Hanrahan v. Safway Steel Scaffold Co. of Minnesota

• Decision Date: 09 February 1951
• Docket Number: No. 35280,35280
• Parties: HANRAHAN et al. v. SAFWAY STEEL SCAFFOLD CO. OF MINNESOTA.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 243

46 N.W.2d 243

233 Minn. 171

HANRAHAN et al. v. SAFWAY STEEL SCAFFOLD CO. OF MINNESOTA.

No. 35280.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 9, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A motion for a directed verdict, which by its very nature accepts the view of the entire evidence most favorable to the adverse party and admits the credibility (except in extreme cases) of the evidence in his favor and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, should be granted only in those unequivocal cases where, in the light of the evidence as a whole, it would clearly be the duty of the trial court to set aside a contrary verdict as being manifestly against the entire evidence, or where it would be contrary to the law applicable to the case.

2. If the evidence as a whole so overwhelmingly preponderates in favor of a party as to leave no doubt as to the factual truth, he is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law, even though there is some evidence which, if standing alone, would justify a verdict to the contrary. Not every conflict in evidence gives birth to a jury question.

3. Considering the evidence produced by plaintiffs in the light of the evidence as a whole, Held that it was not error for the trial court to direct a verdict for defendant.

William H. DeParcq, Donald T. Barbeau and Chester D. Johnson, all of Minneapolis, for appellants.

Meagher, Geer & Markham and Clyde F. Anderson all of Minneapolis, for respondent.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the district court denying the motions of plaintiffs for a new trial.

Plaintiffs were employed as painters by the M. & M. Painters & Decorators (hereinafter called M. & M.), which had a contract with the A-B-C Corrugated Box Company (hereinafter called the box company) for the painting, among other things, of the steel girders in its warehouse. These girders were located about 24 feet above the cement floor of the warehouse, and in order that plaintiffs could reach these girders M. & M. rented a steel scaffold from defendant. The scaffold supplied by defendant was a used one and was delivered disassembled to the box company warehouse. It consisted of various parts, which, when fitted together, formed a scaffold approximately 5 X 7 feet in surface area and approximately 21 feet high, including the caster-type wheels and the adjustable legs upon which it was mounted. It appears that the scaffold could be assembled in only one way, and it was so assembled by Orville R. Mitchell, an employee of M. & M., assisted by plaintiff Hanrahan. It was delivered to the warehouse eight days prior to the date of the accident and had been used for several days without incident in connection with the painting of the girders. As plaintiffs completed painting as much of the girder as they could reach from their platform on top of the scaffold, it was necessary to move the scaffold to another unpainted portion of the girder. This was accomplished by calling to Mitchell, who also acted as painting foreman and was on the floor doing various other jobs. He would thereupon unlock the wheels and push the scaffold to a new position while plaintiffs remained on the platform on top of the scaffold and helped guide the scaffold from above by grasping the girders. After the scaffold had been moved to a new position, plaintiffs would resume their work.

The accident occurred at a time when plaintiffs were standing on one side of the platform on top of the scaffold, which had been centered beneath a girder. Usually, when one man had finished painting his side of the girder he moved over to the other side to help the other finish. Plaintiff Jameson said that he had gone to Hanrahan's side of the girder, had set his paint-pot down, but still had the brush in his hand, when suddenly he 'felt something beneath us * * * give way or break.' Hanrahan testified that when Jameson came over from his side and was getting ready to help him, 'All at once something gave way and we fell back.' It appears from the record that the scaffold fell to the ground and that plaintiffs were thrown onto the floor. Mitchell testified that the scaffold was moved in the manner described above and that after each movement the wheels were locked with the brakes provided thereon. Plaintiffs testified as to the manner of painting and as to their observations in connection with the accident as set forth above.

A structural engineer was called as an expert witness on behalf of plaintiffs. He was asked three hypothetical questions with respect to the falling of the scaffold, but the trial court, on objection by defendant that they were not proper questions to put to an expert witness, in that such interrogation would invade the province of the court and the jury, would not permit him to answer. Plaintiffs sought to establish by the hypothetical questions (1) that it would not be possible for the two men, with their equipment, to place themselves in a place or position atop the scaffold so as to cause it to tip by distribution of their weight alone; (2) that there was some structural defect which caused the tipping; and (3) that, if the scaffold were tipped to such an extent that the men would be able to get themselves in such a position, by distribution of their weight alone, as to tip over the scaffold, such tipping or leaning would have been apparent to the naked eye of a person on the floor below. The court sustained defendant's objection, whereupon plaintiffs made an offer to prove the above, and objections to this offer of proof were sustained.

Fred S. Graser, president of defendant, testified in part as to the general construction and arrangement of the scaffold. He explained that there was only one way in which the various pieces could be fitted together and that if each piece or part was not placed properly the next piece would not go on. On cross-examination, he testified that he had examined the scaffold four or five days after the accident; that by that time the scaffold had been disassembled; and that his examination revealed two broken angle braces and one broken cross brace. He said also that the angle braces bore weight and that the cross braces were stabilizers.

When plaintiffs rested and defendant rested provisionally, the latter moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to establish any actionable negligence proximately causing the injuries to plaintiffs and that there was an utter lack of proof of any negligence or omission or any defect in the equipment upon which a jury verdict could be sustained. Plaintiffs thereupon moved the court for permission to amend their complaints to cover the feature of breach of warranty. Defendant then added to its motion for a directed verdict that there was no evidence upon which it could be concluded that there was a breach of implied warranty and that it appeared conclusively from the evidence that the scaffold was suitable for the purposes for which it was designed. The court allowed the amendment to the complaint as of the beginning of the trial. The court directed the jury to return a verdict for defendant in each case upon the ground that there had been no proof of negligence and no evidence of a breach of warranty. The court stated also that it considered the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur inapplicable so as to make evidence of negligence unnecessary. Plaintiffs on oral argument said that they were not relying on that doctrine, and they did not refer to it in their brief.

The questions involved and the assignments of error as set forth in plaintiffs' brief are as follows:

(1) Was the evidence produced by plaintiffs sufficient for a jury issue on the question of negligence of defendant?

(2) Was the evidence produced by plaintiffs sufficient for a jury issue on the question of breach of warranty by defendant so as to constitute error in both instances on the part of the court in directing a verdict for defendant?

1--2. Plaintiffs cite as controlling Bartley v. Fritz, 205 Minn. 192, 285 N.W. 484, and other Minnesota cases. ¹ In the Bartley case, this court said that a verdict may be directed in those unequivocal cases where it clearly appears to the court on trial that it would be its duty to set aside a contrary verdict as not justified by the evidence or as contrary to the law applicable to the case. Abbett v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 482, 16 N.W. 266; Yates v. Gamble, 198 Minn. 7, 268 N.W. 670; 23 Minn.L.Rev. 363, 367. The court also said in that case that it is only in the clearest of cases where the facts are undisputed and it is plain that all reasonable men can draw but one conclusion that the question of negligence becomes one of law. See, also, Mechler v. McMahon, 180 Minn. 252, 230 N.W. 776, and cases there cited.

A motion for a directed verdict presents only a question of law. It admits for the purposes of the motion the credibility of the evidence for the adverse party and every inference which may be fairly drawn from such evidence. 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 9764, and cases cited.

In the latest expression of this court contained in Hanson v. Homeland Ins. Co., Minn., 45 N.W.2d 637, 638, in connection with an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial in an action wherein a verdict was directed for plaintiffs, it was said: 'It is elementary that a motion for a directed verdict, which by its very nature accepts the view of the Entire evidence most favorable to the adverse party and admits the credibility (except in extreme cases) of the evidence in his favor and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, should be granted only in those unequivocal cases where (1) In the light of the evidence as a whole, it would clearly be the duty of the trial court to set aside a contrary verdict as being manifestly against the Entire evidence, or where (2) it would be contrary to the law applicable to the case. Brulla v. Cassady, 206 Minn....