Hanrick v. Gurley

• Decision Date: 29 March 1900
• Citation: 56 S.W. 330
• Parties: HANRICK et al. v. GURLEY et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

56 S.W. 330

HANRICK et al. v. GURLEY et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 29, 1900.

On motion for rehearing. Granted, and judgment modified.

For former opinions, see 54 S. W. 347; 55 S. W. 119.

WILLIAMS, J.

Upon full consideration of the motions of Charles and Carrie Babbige and of E. G. Hanrick, nothing has been found requiring further discussion, except the point raised by the motion of E. G. Hanrick, which was referred back for further argument. All of the grounds of the motions except that are therefore disallowed.

We are convinced, however, that the defense of E. G. Hanrick, based upon the judgment in the Eubanks case as an estoppel against Nicholas Hanrick to assert his title to any of the land in the Zarza grant, should have been sustained. The judgment was pleaded as an estoppel applicable only to Nicholas Hanrick's claim to an interest in that grant, and hence its effect upon his title to lands in the Serda grant cannot be considered. The case was originally briefed and submitted upon the findings of the trial court alone, and in them there was no statement that the demurrer in the Eubanks case was sustained upon the ground that the plaintiff therein was not an heir of Edward Hanrick; the only finding on this point being that a general demurrer was sustained, and final judgment rendered against the plaintiff. We now find in the statement of facts the substance of the pleadings and the judgment in that case, from which it appears that the demurrer was rested and sustained upon the ground that the facts alleged by plaintiff showed that no title had descended to him by inheritance from Edward Hanrick. While the cause of action in that case was not the same as that now asserted, the question as to Nicholas Hanrick's right to inherit from Edward was and is directly involved in, and common to, both cases, and was expressly adjudicated in the former. Although the judgment of the court was, as we formerly held, only a denial of the right to recover the particular land there in controversy, its estoppel is much broader, and concludes the parties upon every question which was directly in issue, and was passed upon by the court in arriving at its judgment. Cromwell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195; Nicholls v. Dibrell, 61 Tex. 541; Birckhead v. Brown, 5 Sandf. 145; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645, 24 Ala. 302; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 49, 18 Sup. Ct. 18, 42 L. Ed. 355; Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 621, 19 L. Ed. 205; McDonald v. Insurance Co., 65 Ala. 358; Freem. Judgm. §§ 256-259. In the case first cited, the difference between the rule as to the effect of a judgment upon the cause of action adjudicated, and that as to the scope of the estoppel upon questions in issue and determined, where they arise in subsequent litigation between the same parties concerning a different cause of action, is thus stated: "There is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. * * * But, where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." That the estoppel concludes the parties upon the questions of law, as...