Haralson v. Haralson, 55305

• Decision Date: 19 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 55305,55305
• Citation: 483 So.2d 378
• Parties: Hugh H. HARALSON, III v. Betty Jane HARALSON.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 378

483 So.2d 378

Hugh H. HARALSON, III v. Betty Jane HARALSON.

No. 55305.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 19, 1986.

B. Stirling Tighe, Jackson, for appellant.

Pat Donald, Morton, for appellee.

Before WALKER, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and ROBERTSON, JJ.

WALKER, Presiding Justice, for the court:

Hugh H. Haralson appeals from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Scott County awarding Betty Jane Haralson a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and awarding her the use of certain real property of the parties, the ownership of personal property and lump sum alimony.

The Haralsons were married on June 30, 1976, and made their home in Forest, Mississippi. No children were born of this marriage. Mrs. Haralson's teenage son from a previous marriage lived with them.

Hugh Haralson worked as a certified public accountant prior to selling his accounting firm. He owns a minority interest in several corporations in the Forest area involved in the chicken industry. Mr Haralson also owns an interest in the local Ford dealership. Mrs. Haralson had worked prior to marrying Mr. Haralson but did not afterwards at his request.

On this appeal Hugh Haralson cites ten (10) assignments of error committed in the court below. Because one of these is despositive of the case we will only address that one: the question of whether Mrs. Haralson was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

In support of her complaint, Mrs. Haralson testified as to a number of incidents to illustrate the appellant's cruel and inhuman treatment.

Once during the time when the couple was attempting to have children of their own, the appellant purportedly refused to have sexual relations with the appellee at a time when it was more likely she would conceive. The couple had had an argument and the appellant was still angry.

On another occasion the appellant became angry and told appellee that he did not love her and the next day wanted to have sexual relations with her. He is alleged to have said that it was just a physical need and had nothing to do with love.

Mrs. Haralson testified that the appellant one time kicked her on the backside, causing her to scream out in pain.

Appellee and her son complained that the appellant was critical of the son's behavior and on several occasions told him dirty jokes. There was testimony that the appellant restricted the visits of the son's natural father to the home and that the appellant was not friendly and attentive when his in-laws came to visit.

Most of the problems of the marriage just prior to separation seemed to center on Mrs. Haralson's desire to pursue a career in interior decorating and on disputes over money. The appellant restricted her spending and on occasion threatened to withhold money from her.

The appellant was not happy that his wife was gone during the day to classes at a junior college and then later to the University of Sourthern Mississippi. The appellee continued the classes despite her husband's objections.

Recent cases of this Court have reaffirmed the need for adequate proof to sustain a divorce grounded on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Fournet v. Fournet, 481 So.2d 326 (Miss.1985); Kergosien v. Kergosien, 471 So.2d 1206 (Miss.1985); Churchill v. Churchill, 467 So.2d 948 (Miss.1985); Stennis v. Stennis, 464 So.2d 1161 (Miss.1985); Gallaspy v. Gallaspy, 459 So.2d 283 (Miss.1984); Marble v. Marble, 457 So.2d 1342 (Miss.1984).

Often cited is Wires v. Wires, 297 So.2d 900, 902 (Miss.1974), in which the Court said:

It is true these cases held that habitual cruel and inhuman treatment should be sustained by "clear and convincing evidence." This conclusion was based upon the thesis that mental cruelty without violence required clear and convincing evidence to substantiate the charge. We have reexamined the authorities as to the degree of evidence required, and we are now of the opinion that habitual cruel and inhuman treatment may be established by a preponderance of the creditable evidence.

We agree, however, that the charge of cruel and inhuman treatment against one spouse means something more than unkindness or rudeness or mere incompatibility or want of affection. It has been said that:

"The conduct of the offending spouse must be so unkind as to be cruel, that is, so unreasonably harsh and severe as to be inhumane, so lacking in human qualities, so unfeeling or brutal as to endanger, or put one in reasonable apprehension of danger to life, limb, or...