O'Hara v. State

• Citation: 112 N.Y. 146,19 N.E. 659
• Parties: O'HARA v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 15 January 1889
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

112 N.Y. 146

19 N.E. 659

O'HARA

v.STATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

January 15, 1889.

Appeal from bard of claims.

Claim filed against the state of New York before the board of claims by Arthur K. O'Hara. Award for claimant, and the state appeals.

DANFORTH, J., dissenting.

Chas. F. Tabor, Atty. Gen., for appellant.

William B. Ruggles, for respondent.

RUGER, C. J.

This is an appeal by the state from an award made by the board of claims for services rendered and materials furnished, at the request of the quarantine officials, by the claimant in the years 1875 and 1876, in repairing and fitting up vessels and property used in quarantine affairs in the harbor of New York. There can be no question but that the maintenance of the quarantine station in that harbor is of great public benefit and importance, nor but that the legitimate expenditures therefor are a public necessity, justifying their incurrence and payment by the state. The organization of the quarantine system was created by the state for the benefit of the people; is under its control; its officers are appointed by it; and it has uniformly provided, in some form or another, for their compensation, and for the procurement of the supplies necessary to its efficient operation; and it was the moral duty of the state to see that their agents properly discharged their obligations to the persons employed by them in the service of the state. The services and materials in question were rendered and furnished at the request of the state officials, and compensation therefor was honestly earned by the claimant a long time since, and it is a reproach to the state that satisfaction of them shoulc have been postponed so long by controversies among the state officials as to the department responsible for their payment. The board of claims have found that in the years mentioned the claimant performed services and furnished materials in the repair of the quarantine steamers and other property of the state, under the direction of the quarantine officials, of the value and for the amount named by them in the award appealed from. The undisputed evidence showed that the claimant, originally supposing the health-officer to be liable for his claim, sued him in a state court, and was defeated, upon the ground that that officer had incurred no personal liability by reason of the rendition of such services, and that the claim therefor was against the state. Thereupon, in 1878, he filed his claim against the state before the board of audit, and, after a hearing thereof before such board, it rendered a decision, holding that the state was not liable therefor, but that the health-officer was, and therefore refused to make an award in his favor, and dismissed the claim. Applications were thereafter made on behalf of the claimant to each successive legislature for relief in every year, including that of 1885, and excepting that of 1880, with unavailing effect. In 1886, however, an act was passed, being the law under which the board of claims based its anthority to make the award in question, which is as follows: ‘The board of claims is hereby authorized to rehear, audit, and determine the claims of A. K. O'Hara & Co. for work and services done and performed by them for the state under the directions of the quarantine officials, and to award to them such sums as, upon due proof before said board, shall be a reasonable compensation therefor.’ It is now claimed by the attorney general for the state that this act violated section 19, art. 3, and section 14, art. 7, of the constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional and void.

The provisions of the constitution are as follows: Article 3, § 19: ‘The legislature shall neither audit nor allow any private claim or account against the state, but may appropriate money to pay such claims as shall have been audited and allowed according to law.’ Article 7, § 14: ‘Neither the legislature, canal board, canal appraisers, nor any person or persons acting in behalf of the state, shall audit, allow, or pay any claim which, as between citizens of the state, would be barred by lapse of time. The limitation of existing claims shall begin to run from the adoption of this section; but this provision shall not be construed to revive claims already barred by existing statutes, nor to repeal any statute fixing the time within which claims shall be presented or allowed, nor shall it extend to any claims duly presented within the time allowed by law, and prosecuted with due diligence from the time of such presentment. But, if the claimant shall be under legal disability, the claim may be presented within two years after such disability is removed.’

It was held by us in Cole v. State, 102 N. Y. 54, 6 N. E. Rep. 277, that an act of the legislature recognizing meritorious services, rendered to the state without previous authority of law, and authorizing the board of claims to hear claims for compensation therefor, and award such sum as they might think proper and just, was neither an audit or allowance of a claim against the state, within the meaning of section 19, art. 3, of the constitution. We think our decision in that case disposes of the objection to the act under consideration. A brief reference to the history of this claim seems to show that it comes within the principle laid down in that case.

Under chapter 444 of the Laws of 1876 the board of audit was orgnized, and was authorized to hear all private claims and accounts against the state, (except such as are now heard by the canal appraisers,) and to determine the justice and amount thereof, and to allow such sums as it shall consider should equitably be paid by the state. The hearing of the claim in question by that board, in 1878, was had under this law, and no other tribunal then existed, or was thereafter created, by the state competent to hear and determine such a claim, until 1883, more than six years after the service had been rendered; and that tribunal was authorized to hear only such claims as should arise within two years previous to the time of filing the claim before it. The board of audit had no power to reopen and rehear claims once determined by it, and no appeal lay from its decisions, except those provided by chapter 211, Laws 1881, which were confined to awards made subsequent to January 1, 1879, and did not reach the award made upon the claim of the respondents. Their decision upon the claim, therefore, was final and conclusive between the parties, and determined the fact that for the services in question no legal claim then existed against the state on behalf of the claimants. That determination necessarily proceeded upon the ground that persons upon whose request the services were rendered had no authority to bind the state, and therefore that no legal cause of action existed against it. It was undoubtedly within the province of the legislature originally to have provided for the rendition of these services, and the purchase of materials for the use and benefit of the quarantine station, and it is equally clear that it could by subsequent legislation ratify and approve any act performed for the benefit of the state which it had original authority to legislate and provide for. Brown v. Mayor, etc., 63 N. Y. 240;People v. Denison, 80 N. Y. 656;People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 529.

It cannot be questioned, we think, but that when individuals voluntarily furnish property or render valuable services to the state at the request of state officers, for state purposes, but with the expectation of payment for the same, the legislature may ratify the acts of such officers, although previously nuauthorized, and create a legal liability on the part of the state to pay for such property and services, enforceable in its tribunals. The act of the legislature in supplying defects or omissions in pre-existing legislation, wherever a liability may be predicated against the state, is clearly not the audit of a claim; neither is it an allowance thereof. The power of auditing and allowing is expressly referred to the tribunal authorized to hear and...