Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. S–14–0128.,S–14–0128.
• Citation: 2015 WY 12,341 P.3d 428
• Parties: William S. HANSULD and Tia J. Hansuld, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION and Marvin Piel, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

341 P.3d 428

2015 WY 12

William S. HANSULD and Tia J. Hansuld, Appellants (Plaintiffs)

v.LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION and Marvin Piel, Appellees (Defendants).

No. S–14–0128.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Jan. 21, 2015.

Representing Appellants: Larry W. Harrington of the Harrington Law Firm, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees: Thomas M. Hogan, Casper, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] The district court determined the location of an implied access easement for Lariat Diesel Corporation and Marvin Piel (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Lariat”) across property belonging to William S. and Tia J. Hansuld. The Hansulds assert the district court applied the wrong rule of law in determining the location of the easement and its decision was not supported by the evidence presented at trial. While we agree that the district court's legal analysis was incorrect in some respects, we conclude that its ultimate decision was correct and affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The issues we must address in this appeal are:

1. Did the district court err by refusing to rule that Lariat did not prove the elements of an implied easement and, therefore, was not entitled to an easement at all?

2. Did the district court apply the wrong rule of law to locate the easement?

3. Was the district court's decision as to the location of Lariat's implied easement unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law?

FACT

[¶ 3] The properties at issue in this case are commercial properties that were, at one time, commonly owned by Chapin and Ratcliff, LLC (the LLC). Lariat purchased part of the property in 1995 when it took over a diesel truck sales and service business that had been operating on the property. The truck business had historically used the adjoining property for access, and the LLC and Lariat agreed that the arrangement should continue. Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 165, ¶¶ 4–6, 81 P.3d 215, 217 (Wyo.2003) (Hansuld I ).

[¶ 4] In 1996, the LLC sold the property adjacent to Lariat's to Gary Petley. Prior to the closing on that transaction, the LLC, Lariat and Mr. Petley met to discuss exchanging easements, specifically an access easement for Lariat across Petley's property and a sewer easement for Petley across Lariat's property. Hansuld I, ¶¶ 6–7, 81 P.3d at 217. The LLC signed the Access Agreement in favor of Lariat, and Lariat signed a sewer easement. The Access Agreement granted Lariat an easement over the southerly 100 feet of Petley's property. Unfortunately, the Access Agreement was not recorded until after the warranty deed from the LLC to Petley so the agreement was outside the chain of title. Id., ¶ 8, 81 P.3d at 217. Nevertheless, Lariat continued to use the adjoining property for access and, although the property had different owners over the years, there were no problems until the Hansulds acquired it in 2001.

[¶ 5] The Hansulds' predecessors operated businesses involving the sale of various types of vehicles. Similarly, the Hansulds operate a low volume used car business and an electrical contractor business on their property. Immediately after purchasing it, the Hansulds notified Lariat that it could no longer use their property for access and constructed a fence along the property line. The conflicts between the parties grew and litigation ensued. Hansuld I, ¶ 10, 81 P.3d at 217.

[¶ 6] The present matter is the third appeal of the parties' various claims to this Court. In Hansuld I, we ruled that Lariat had an implied easement for access across the Hansulds' property, including a portion that had been part of the highway right-of-way and abandoned to the adjacent property owners in 2001. In Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2010 WY 160, 245 P.3d 293 (Wyo.2010) (Hansuld II ), we ruled, among other things, that Lariat was entitled to a judicial determination as to the specific location of its implied access easement, and remanded for appropriate proceedings.

[¶ 7] On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial to establish the location of the easement.¹ The court had before it a set of stipulated documents which included the original ineffective Access Agreement. In addition, the parties presented lay and expert testimony concerning the path of trucks traversing the Hansulds' property to enter or exit Lariat's diesel truck business. The district court applied the law of floating easements to determine the location of Lariat's implied access easement and accepted one of Lariat's proposed locations with some modification. After the district court entered judgment, the Hansulds appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8] We apply the following standard to review a district court's decision after a bench trial:

“The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

With regard to the trial court's findings of fact,

“we assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law.”

The district court's conclusions of law, however, are subject to our de novo standard of review.

Morris v. CMS Oil & Gas Co., 2010 WY 37, ¶ 12, 227 P.3d 325, 330 (Wyo.2010), quoting, Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 40, 208 P.3d 1296, 1308 (Wyo.2009) (citations omitted). See also Windsor Energy Group, LLC v. Noble Energy, Inc., 2014 WY 96, ¶ 9, 330 P.3d 285, 288 (Wyo.2014).

DISCUSSION

1. Existence of Implied Easement

[¶ 9] The Hansulds argue that Lariat did not meet its burden of proving that an implied easement existed at all. As we stated in our prior Hansuld decisions:

The elements which must be satisfied in order to establish an implied easement are: (1) common ownership followed by a conveyance separating the unified ownership; (2) before severance, the common owner used part of the property for the benefit of the other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel previously benefitted.

Hansuld I, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d at 218 (citations omitted). The Hansulds maintain that Lariat did not prove the second and third elements of implied easements.

[¶ 10] The existence of an implied easement in favor of Lariat over the Hansulds' property has been extensively litigated. In Hansuld I, we affirmed the district court's determination that Lariat was entitled to an implied easement, and in Hansuld II we ruled that Lariat was entitled to a judicial determination of the exact location of the implied easement.

[¶ 11] The law of the case doctrine states that a court's final decision at one stage of a proceeding is binding in the successive stages of litigation. Lieberman, ¶ 28, 208 P.3d at 1305. “Ordinarily, the law of the case doctrine requires a trial court to adhere to its own prior rulings, the rulings of an appellate court, or another judge's rulings in the case or a closely related case.” Id., citing Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667–68 (Wyo.1993). Given the history of the case at bar, the law of the case is that an implied easement exists, and we expressly decline the Hansulds' request to reconsider the merits of that question.

2. Legal Standard

[¶ 12] The Hansulds claim the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it located Lariat's access easement. In particular, the Hansulds take issue with the district court's reference to “floating easements,” believing the district court wrongly applied the principles relevant to express easements rather than implied easements. The district court's decision letter stated:

In accordance with the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Hansuld II, ¶ 23, 245 P.3d at 301, Lariat requests a declaratory judgment legally describing its implied access easement across the Hansulds' property. Because Lariat did not timely file its “Access Agreement,” no document clearly states the location and dimensions of its easement, and therefore, it is best characterized as a floating easement. See, Brumbaugh v. Mikelson Land Co., 2008 WY 66, ¶ 21, 185 P.3d 695, 702–03 (Wyo.2008) (citing Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo.1996) ). “When a floating easement is created, ‘[t]he parties are presumed to have intended an easement that is reasonably convenient or necessary under the circumstances.’ ” Brumbaugh, ¶ 21, 185 P.3d at 703. The primary goal is to determine the intention of the parties. Any oral or written collateral agreements are the best evidence of the parties' intent. If there is no agreement or if it is insufficient, a court is to consider the “purpose of the easement, the geographic relationship between the dominant and the servient estates, the use of each of the estates, a comparison of the benefit to the dominant owner to the burden of the servient holder, and the actual use of the servient property by the dominant owner, if any.” Id.

[¶ 13] A floating easement is an “ ‘easement for [a] right-of-way which, when created, is not limited to any specific area on [the] servient tenement.’ ” Edgcomb, 922 P.2d at 855, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 640 (6th ed.1990). Thus, a floating easement is created when an easement is expressly granted by the...