Hansen v. State, A92A0821
| Decision Date | 08 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A0821,A92A0821 |
| Citation | 205 Ga.App. 604,423 S.E.2d 273 |
| Parties | HANSEN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Sexton, Moody & Renehan, Lee Sexton, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Keith C. Martin, Sol., Leigh A. Moore, Asst. Sol., for appellee.
A jury found Hansen guilty of possession of alcohol by an under-age person, OCGA § 3-3-23, and driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.12 grams, former OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(4). It found him not guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive, OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1).
The police were summoned and Hansen arrested after witnesses at a service station between midnight and 1:00 a.m. observed Hansen's vehicle "flying off" the street into the station parking lot, nearing a building. The car instead hit and bounced off the curb, flattening a tire. Hansen appeared to "be kind of glassy-eyed" with a "blank look" and seemed to fall down several times as he was changing the tire. He also appeared to have some injuries on his face. He exhibited signs of intoxication to the summoned officer and failed several field sobriety tests.
At trial, Hansen stipulated that at the request of the officer who stopped him, he submitted to a lawfully performed breath test resulting in a blood-alcohol reading of 0.20 grams. He did not dispute that he had been drinking alcohol prior to driving and that he was then under the lawful drinking age.
Hansen's defense was that he was justified in or coerced into driving his car because he was fleeing the scene of an altercation in which he feared for his life. He claimed: After a baseball game, he drove to a pub to shoot pool, had a couple of beers and there met a man named "Kojak." Hansen intended to call a cab for home but "Kojak" offered to drive Hansen home in Hansen's car. The two stopped at a liquor store, "Kojak" purchased a bottle of liquor, and Hansen drank some. They then headed to a house where they stayed on the porch. Once there, the man "went crazy," began hitting Hansen, robbed him, and told Hansen he was going to kill him. Hansen noticed a gun on the porch, "Kojak" went to get it, and Hansen fled to his car to get away believing he would otherwise be shot.
The State produced evidence that Hansen drove past several exits on the interstate, for five or six miles, before exiting even though he did not see anyone chasing him. Hansen mentioned to the officer that he had been in a fight but did not speak of a gun or a robbery. He told the officer he was "doing all right" and had been drinking at the baseball game. Hansen later related to his mother that he and not "Kojak" drove from the pub.
1. Hansen contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of two prior DUIs. He maintains that the first, occurring on September 2, 1988, and in which his blood-alcohol level was .10, was inadmissible because it resulted in a plea of nolo contendere, and that both it and the second one, occurring on February 17, 1990, and in which his blood-alcohol level was .14, were inadmissible because of lack of similarity to the incident on trial.
Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991), established Weems v. State, 204 Ga.App. 352, 419 S.E.2d 346 (1992). See also Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 468(6), 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991); Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952).
The State gave notice of its intention to introduce evidence of the two earlier offenses. Its express purpose for introducing the evidence was to show the defendant's motive, bent of mind, and propensity for committing the same type of offense. It was to show, as the court noted, that Hansen engaged in this type of conduct, i.e., driving after drinking alcohol without exigent circumstances, so as to discredit his version, that he would not have driven without the perceived threat to his safety. There was a legitimate purpose for the other-crimes evidence.
There was no dispute that Hansen was the perpetrator of the earlier offenses. As to similarity of both independent offenses to the incident on trial, the State offered in hearing outside the jury's presence that Hansen was underage and intoxicated by alcohol; he submitted to breath tests on all three occasions; in...
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