Handrahan v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-P-126,96-P-126
• Citation: 43 Mass.App.Ct. 13,680 N.E.2d 568
• Parties: , 10 NDLR P 125 Susan HANDRAHAN v. RED ROOF INNS, INC.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 568

680 N.E.2d 568

43 Mass.App.Ct. 13, 10 NDLR P 125

Susan HANDRAHAN v. RED ROOF INNS, INC.

No. 96-P-126.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 10, 1997.

Decided June 23, 1997.

Further Appellate Review Denied Aug. 5, 1997.

Douglas W. Stoddart, South Natick, for plaintiff.

Scott C. Moriearty (Laurie Rubin, with him), Boston, for defendant.

Stephen S. Ostrach, for New England Legal Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before BROWN, KAPLAN and PERRETTA, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

On April 30, 1992, the plaintiff, Susan Handrahan, filed this action in Superior Court alleging that the defendant, Red Roof Inns, Inc. (Red Roof), discriminated against her on the basis of her handicap. ¹ See G.L. c. 151B, § 4. Following a jury trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff $1,705,000 in damages; that amount was comprised of $55,000 in back pay, $600,000 in front pay, $50,000 for emotional distress, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The defendant then filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.), new trial, and remittitur. The judge denied the defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and new trial but allowed its motion for remittitur, reducing the front pay award by $112,200 and the punitive damage award by $900,000. ² Judgment was subsequently entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $732,700. ³ Both parties appeal from the judgment.

We first consider the defendant's contention that the trial judge erred in denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. The defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of discrimination under G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16). ⁴

In bringing a claim for handicap discrimination under this section, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Tardanico v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 41 Mass.App.Ct. 443, 447, 671 N.E.2d 510 (1996). Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for its actions. Ibid. Thereafter, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's asserted reason was not the true reason, but rather a pretext. ⁵ Ibid. "[I]f the fact finder concludes that the plaintiff has proved that the employer's reasons are a pretext,[ ⁶] then the plaintiff prevails." Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 446, 646 N.E.2d 111 (1995).

From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the following facts. The plaintiff, an epileptic, began working for the defendant as a housekeeper in 1983. At that time, she did not disclose her epilepsy to the defendant because she feared that she might be fired. From December, 1983, through December, 1990, the plaintiff received favorable performance evaluations and, on several occasions, was generally noted as being a good employee. The plaintiff, however, was often criticized for her inability to clean her assigned rooms in a timely manner.

On the morning of April 10, 1991, the plaintiff suffered an epileptic seizure while at her brother's home. Since the plaintiff was scheduled to work that day, her sister-in-law called the defendant and spoke with one of its female employees. She told the woman that the plaintiff had had a "grand mal seizure," and requested that she relay this information to the plaintiff's boss. The woman agreed to do so. When the plaintiff returned to work the next day, her boss, Brian Thompson, requested a note from her doctor. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a doctor's note indicating that she could return to work. The note, which contained the heading "Neurological Services," made no mention of the plaintiff having had a seizure. On April 16, 1991, the plaintiff told Thompson that she needed to leave work early because her medication had made her tired.

On April 11, 1991, Annie M. Cowles, a former coworker of the plaintiff, filed a complaint against the defendant with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. In her complaint, Cowles alleged that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her epilepsy.

On May 27, 1991, the plaintiff received a disciplinary warning for failing to complete her room assignments. Three days later, the plaintiff received a second warning for not completing her rooms in the allotted time frame. At that time, the plaintiff was warned that if she fell behind again she would be terminated. On June 4, 1991, the plaintiff was fired after she failed, once again, to finish cleaning her assigned rooms within the allotted time.

1. Evidence of discrimination.

a. Prima facie case. Contrary to the defendant's contention, we think that the plaintiff met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. "To establish the prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of handicap pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, a plaintiff who has been terminated from employment must show that: (1)[s]he suffers from a handicap; (2)[s]he is a 'qualified handicapped person'; and (3)[s]he was fired solely because of [her] handicap." Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 821, 678 N.E.2d 853 (1997), and cases cited. Here, the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence on each of the required elements. ⁷

b. Defendant's articulated reason. It is undisputed that the defendant articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. It was the defendant's contention at trial that it terminated the plaintiff because she routinely failed to clean her assigned rooms within the allotted time. According to the defendant, each housekeeper was expected to comply with a thirty minute per room requirement ("thirty-minute rule"). The defendant contended that, in an effort to become more competitive, it began to enforce strictly its thirty-minute rule. The defendant stated that, after implementing this stringent enforcement policy, the plaintiff continued to have difficulty completing her room assignments. The defendant introduced evidence that the plaintiff was given two warnings, and was not terminated until she failed for a third time to comply with the thirty-minute rule.

c. Evidence of pretext. Although the evidence is slim, the jury reasonably could have found the defendant's asserted reason to be a pretext. Based on the evidence, the jury could have disbelieved the defendant's claim that the thirty-minute rule was an established company policy. The plaintiff indicated that the first time she learned of the thirty-minute rule was May 30, 1991, the date she received her second disciplinary warning. ⁸ Although some of the plaintiff's evaluations refer to a company standard, none mentions a thirty minute per room requirement. Moreover, the housekeeping handbook contains no mention of the thirty-minute rule. In fact, Thompson, during cross-examination, acknowledged that the thirty-minute rule was not "per se" in the handbook. ⁹

There was also conflicting evidence as to when the thirty-minute rule was implemented. According to Thompson, the thirty-minute rule was already in place when he returned to Framingham in February, 1990. ¹⁰ However, Patricia V. Freeman, the head housekeeper at that time, indicated that the thirty-minute rule was not implemented until some time after Thompson arrived.

The timing of the enforcement of the thirty-minute rule as to this plaintiff is also suspect and could support an inference that the defendant's real motive was discrimination. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's difficulties in timely completing her room assignments were long-standing. Yet despite this recurring criticism, her reviews throughout her employment with Red Roof were generally good. Moreover, prior to her disclosure of her handicap, she never received a warning for failing to complete her assignments, nor was she ever disciplined on that basis.

The defendant's explanation that the sudden stepped-up enforcement of the thirty-minute rule in May, 1991, was motivated by economic concerns also could have been rejected by the jury. Thompson testified that toward the beginning of 1991, the company began to focus on controlling costs, and that in January or February of that year, there was emphasis placed on lowering the number of minutes spent cleaning each room. However, when asked whether there was an increased focus on enforcement of the thirty-minute rule during this time period, 1990 to 1991, Gregg Weisz, another employee of the defendant, testified that he could not recall such an increase. The defendant contends that Weisz's testimony did not contradict that of Thompson's because Weisz at that time worked at a Red Roof Inn in Salem, New Hampshire. However, there was evidence that both the Framingham and Salem locations were controlled by the same regional director, Mark G. Workman. Therefore, the jury could have concluded that, if there were such a shift in direction, Weisz would have been aware of it. Based on this somewhat equivocal evidence, the jury could have disbelieved some or all of the testimony of the defendant's agents that their real motivation in strictly enforcing the thirty-minute rule was to contain costs. See Finney v. Madico, Inc., 42 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 51, 674 N.E.2d 655 (1997).

On the foregoing evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the thirty-minute rule was not a well established company policy, as the defendant contended, but rather a new rule implemented and enforced only after the defendant learned of the plaintiff's handicap. Accordingly, the trial judge correctly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v.

2. Jury instructions. The trial judge instructed the jury that "once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and shows that the employer's articulated reasons are pretext ... the plaintiff is entitled to recover for illegal discrimination under Chapter 151B." The defendant argues that the judge erred in not instructing the jury ¹¹ that the plaintiff...