Pryor v. Stone

• Decision Date: 01 January 1857
• Citation: 19 Tex. 371
• Parties: SAMUEL B. AND CHARLES R. PRYOR v. B. WARREN STONE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

19 Tex. 371

SAMUEL B. AND CHARLES R. PRYOR

v.B. WARREN STONE.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1857.

The limitation of the homestead in a town or city is not to the number, but to the value of the lots. It is not required that the lots shall adjoin or be contiguous to each other; all that is required to entitle the property to exemption from forced sale is, that it should be used for the convenience or uses of the head or members of the family. [23 Tex. 498;24 Tex. 224.]

The homestead exemption in a town or city does not merely include a residence, but also a place where the head or members of the family may pursue such business or avocation as may be necessary for the support and comfort of the family, whether on adjoining or contiguous lots or not, subject to the limitation that the valuation of all shall not exceed two thousand dollars. [[[[[

Error from Kaufman. Tried below before the Hon. John H. Reagan.

Removed by change of venue from Dallas. The cause was submitted to the judge without a jury. The only property sold, so far as it appeared, was the one lot on the public square.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

J. M. Crockett, for plaintiffs in error. The property in litigation was not the homestead of appellee at the time of the levy or sale.

1st. Because the appellee was not occupying any place as a homestead.

2d. Because the lot in controversy was not, or had not at any time been used in connection with the homestead, nor was there any evidence of an intention so to use it. See Hancock v. Morgan, and Mather v. Walker, Austin term, 1856; Lee v. Kingsbury, 13 Tex. 68.

J. E. Cravens, for defendant in error.

HEMPHILL, CH. J.

This was an action by Stone to try the title to a lot of land in the town of Dallas. The lot had been sold at sheriff's sale, as the property of Stone, and the Pryors claimed through that sale. The plaintiff, Stone, had judgment for the lot, and for rents, with some deductions which were specified. The only important question presented by the record is, whether the lot in question was a portion of the homestead of the plaintiff, Stone, and as such exempt from forced sale.

The material facts are, that Stone, with his wife and children, occupied a house and eight lots which he purchased shortly after his settlement in the town of Dallas, for several years, up to the death of his wife, viz., in January, 1855; that Stone, with his children, continued to occupy said house and eight lots for four weeks after the death of his wife; that he then sold most of his furniture, and rented the house and lots to one C. M. Peak; that his children boarded in the house with Peak's family; that Stone also boarded there, but slept in the house upon the lot which is in controversy. Said last mentioned house had two rooms, in one of which Stone put his bed and bedding, pictures, carpet, toilet, and all the furniture necessary to fit it up as a bed-room, and which had remained unsold; that the other room was used by Stone as a law office, and had been so used by him for a year or two, he having purchased the same; that he and children continued to live as above mentioned until about 1st July, 1855, when he left, with the children, for Kentucky; that during his absence the property in controversy was sold under execution; that the house and eight lots rented to Peak, and the property in controversy, was all the real estate owned by Stone in the town of Dallas It was in...