Handley v. State
| Decision Date | 13 May 1994 |
| Citation | 889 S.W.2d 223 |
| Parties | William Lewis HANDLEY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Ardena J. Garth, Dist. Public Defender, Donna Robinson Miller, Asst. Dist. Public Defender, Chattanooga, for appellant.
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, John B. Nisbet, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Justice Div., Nashville, for appellee.
The appellant, William Lewis Handley, Jr., appeals as of right the trial court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, holding same was barred by Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) section 40-30-102. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On November 6, 1986, petitioner pled guilty to armed robbery and to being an habitual offender. His petition to enter a guilty plea stated that his thirty-five year sentence was to be consecutive to another sentence out of Sequatchie county for aggravated kidnapping and assault with intent to commit armed robbery. The judgment entered by the trial court on the same date states the sentence is to run concurrent with the Sequatchie county sentence. Appellant states in his petition that his sentence was ordered to be consecutive, but that the sentence is void. Petitioner asks for post-conviction relief to remedy this situation. His petition for post-conviction relief was filed November 19, 1992.
The petitioner argues three issues for review. The first is whether or not the State waived the statute of limitations set forth in T.C.A. section 40-30-102. 1 The second issue is whether or not the limitation period applies to delayed appeals. The third issue is whether or not the barring of this petition would violate the petitioner's due process rights.
The petitioner's post-conviction relief petition is clearly past the three year statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. 2 The petitioner argues that the statute of limitations has been waived as a defense by the State because it was not brought up in any of the pleadings. The failure of the state to plead the three year statute of limitations does not bar the trial court's application of it. In Smith v. State, 873 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993), this court observed that the mandatory language of the statute gives the trial court the power to dismiss cases brought past the three year deadline, whether or not the state mentions the statute of limitations in the pleadings. Id. at 6.
The second issue argued is whether or not the statute of limitations applies to delayed appeals. 3 The petitioner attempts to differentiate post-conviction relief and a delayed appeal. Through such a differentiation, he argues the statute of limitations would not apply. However, this court has held that the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief applies to delayed appeals as well, because the petitioner must comply with the post-conviction procedure act to obtain a delayed appeal. Owens v. State, No. 03C01-9205-CR-177, slip op. at 4, 1993 WL 133230 (Tenn.Crim.App., Knoxville, filed Apr. 28, 1993).
The third issue argued is that the application of the statute of limitations to petitioner's post-conviction relief is a violation of his due process rights. The petitioner cites Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn.1992) to support his argument. In Burford, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that in certain situations the application of the three year statute of limitations would be a violation of a person's due process rights. In Burford the petitioner was caught in a procedural trap. Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. He could not challenge one sentence until another's validity was decided. Id. For this reason, Burford was left with only ten months before the statute would run. Id. at 209.
The petitioner's case is totally distinguishable from Burford. He had the full three years to discover the discrepancy in his case. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that three years is a reasonable amount of time,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rickman v. State
...not be raised for the first time on appeal). The post-conviction court may raise the issue sua sponte. Id. See also Handley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). However, in the instant case, the court did not address this Nevertheless, in Sands, 903 S.W.2d at 299, our supreme......
-
State v. Graves, No. E2004-02620-CCA-R3-CD (TN 10/3/2005)
...as well, because the petitioner must comply with the post-conviction procedure act to obtain a delayed appeal." State v. Handley, 889 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). The defendant's judgment, which was not appealed, became final on July 7, 2002. On May 18, 2003, the defendant wrote......
-
State v. Hamilton, No. M2005-02748-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. 3/29/2007), M2005-02748-CCA-R3-CD.
...statute of limitations is a prerequisite to obtaining post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. See Handley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion for new trial on July 1, 2002......
-
Church v. State
...Procedures Act prevents the trial court from noticing such a bar to a petition upon its own motion. Compare Handley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (trial court could notice the application of the statute of limitations under the former Post-Conviction Act without it bein......