Hanks, In re

Decision Date14 June 1988
Citation553 A.2d 1171
PartiesIn re Carol M. HANKS, Adam D. Crane, and David A. Crane, three minor children. * ]] . Submitted:
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware

Ben T. Castle (argued), and Alison Whitmer Tumas, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for appellant.

P. Clarkson Collins, Jr. (argued), and Mary M. Johnston, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for appellee.

Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY and MOORE, JJ.

CHRISTIE, Chief Justice:

In this case, the Court is called upon to examine the application of the Delaware statute providing for termination of parental rights when an individual has failed "to plan adequately for the child's physical needs or his mental and emotional health and development...." 13 Del.C. § 1103(5). This Court has, of course, recognized that, under certain specified circumstances, the State may terminate parental rights when it is clear that such action is in the best interest of a child. In re Burns, Del.Supr., 519 A.2d 638 (1986). However, this Court also pointed out that parental rights may not be terminated without full compliance with the statutory requirements and the due process rights of parents. Id. at 640. Here, we must specifically address the constitutional sufficiency of the statutory standards set forth in 13 Del.C. § 1103(5) as they apply to the termination of parental rights. The appellant notes that neither of the key words in the statute, "plan" and "adequately", are defined. Therefore, the appellant contends that the statute as a whole is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give ordinary citizens fair warning as to what conduct will justify termination of parental rights. We hold that the wording of the statute is not unconstitutionally vague and that, under the circumstances of the case, the termination of parental rights was justified.

I.

The appellant, Ms. Allison Crane, is the mother of three children, Carol, Adam, and David, who were respectively eleven, eight, and four and a half years old at the time this appeal was heard. The children are the subject of a suit brought by the State to terminate Ms. Crane's parental rights.

Ms. Crane's involvement with the Children's Bureau of Delaware, Inc. ("Children's Bureau"), began in May, 1983. At that time, Ms. Crane was the mother of the two children, then aged six and three, and she was seven months pregnant with her third child. Mr. Crane, her husband, deserted the family, leaving it with inadequate financial resources. Since Ms. Crane had no means with which to provide food for her children, she contacted the Children's Bureau for assistance. Therese Gilchrist, the social worker who responded to Ms. Crane's request, went to her home and found it to be "messy" and "in complete disarray." Social workers who met with Ms. Crane described her as having an "unmotivated" attitude, as a result of her being depressed and exhausted.

Several workers helped to secure food for the family and clean the apartment. On visits made over the next few months, social workers consistently found the household to be running low on food and in disarray. The children were generally unsupervised and "ran rampant" throughout the house.

The Division of Child Protective Services ("DCPS") became involved in June, 1983, after it received a phone call from one of Ms. Crane's relatives who said that Ms. Crane was abusing her children physically (hitting them with a baseball bat) and emotionally. On June 30, 1983, Carol Robinson, a DCPS intake worker, made an unannounced visit to Ms. Crane's home. Ms. Crane initially denied hitting Carol, although she subsequently said that the bat was only plastic. Later during the interview, Ms. Crane went to get Carol's report card from a drawer. When she was unable to find it she became extremely upset, accused Carol of "playing head games" with her, and repeatedly slapped Carol across the face. Ms. Crane then looked in her pocketbook and found the report card there. At the end of the interview, Ms. Crane told Ms. Robinson that her self-image was very low, and that she felt trapped. She wondered out loud whether it would be better to give up her children. On July 25, 1983, Ms. Robinson again visited Ms. Crane, and at that time Ms. Crane agreed her children should be placed in temporary foster care and signed the forms for voluntary placement. Carol and Adam were then placed in foster care.

On August 9, 1983, Ms. Crane gave birth to her third child, David. The following day Ms. Gilchrist and Karen Kirkpatrick, another DCPS worker, visited Ms. Crane in the hospital. Ms. Crane stated that she wished to place the baby in foster care temporarily. Ms. Crane signed placement papers, and on August 11, 1983, the Children's Bureau placed David in a foster home.

Upon Ms. Crane's release from the hospital after the birth of David, Ms. Gilchrist arranged for her to stay at the Mary Mother of Hope House, since she had been evicted from her apartment. On August 22, 1983, Ms. Crane was involuntarily committed to St. Francis Hospital, where she was treated for depression. On August 26, 1983, Ms. Crane was discharged from St. Francis Hospital into the custody of her father. She, therefore, went to live in his home in Parksburg, Pennsylvania. Ms. Crane continued to have problems interacting with other people, and on September 15, 1983, she was involuntarily committed to Sacred Heart Hospital in Haverford, Pennsylvania. Ms. Crane remained there until October 10, 1983, when she was again released to her father's care.

In October, 1983, Ms. Gilchrist met with Ms. Crane to develop a written plan which provided that the children would remain in foster care for the time being, with the goal of achieving family reunification in January, 1984. Ms. Crane was to have supervised visits with the children twice a month. The plan also called for Ms. Crane to remain in a stable environment, attend counseling and therapy, and take recommended medication. The plan was signed on October 14, 1983.

The bimonthly visits scheduled for Ms. Crane and her children did not proceed smoothly. At times there was very little interaction between Ms. Crane and her children. At other times Ms. Crane, who was prone to outbursts, was described as having become obsessed with trivial matters. The visits were temporarily interrupted by Ms. Crane's voluntary admission to Sacred Heart Hospital on December 14, 1983. At that time Ms. Crane, who stated that she had been hearing voices, was diagnosed as schizophrenic, paranoid type. Ms. Crane was released from the hospital on January 9, 1984.

Since the first plan was unsuccessful, Ms. Gilchrist met with Ms. Crane on January 27, 1984, to formulate a second plan. The second written plan did not call for the children to live with Ms. Crane, but instead aimed to have them reside with one of Ms. Crane's relatives. Until this occurred, Ms. Crane would have regularly supervised visits with the children. In the event placement with Ms. Crane's relatives was not possible, the plan provided that the children would be put up for adoption. In addition, Ms. Crane agreed to continue to receive therapy and to take appropriate medication.

In April, 1984, upon the recommendation of a psychiatrist, the Children's Bureau unilaterally ceased visitations between Ms. Crane and her children. By July, 1984, the time the second plan was to go into effect, the Children's Bureau determined that it would not be able to place the children with any of Ms. Crane's relatives because those relatives who had initially expressed an interest in providing for the children declined to do so when they realized that the responsibility involved a long-term commitment. Meanwhile, Ms. Crane's mental condition and emotional health were not improving. Thus, foster care of the children, which is designed to be temporary, had become long term.

The Children's Bureau, acting in what it perceived to be the best interests of the children, then formulated a new plan pursuant to 13 Del.C. § 1103(5). 1 This plan called for termination of Ms. Crane's parental rights. Such termination of parental rights would make the children eligible for adoption, and such termination was perceived as a means of bringing familial stability to their lives. On December 17, 1984, the Family Court Judicial Review Board met and recommended this third plan for the children.

.............................................................

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* * *

Pursuant to the new plan, the Children's Bureau filed a petition for termination of Mr. Crane's and Ms. Crane's parental rights on January 25, 1985. A hearing was scheduled for July 3, 1985. Before the hearing could be held, Ms. Crane was involuntarily committed to Haverford State Hospital and diagnosed as having schizophrenia, paranoid type, and this time the illness was listed as chronic. The hearing as to the proposed termination was postponed indefinitely because of her hospitalization. Eventually, however, Ms. Crane was allowed to attend the rescheduled hearing on February 25, 1986, although she was still hospitalized. She was formally released from the hospital on June 5, 1986.

By an order dated April 14, 1986, the Family Court denied the Children's Bureau's petition for termination of parental rights and ordered that action on the petition be postponed for at least six months. After that period either party could request a rehearing. During the interim, the children were to remain in the custody of the Children's Bureau, and Ms. Crane was to be permitted to resume supervised monthly visits with them.

A second hearing concerning termination of parental rights was held on April 25, 1987, and much evidence was presented at that hearing.

Elizabeth Chapman, an in-take caseworker for the Chester County Children In Need Service, testified concerning a home evaluation report she had prepared on Ms. Crane. Ms. Chapman stated that she had met with Ms. Crane...

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