Hanlon v. State, s. 63379
| Decision Date | 06 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | 63757,Nos. 63379,s. 63379 |
| Citation | 290 S.E.2d 285,162 Ga.App. 46 |
| Parties | HANLON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Frank B. Hanlon, Jr., pro se in No. 63379.
Amy W. Stewart, Atlanta, for appellant in No. 63757.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, for appellee in Nos. 63379, 63757.
The appellant was indicted for the murder of his wife and was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Police discovered the victim's body when they arrived at the appellant's apartment on the morning of February 15, 1981, in response to a suicide call. The appellant was observed to be in an intoxicated condition. Asked what had happened, he responded that he had strangled the victim about 3:00 a. m. that morning. A friend of the appellant's testified that the appellant had phoned him about 8:30 that morning claiming to have strangled his wife to death and to have ingested a poison. The friend reported this information to the police, and it was evidently in response to this information that they arrived at the appellant's apartment.
The appellant was arrested at the scene and taken to a hospital to have his stomach pumped. About 3:00 or 3:30 that afternoon, a detective visited him in his hospital room, told him that he was suspected of murder, and read him his Miranda rights. The detective described the appellant as being conscious, alert, and able to speak clearly and intelligently. The appellant told the detective that he did not want to "sign anything" until he had talked with his lawyer, but he admitted orally that he and his wife had gotten into a fight and that he had strangled her to death. A psychiatrist who interviewed the appellant about 4:00 or 5:00 that afternoon described him as follows: "His speech was slow, and he appeared to be dazed but he answered all questions rationally." The appellant told the psychiatrist that he and his wife had fought after he argued with her about her drug abuse, that she struck him on the head with a metal object, and that he lost his temper and strangled her.
A pathologist who had performed an autopsy on the victim's body testified that there were abrasions and bruises on the head, face, arm, knees, and other locations, and indicated that some of the bruises on the arm were of the type which would be incurred by using the arm to ward off blows. He stated that there were six areas of bruising on the head, some caused by blows from a blunt object and some caused by striking the head against a blunt object, such as the floor or the wall. In his opinion, death resulted from "the effect of brain injuries due to fractured skull caused by multiple injuries to the head." He further indicated that had an ambulance been summoned in time, she would have survived.
Testifying in his own behalf, the appellant gave an account of the homicide which was consistent with the statements he had made to the officers at the scene, to the detective, and to the psychiatrist. He stated that his wife had come home during the early hours of the morning and that an argument had commenced about her use of drugs and her plans to go to Florida. She hit him with an ash tray, they struggled, a temporary calm prevailed, and she went to bed. Shortly thereafter, he entered the bedroom, sat down on the bed, and tried to talk to her, whereupon she kicked him and began hitting him with the telephone receiver. The appellant stated, The appellant described his wife as a very slim woman, about 5' 9"' tall and weighing less than 120 pounds, and said she was not as strong as he. Held :
1. The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for directed verdict.
2. The trial court was authorized to conclude from the evidence that the appellant made his statements to the detective freely, voluntarily, intelligently, and without hope of reward or punishment. The fact that the appellant may have been under the influence of medications at the time does not require a contrary conclusion, since his speech was shown to be clear and coherent. See Blanchard v. State, 247 Ga. 415(3), 276 S.E.2d 593 (1981); Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17, 21, 200 S.E.2d 106 (1973). Moreover, these statements were merely cumulative of the statements which he had previously made to officers at the scene and statements which he subsequently made to the psychiatrist. Indeed, they were consistent with the account of the homicide which he offered at trial.
3. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing a psychologist who had treated the victim for emotional disturbances to decline to answer questions...
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