Hannah v. State, 37052

• Decision Date: 18 February 1958
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 37052,37052,2
• Citation: 102 S.E.2d 624,97 Ga.App. 188
• Parties: M. C. HANNAH v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 624

102 S.E.2d 624

97 Ga.App. 188

M. C. HANNAH v. The STATE.

No. 37052.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Feb. 18, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

The General Assembly cannot confer jurisdiction over crimes against the State upon a court created for the trial of municipal offenses.

The defendant, M. C. Hannah, was tried and convicted in the City Court of Richmond County for the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicants. When called upon to plead, the defendant filed a plea of autrefois convict. He waived trial by jury, and the judge of the City Court of Richmond County tried the case after having overruled and dismissed the plea of autrefois convict and sentenced the defendant for the offense charged in the accusation. It is the contention of the defendant that since he had been convicted in the Recorder's Court of the City of Augusta, he had been once put in jeopardy and could not be tried in the City Court of Richmond County thereafter. There is no dispute that at the time the defendant was tried in the Recorder's Court of Augusta, as set forth in the plea of autrefois convict, the City Court of Richmond County was in existence and had jurisdiction to try all misdemeanor cases in Richmond County. The question here is whether or not the Recorder's Court of the City of Augusta had legal authority to try the defendant for a misdemeanor for which he was convicted later in the City Court of Richmond County.

O. L. Collins, Augusta, for plaintiff in error.

W. D. Lanier, Solicitor, Eugene M. Kerr, Asst. Solicitor, Augusta, for defendant in error.

GARDNER, Presiding Judge.

If the Recorder's Court of the City of Augusta had legal authority to try the defendant, the City Court of Richmond County had no authority to try him again for the same offense. The Constitution of Georgia, art. 6, § 6, par. 2, Ga.L.1937, p. 1116; Code Ann., § 2-4102, omitting the part referring to ratification, reads as follows 'The courts of ordinary shall have such powers in relation to roads, bridges, ferries, public buildings, paupers, county officers, county funds, couty taxes and other county matters as may be conferred on them by law.

'The court of ordinary shall have jurisdiction to issue warrants, try cases and impose sentences thereon in all misdemeanor cases arising under the Act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937, and other traffic laws, and in all cases arising under the Compulsory School Attendance law in all counties of this State in which there is no city or county court, provided the defendant waives a jury trial. Like jurisdiction is also conferred upon the judges of the police courts of incorporated cities and municipal court judges for offense arising under the Act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937, and other traffic laws of the State within their respective jurisdiction.' (Italics ours.) With reference to this provision of the Constitution of Georgia, the Supreme Court in Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 33 S.E.2d 425, said in the headnote: 'The amendment of 1937 to article 6, section 6, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of Georgia * * * confers upon judges of police courts of incorporated cities and municipal-court judges jurisdiction to try misdemeanor cases arising under the act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937 only in those counties in which there is no city or county court.' Then the court elaborated further as follows: 'We are called upon to construe the words, 'like jurisdiction,' in this amendment. The question is: Did the constitutional amendment of 1937 confer upon the judges of police courts of incorporated cities and municipal-court judges jurisdiction over the class of misdemeanor cases mentioned in the amendment in all counties in the State without regard to whether there is a county or city court in the county? 'In interpreting the provisions of a constitution, it is to be presumed that the words therein used were employed in their natural and ordinary meaning; and, where a word has a technical as well as a popular meaning, the courts will generally accord to it its popular signification, unless the nature of the subject indicates, or the context suggests, that it is used in a technical sense. Constitutions are the result of popular will, and their words are to be understood ordinarily in the sense they convey to the popular mind. The presumption is that the same meaning attaches to a given word or phrase wherever it occurs in a constitution; and where a word or phrase is used in one part of a constitution in a plain and manifest sense, it is to receive the same interpretation when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears, from the context or otherwise, that a different meaning should be applied to it'. Epping v. Columbus, 117 Ga. 263, 43 S.E. 803.

'The word 'jurisdiction' is used three times in the amendment under consideration. In the first instance, the word is used in the sense of subject matter, i. e., the class of misdemeanor cases over which the court of ordinary shall have jurisdiction; and, in the last instance, in the sense of territorial limitation. In the first instance, jurisdiction as to the subject matter is conferred on courts of ordinary, but with a restriction and proviso; first, jurisdiction of the class of misdemeanor cases referred to is limited to counties having no city or county court; and, second, the defendant must waive a jury trial. As used the second time in the amendment, the word 'jurisdiction' in the phrase, 'like jurisdiction', also refers to subject matter. Was it the intention of the framers of the constitutional amendment to confer upon judges of police courts powers as to the subject matter without the same restrictions as are imposed on courts of ordinary? We do not think so * * * It is our conclusion that the framers of the amendment intended to confer jurisdiction as to the subject matter upon police courts with the same restrictions as were imposed upon courts of ordinary. Certainly the framers of the amendment did not intend to confer jurisdiction of the subject matter on police courts without the proviso as to a waiver of a trial by jury. If it were intended that this limitation should be imposed on police courts, then we do not feel that we can arbitrarily say the first limitation did not also apply. Either all or none of the limitations are imposed on police courts * * *. If the framers of the amendment intended that police courts should have jurisdiction of certain misdemeanor cases in all counties of the State without regard to whether there is a city or county court in the county, that intention could have been shown clearly by having the last sentence of the amendment read: 'Like jurisdiction, regardless of whether there is a city or county court in the county, is also conferred.' * * * Evidently the framers of the amendment recognized the need of speedily disposing of misdmeanor cases under the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act, and other traffic laws, and recognized the fact that in many counties of the State there are no city or county courts, and misdemeanor cases must be disposed of in the superior courts. Consequently, in those counties having no city or county court, considerable delay might be necessary in disposing of this class of misdemeanor cases, while, in counties having city or county courts, charges could be prefereed upon an accusation and the offender given a speedy trial. By conferring upon the courts of ordinary and judges of police courts of incorporated cities and municipal court judges jurisdiction over this class of misdemeanor cases in counties having no city or county court, the delay in such counties necessitated in disposing of this class of misdemeanor cases could be obviated.'

The Supreme Court went extensively into the matter of jurisdiction of courts in cases of this type in City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 113, 90 S.E.2d 583, 585 in the following language: 'That the only courts with authority or jurisdiction under our Constitution to try 'State cases,' or persons charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts, is firmly established by the previous decisions of this court. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 40 S.E. 857; Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 33 S.E.2d 425; Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714, 51 S.E.2d 664; ...