amount of $500 only, and lot or lots used for the purposes of the family residence or domicile not to exceed $2,000 in value.

III. Laws exempting certain portions of debtors' property from forced sale should not receive a broad construction, or take anything by inference or implication, because they are in derogation of common law rights. (5 Denio, 119;Cincinnati College v. Ohio, 19 Ohio, 110.)

A. J. Hamilton, also for appellants.

I. A. & G. W. Paschal, for appellees.

LIPSCOMB, J.

The material facts in this case are: The appellants obtained judgment against the appellee, and levied execution on a house and lot in the city of Austin, occupied by one Gray and family, under a lease from Morgan. Execution was enjoined by Morgan and wife under a claim that the levy was upon a part of their homestead lot, upon which they resided. It was in proof that Morgan, shortly after his marriage, purchased the lot and moved into the house; lived upon and resided therein until he built another house upon the same lot, and then moved into the new house. The whole lot was inclosed; that after moving into the new house he rented the old house to Gray for two hundred dollars, and run a fence across the lot, separating the old...