Hanssen v. Our Redeemer Lutheran Church
| Decision Date | 26 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-95-01092-CV,05-95-01092-CV |
| Citation | 938 S.W.2d 85 |
| Parties | Claudia HANSSEN & Bruce Hanssen, Appellants, v. OUR REDEEMER LUTHERAN CHURCH, Robert L. Segar, David Rayson, Raymond F. Widmer, Daniel Rheiner, III, & David A. Haak, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
G. Leroy Street, Geary, Porter & Donovan, P.C., Dallas, for appellants.
J. Shelby Sharpe, Sharpe & Tillman, Fort Worth, for appellees.
Before LAGARDE, WRIGHT and WOLFE, * JJ.
Claudia and Bruce Hanssen 1 appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Our Redeemer Lutheran Church and the church's audit committee members Robert L. Segar, David Rayson, Raymond F. Widmer, Daniel Rheiner, III, and David A. Haak (collectively ORLC) on Claudia Hanssen's claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In one point of error, Hanssen contends that the trial court erred in granting ORLC summary judgment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Claudia Hanssen was a secretary at a private school operated by ORLC. Walter C. Shiffer, minister of education and school principal, was Hanssen's supervisor. Shiffer resigned after admitting to ORLC that he misappropriated church funds, destroyed church records, forged signatures, and committed other criminal acts. Shiffer later pleaded guilty to criminal charges for his admitted conduct in misappropriating school funds. 2 Shiffer also told ORLC that Hanssen participated in the misappropriations. After an audit by ORLC confirmed Shiffer's statements, ORLC asked Hanssen to resign. It is undisputed that ORLC published:
1. a letter to its members claiming that Hanssen misappropriated school funds;
2. a letter to the school children's parents claiming that Hanssen deposited tuition funds into the wrong accounts and subsequently used the funds for her personal benefit; destroyed checks, financial records, and bank records; forged signatures; covered up these indiscretions; received seventy dollars extra per pay period for nearly two years as well as other undocumented "reimbursements"; and
3. a report to the church members reporting Hanssen's resignation and claiming that Hanssen deposited tuition funds into the wrong account and then used the funds to support programs and individuals outside of and over the budget adopted by the congregation.
At a meeting of church members, ORLC orally accused Hanssen of depositing tuition funds into the wrong account and then using the funds for her personal benefit or for other people or projects as she and Shiffer saw fit; destroying checks, bank records, and financial records; forging signatures; and covering up many of these indiscretions.
Hanssen's pleadings claimed that ORLC's actions defamed her, placed her in a false light, and inflicted her with emotional distress. ORLC answered, asserting several special exceptions and claiming that it had no knowledge that any publication was untrue. 3 ORLC also asserted the affirmative defense of qualified privilege, the supreme court's failure to recognize the tort of false light, and a lack of outrageous conduct to support the claim of infliction of emotional distress. Hanssen amended her original petition, making no substantive changes but adding the requested exhibits and again claiming defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ORLC answered with a general denial. 4
ORLC then moved for summary judgment, asserting a qualified privilege against Hanssen's defamation claim, the supreme court's failure to recognize the tort of false light, and a lack of outrageous conduct to support the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. As evidence, ORLC offered Hanssen's pleadings; affidavits of Segar Rayson, Widmer, Rheiner, Haak, Houska, and Sharpe; several letters; Hanssen's responses to ORLC's interrogatories; Hanssen's objections and responses to ORLC's interrogatories; and excerpts and exhibits from Shiffer's January 14, 1995 deposition.
Hanssen responded to ORLC's motion for summary judgment, contending that ORLC defamed her maliciously, knowingly, with conscious indifference to her rights, recklessly, and with heedless disregard for the truth or falsity that the publications had no factual basis. As evidence, Hanssen relied on the pleadings on file; ORLC's motion for summary judgment; the depositions of Segar, Haak, Rheiner, Widmer, Rayson, and Houska; and affidavits of Leroy Street.
The trial court granted ORLC summary judgment without specifying its reasons for doing so. The judgment states that the court reviewed the motion for summary judgment with its supporting affidavits, plaintiff's response and its supporting affidavits, and argument of counsel. The court found that there were no disputed issues of material fact and that ORLC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all causes of action.
In her only point of error, Hanssen argues that the trial court improperly granted ORLC summary judgment because there is summary judgment evidence that contradicts ORLC's legal and factual positions. Hanssen argues that fact issues remain about 1) whether the publications were accurate, 2) whether ORLC reasonably believed Shiffer, and 3) whether ORLC published only to those with an interest recognized by law.
ORLC contends that summary judgment was proper because ORLC established as a matter of law its affirmative defense of qualified privilege to Hanssen's defamation claim; Texas does not recognize a false light cause of action; and the allegations were insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove ORLC's conduct was so extreme and outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. Contending that no genuine issue of material fact remained, ORLC argues that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The standards for reviewing a motion for summary judgment are:
1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true.
3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984); Wilcox v. St. Mary's Univ., 531 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Tex.1975). The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to provide a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved and that no genuine issue of material fact remains. Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 626, 358 S.W.2d 557, 563 (1962).
When the defendant is the movant, summary judgment is proper only if the plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, succeed upon any theory pleaded. See Peirce v. Sheldon Petroleum Co., 589 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1979, no writ). Thus, the defendant can prevail by conclusively establishing against the plaintiff at least one factual element of each theory pleaded by the plaintiff, Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970), or by conclusively establishing every factual element of an affirmative defense. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972). Conversely, the plaintiff can bar summary judgment by presenting evidence that creates a fact question on those elements of the plaintiff's case under attack by the defendant or on at least one element of each affirmative defense advanced by the defendant. Torres v. Western Casualty Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex.1970); see also Puga v. Donna Fruit Co., 634 S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (Tex.1982). Alternatively the plaintiff can defeat the motion by conceding that the material facts are undisputed, but convincing the court that the defendant's legal position is unsound. See Estate of Devitt, 758 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
The testimony of an interested witness, such as a party to the suit, though not contradicted, does no more than raise a fact issue to be determined by the factfinder. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1990). An exception to this rule is that when the testimony of an interested witness is not contradicted by any other witness, or attendant circumstances, and the same is clear, direct and positive, and free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon, it is taken as true, as a matter of law. Id. These are the tests that courts have traditionally applied to an interested witness's testimony, whether in summary judgment proceedings or in jury or nonjury trials, involving the question of whether a fact is established or negated as a matter of law. Duncan v. Horning, 587 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1979, no writ). The exception to the interested witness rule is especially true when the opposing party has the means and opportunity of disproving the testimony, if it is not true, and fails to do so. Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882. Failure to contradict is another factor to be considered by the court, but it does not necessarily preclude the holding that a fact issue is raised when there are circumstances in evidence tending to discredit or impeach the testimony of the interested witness. Id. Not every case in which uncontradicted testimony is offered mandates an award of the relief claimed. Id. For example, even though the evidence might be uncontradicted, if it is unreasonable, incredible, or its belief is questionable, then such evidence would only raise a fact issue to be determined by the trier of fact. Id. In order for the court to award summary...
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