Blanchard v. State, 37187

• Citation: 247 Ga. 415,276 S.E.2d 593
• Decision Date: 08 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 37187,37187
• Parties: BLANCHARD v. The STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 593

276 S.E.2d 593

247 Ga. 415

BLANCHARD v. The STATE.

No. 37187.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 8, 1981.

Dean B. Donehoo, Chatsworth, Robert B. Adams, Dalton, for Hoyt Douglas Blanchard.

Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., Dalton, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., for State.

UNDERCOFLER, Justice.

Hoyt Douglas Blanchard, Jr., was convicted in Whitfield County for the murder of Monroe Bishop, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals. We affirm.

Blanchard formerly was married to Bishop's daughter. On the day of his release from the mental ward of the local hospital, Blanchard went to Bishop's Fruit Stand, where Bishop and his son, Kenneth, were working on a tire while they were engaged in a conversation with Sherman Fowler. Kenneth Bishop saw Blanchard drive up, and told his father of Blanchard's arrival. While Kenneth Bishop continued to work on the tire and continued his conversation with Sherman Fowler, Monroe Bishop walked toward Blanchard. Kenneth heard a bang, looked up, and saw his father grab his side and fall to the ground. He saw Blanchard placing a pistol into a holster. Fowler called an ambulance while Kenneth knelt by his father.

Investigator Claude Nix of the Whitfield County Sheriff's Department arrived to investigate the shooting. He observed the body of Monroe Bishop lying in the parking lot. When Nix asked Blanchard if he had witnessed the shooting, Blanchard replied, "I done the shooting." Nix then took Blanchard into custody, read him his rights, and transported him to jail.

Investigator Ricky Swiney photographed the scene and removed a .38 caliber pistol in a holster from the glove compartment of Blanchard's vehicle. The revolver contained five rounds of live ammunition and one empty cartridge casing.

Dr. James Metcalfe, a pathologist, performed the autopsy on Monroe Bishop's body. He determined that one bullet had entered the body in the left upper abdomen, severing major arteries. He testified that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the abdomen.

State Firearms Examiner Kelly Fite determined from tests that the .38 special round recovered from the body of Monroe Bishop was fired from the revolver recovered by Investigator Swiney from the glove compartment of Blanchard's vehicle.

After being read his rights and signing a waiver form, Blanchard stated that he had gone to Bishop's Fruit Stand to shoot Monroe Bishop because he didn't want Bishop messing around with Blanchard's little girl. The statement was admitted in evidence after a Jackson-Denno hearing. Blanchard's former wife and his children lived with Monroe Bishop.

The foregoing evidence supports the jury's verdict under the current legal standard. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

1. A violation of the rule of sequestration is the basis for the first two enumerations of error. Code Ann. § 38-1703. Blanchard's former wife, Shirley, who is the daughter of Monroe Bishop, the deceased, had been subpoenaed by the State but had not been called to the witness stand in behalf of the State. She had remained in the courtroom throughout the trial after invocation of the rule of sequestration and despite the fact she had heard the court instruct the witnesses to leave the courtroom. When the State called her to the stand as a rebuttal witness, Blanchard first objected to the admissibility of her testimony, then moved for a mistrial because her testimony had been admitted.

We recently have held that a defense witness who has violated the rule of sequestration in a criminal case shall not be prevented from testifying. Jordan v. State, --- Ga. ---, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981). We now extend that rule to witnesses for the prosecution. In criminal cases, the violation of the rule of sequestration by any witness either for the defense or for the prosecution goes to the credibility rather than to the admissibility of the witness' testimony. Jordan v. State, supra; Wright v. State, 246 Ga. 53(1), 268 S.E.2d 645 (1980). The first and second enumerations of error are without merit.

2. Blanchard objected to the State's comment during opening statement, and the State's question on direct examination, regarding whether the deceased, Monroe Bishop, was supporting Blanchard's wife and children. He contends that this impermissibly placed his character in evidence. Code Ann. § 38-202. The question to the witness never was answered; rather, after the objection, the State proceeded to the next question.

The evidence against Blanchard was overwhelming. The State contends that the reference to who was supporting whom simply was background information to enable the jury to understand the relationships between the accused, the deceased, and some of the witnesses. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court should have sustained Blanchard's objections to the matter of financial support being placed before the jury, we conclude that it is highly probable that the remark during the State's opening statement and the unanswered question did not contribute to the judgment of conviction in this case. Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 76, 235 S.E.2d 515 (1977); Lingerfelt v. State, 238 Ga. 355, 359(4), 233 S.E.2d 356 (1977); Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 230 S.E.2d 869 (1976). The third and fourth enumerations of error are without merit.

3. Blanchard next contends that the statements he made to the investigating officers were given involuntarily due to his mental illness and his being under the influence of drugs.

The court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing. Blood and urine tests conducted on samples obtained from Blanchard before Blanchard was questioned by the officers revealed phencyclidine, and possibly barbituates, in Blanchard's blood. The officers knew Blanchard had been discharged that day from the mental ward of the local hospital. Dr. Svoren, a psychiatrist, testified in behalf of Blanchard that Blanchard's perception of reality was impaired on the day of the homicide and of the investigative questioning, and that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether Blanchard could have made a knowing and intellingent waiver of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Blanchard contends that this expert testimony stands unrebutted. However, the State points out that Dr. Svoren also testified that Blanchard would have been able to understand, talk with and answer the questions of the investigating officers; that Blanchard would understand the words "You have the right to remain silent," but that Blanchard "was in such a state of mind that nothing mattered." Dr. Svoren further testified that Blanchard later was able to recall his interview with the officers, was aware that he had killed Monroe Bishop, and knew his reason for doing it.

Detective Swiney testified that Blanchard understood his Miranda rights; that Blanchard was in a quiet mood and did not appear intoxicated at the time he was interviewed three hours later.

Although there was evidence that Blanchard had taken drugs, there also was evidence sufficient to support a finding that his statements were the product of a rational intellect and a free will. The "coherency test" was not violated. Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17, 18(2), 200 S.E.2d 106 (1973). A mere showing that Blanchard was suffering from some mental disability was not a sufficient basis upon which to exclude his statements. Corn v. State, 240 Ga. 130, 134(3), 240 S.E.2d 694 (1977). "Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal." Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 590, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979). The fifth enumeration of error lacks merit.

4. In his...