Ollison v. Village of Climax Springs

• Decision Date: 20 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 78532,78532
• Citation: 916 S.W.2d 198
• Parties: Ray OLLISON and Helen Ollison, Respondents, v. VILLAGE OF CLIMAX SPRINGS, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 198

916 S.W.2d 198

Ray OLLISON and Helen Ollison, Respondents, v. VILLAGE OF CLIMAX SPRINGS, Appellant.

No. 78532.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

Feb. 20, 1996.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Camden County; James A. Franklin, Jr., Judge.

John E. Curran, Julie Jinkens McNitt, Osage Beach, for appellant.

Gary W. Lynch, Bolivar, for respondents.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Amy E. Randles, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo. Dept. of Natural Resources, for amicus.

PER CURIAM. ¹

In 1991 plaintiffs Ray Ollison and Helen Ollison, husband and wife, brought this quiet title action against defendant Village of Climax Springs, a municipal corporation ("the Village"), and other defendants. The Village was the only defendant that appeared and defended.

The petition sought a judgment declaring that plaintiffs have title in fee simple absolute to a tract of land, described by metes and bounds, in Camden County ("the Ollison property"). The petition alleged that plaintiffs based their claim of title on a recorded deed and on adverse possession. The petition also alleged that plaintiffs and their predecessors in title "have maintained a fence on the east boundary of [the Ollison property] for a period of 60 years."

The answer of the Village admitted that it was a municipal corporation, and denied most of the other allegations in the petition. Paragraph 9 of the answer reads:

9. That [the Village] is the holder of an easement for public use, subject to a possibility of reverter to Climax Springs Association. Said parcel is designated as City Spring Park, as shown by the plat of Climax Springs filed at Plat Book 1, page 14, Records of Camden County, Missouri, and if the plaintiffs are claiming some interest in and to said park, [the Village] is making an adverse claim to these plaintiffs.

The answer also alleged: plaintiffs' claim was "barred by res judicata" by reason of judgment entered on December 19, 1984, in a prior action [Case I]; plaintiffs' claim "is barred for the reason that the same was a compulsory counterclaim in [Case I], and the matter was not raised at that time"; plaintiffs are the owners of Block Fifteen "of the town of Climax Springs and [the Village] makes no claims to Block Fifteen"; and plaintiffs' claim "is one of adverse possession and if their claim includes any land not within the boundaries of Block Fifteen, then the same is barred for the reason that adverse possession will not run against [the Village]."

The answer was accompanied by a counterclaim in which the Village alleged that it was "the owner of and entitled to possession of the following described property, located in Camden County, to wit: All of Spring Street, Jackson Street, Park Street, Murry Street, and City Spring Park as shown by the plat of the town of Climax Springs" and "[t]hat the plaintiffs are unlawfully withholding possession of portions of the above described real estate." The counterclaim prayed judgment against the plaintiffs "for recovery of said real estate."

A nonjury trial was held on March 17, 1993. Plaintiffs' witnesses were plaintiff Ray Ollison and land surveyor Eddie Whitworth. The Village's witness was land surveyor Dexter Slagle. The trial court found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the Village, on the petition and on the counterclaim.

The judgment found that plaintiffs were the legal owners of the Ollison property and the Village "has no interest in or to the Ollison property by virtue of the Plat of Climax Springs recorded in Plat Book 1 at page 14 of the Deed Records of Camden County, Missouri, or by virtue of any other legal document or by any legal or equitable right." The judgment also recited that title to the Ollison property was vested in plaintiffs "by virtue of § 516.010, ² and by virtue of [the Village's] lack of any legal or equitable interest therein." The Village appeals.

The Village's first point is that the trial court erred in not dismissing the action because plaintiffs' claim was barred, on res judicata principles, by the judgment in Case I, and because plaintiffs' claim was barred by failure to assert it as a counterclaim in Case I. The fatal flaw in this point is that Case I did not involve the title to the Ollison property.

Res judicata is an affirmative defense. Rule 55.08. Although the Village's answer pleaded that defense, there was no evidence to support it. Case I involved the title to City Spring Park. The instant petition made no claim to City Spring Park, and the trial theory of the Village was that the Ollison property was west of City Spring Park and that the two tracts are separate and distinct.

"[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies to judgments in quiet title actions. Randall v. Schmidt, 159 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Mo.1941); Hutchinson v. Patterson, 226 Mo. 174, 126 S.W. 403, 404-05 (1910); Autenrieth v. Bartley, 238 Mo.App. 55, 176 S.W.2d 546 (1943)." Moore v. Beck, 664 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo.App.1984).

Section 527.150 deals with actions to quiet title. Although the statute does not specifically state that the petition must describe the land involved, it uses such terms as "title, estate or interest in such property" and "the estate, title and interest of said parties, respectively, in such real estate " and "adjudge by its judgment or decree the title, estate and interest of the parties severally in and to such real property." (emphasis added).

Missouri case law requires that the petition and judgment describe the land involved. "It is universally held that judgments should describe with reasonable certainty the land adjudicated therein, both in ejectment and actions to determine title." Curd v. Reaban, 232 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo.1950). Similarly, in Hartvedt v. Harpst, 173 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Mo.1943), an action to quiet title, this Court said: "If the real estate in controversy could not be identified from the description given in the petition, no cause of action was stated."

In order to have estoppel by a former judgment (res judicata), four elements must be present. King General Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. banc 1991). The first element is "identity of the thing sued for," which is alternatively stated as "subject matter of the suit." Barkley v. Carter County State Bank, 791 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Mo.App.1990); see also Winter v. Northcutt, 879 S.W.2d 701, 708 (Mo.App.1994); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 531; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 652. The first element is absent here.

The appeal of Case I is reported in Village of Climax Springs v. Camp, 681 S.W.2d 529 (Mo.App.1984). In Case I, the Village sought to quiet title to "City Spring Park." The plat of the Village of Climax Springs, which was received into evidence without objection in the instant action as Exhibit C, was also received into evidence in Case I. In Case I the court of appeals held that title to City Spring Park was vested in the Village by dedication, and that the public would not lose its interest merely by neglect or failure to care for the park.

A judgment in an action to quiet title "affects only the land directly involved." 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 738. In successive quiet title actions involving the same parties or their privies, a judgment in the first action is not res judicata with respect to the second action if the land involved in the second action is separate and distinct from the land involved in the first action. Farrell v. Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 1031, 729 P.2d 1090, 1094 (App.1986); Girard Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 128 N.J.Eq. 91, 15 A.2d 206, 212 (N.J.Ch.1940); Penrose v. Absecon Land Co., 94 N.J.Eq. 436, 120 A. 207, 208 (N.J.App.1923); Lawrence v. Ayres, 206 Okl. 218, 242 P.2d 142, 146 (1952) (overruled on other grounds by Gardner v. Jones, 309 P.2d 731 (Okla.1956)); Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex. 458, 54 S.W. 347, 351 (1899). See also State by Price v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 858 P.2d 712, 725 (1993); Hangman v. Bruening, 247 Neb. 769, 530 N.W.2d 247, 249 (1995); Valdez v. Smith, 38 N.M. 345, 32 P.2d 1022 (1934); Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex. 458, 56 S.W. 330 (1900); Restatement, Second, Judgments § 30.

This Court holds that the judgment in Case I is not res judicata with respect to this action because the land involved in Case I was separate and distinct from the land involved in this action. For the same reason, the Village's argument that plaintiffs' claim was barred by failure to assert it as a counterclaim in Case I has no merit.

Rule 55.32(a) provides, in pertinent part: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim that at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim...." The subject matter of Case I is not the subject matter of this action. See Farrell, 111 Idaho at 1031, 729 P.2d at 1094. The Village's first point has no merit.

The Village's second and third points will be considered together. The Village contends that the trial court erred: (2) in ruling that plaintiffs held title to the Ollison property by virtue of § 516.010, the ten-year statute of limitations, because § 516.090 ³ rendered § 516.010 inapplicable in that plaintiffs were estopped from denying the existence of the streets shown on the plat (Exhibit C) because plaintiffs received their deed to Block Fifteen as described in the plat and thereby approved and adopted the plat; (3) in rejecting Exhibits D and E, two surveys made by surveyor Slagle, and his testimony concerning the same, because the evidence was admissible under § 60.150.

Plaintiff Ray Ollison testified that he and his wife Helen received a deed for "all of Block 15 of the original plat of the Town of Climax Springs, Missouri," in February 1989. He testified that in September 1990, persons acting on behalf of the Village tore down the eastern fence on the Ollison property. He employed surveyor Eddie Whitworth,...