Batiste v. State
| Decision Date | 24 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-CA-00283-SCT,2019-CA-00283-SCT |
| Parties | BOBBY BATISTE a/k/a BOBBY L. BATISTE a/k/a BOBBY L. BATISTE, JR. a/k/a BOBBY LIONEL BATISTE, JR. a/k/a BOBBY LIONEL BATISTE v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL BY: BENJAMIN H. McGEE, III TREASURE R. TYSON SCOTT A. JOHNSON
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND BRAD A. SMITH ASHLEY L. SULSER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DEATH PENALTY - POST CONVICTION
DISPOSITION: REMANDED - 09/24/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Bobby Batiste was convicted of capital murder in Oktibbeha County and was sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court. Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808 (Miss. 2013). This Court later granted him the right to file the petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), the subject of this opinion. Batiste v. State, 184 So. 3d 290 (Miss. 2016).1 This Court granted Batiste the right to file a PCR action because the Court determined that Batiste was entitled to a hearing regarding alleged communications between bailiffs and/or others and members of the jury. Id.
¶2. Batiste then filed a PCR action in circuit court, and hearings were held. During the hearings, a motion was made requesting that the trial judge recuse. This motion was denied, and, ultimately, the PCR was denied. Batiste appealed both the denial of the request to recuse as well as the denial of the PCR on its merits. Because we find that evidentiary questions remain relating to the recusal issue, we do not yet address the merits of the PCR.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. Because this Court's analysis is limited to the recusal issue, a lengthy recitation of the facts underlying Batiste's conviction/sentence or this PCR action are unnecessary. A detailed outline of those facts, however, can be found in this Court's decision granting Batiste's PCR. Id. For the purposes of this opinion, the circuit court held a hearing on April 4, 2018, to determine if improper communications had occurred between bailiffs and/or other persons and the jury and, if so, what impact, if any, those communications had on Batiste's conviction and sentence.
¶4. At the hearing, the two jurors (Denise Cranford and Webster Rowan) who hadpresented affidavits alleging extraneous contact were called by Batiste to testify. The State called one of the trial bailiffs. After receiving testimony, the judge recessed the hearing, which he later set to reconvene on July 27, 2018. The hearing did not take place that day because Batiste had not been transported by the Mississippi Department of Corrections for unknown reasons. During a chambers conference that day, however, the trial judge expressed concern about one of the statements in Cranford's affidavit. The statement read as follows:
During the year before my trial, my sister-in[-]law had been murdered in Tennessee by police. During the trial, Judge Kitchens told me that he knew about this situation and if there was anything he could do to help me with this situation, just let him know. I felt the judge was extremely nice to me and his attention made me feel more comfortable serving on the jury.
¶5. Batiste moved for the trial judge to recuse based on what had occurred at the conference. According to the affidavit of Batiste's counsel, the trial judge advised the attorneys that Cranford's affidavit "raised questions in his mind about the reliability of Ms. Cranford's testimony." The judge indicated that he did not recall making the statement in question to Cranford but that he had seen Cranford at a campaign-related event in 2010 and might have made such a statement to her then.
¶6. Batiste, in his motion to recuse, argued that the trial judge had become a witness in the case by relying on his personal recollection to assess Cranford's credibility. He also argued that, by sua sponte raising the issue of Cranford's credibility based on Cranford's affidavit, the trial judge had brought up a new argument that the State had never raised. TheState filed a response arguing that because the trial judge had sufficient evidence to deny the PCR without relying on his own recollection, Batiste had not overcome the presumption of the judge's impartiality.
¶7. On December 17, 2018, the trial judge denied the motion to recuse and denied the PCR on the merits. Pertinent to our analysis, the order stated, in part:
At the July 27, 2018 discussion with the attorneys for both sides the court asked whether Ms. Cranford stated to the Office of Capital Post Conviction that this Court talked to her off the record during the pendency of this trial in October 2009. If Ms. Cranford made such a statement, then the Court would be obliged to recuse since the Court would be a witness to rebut such statement.
(Emphasis added.) Because "there [was] no allegation that the Court conferred with Ms. Cranford off the record during the pendency of this trial and before the jury reached its verdicts," the trial judge denied the motion to recuse, saying, "[h]ad there been such an allegation by Ms. Cranford, this Court would have recused itself." (Emphasis added.) The order then went on to address the merits of the PCR and found, relevant to our discussion today, that Cranford was not a credible witness in part because her testimony was contradicted by her affidavit, her testimony and the trial record.
¶8. Batiste filed a motion to alter or amend the order, arguing that Cranford did not allege that the conversation had occurred on the record and that the hearing should have been reconvened to hear additional testimony on the subject. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. In doing so, he reiterated that the trial record spoke for itself, and he noted other issues with Cranford's credibility.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to recuse for manifest abuse of discretion. Hathcock v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 912 So. 2d 844, 849 (Miss. 2005).
DISCUSSION
¶10. The issue before the Court is covered by Canon 3 of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically implicated are Canon 3E(1)(a) and Canon 3E(1)(d)(iv), which require a judge to disqualify himself when the judge has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" or if "to the judge's knowledge [he is] likely to be a material witness in the proceeding," respectively.
¶11. A litigant contending that a judge's failure to recuse was a manifest abuse of discretion has a heavy burden of proof. Payton v. State, 897 So. 2d 921, 943 (Miss. 2003). The litigant must overcome the presumption of impartiality "that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased." Id. (citing McBride v. Meridian Pub. Improvement Corp., 730 So. 2d 548, 551 (Miss. 1998)). When this Court is asked to review the denial of recusal, it "will look to the whole trial and pass upon questions on appeal in the light of the completed trial." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. State, 829 So. 2d 93, 99 (Miss. 2002)). We will consider "[e]very act and movement had during the entire trial . . . and if we are unable to find that rulings have been prejudicial to the defendant, we will not reverse." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown, 829 So. 2d at 99). But if the evidence produces a reasonable doubt about the judge's impartiality,recusal is required. Hathcock, 912 So. 2d at 849 (quoting Dodson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 839 So. 2d 530, 533 (Miss. 2003)).
¶12. The question in this case, at this point, is simply whether the judge was required to recuse. Although the question is simple, the answer is not. Cranford attested to a conversation with the judge during trial—a conversation the judge found did not occur. He supported that finding with a review of the record. The judge then factored this finding into his evaluation of Cranford's credibility. The trial judge recognized and emphasized that he would be "obliged to recuse" had the purported conversation occurred off the record. But he found the juror alleged their conversation had occurred on the record. So he understandably believed there was no impediment to his presiding over the hearing.
¶13. Cranford's affidavit, however, stated the communications happened "during trial," a statement the trial judge apparently took to mean "on the record." A review of this issue indicates that the question of whether the alleged communication was "during trial," whether it was on or off the record, was ambiguous. At this juncture, however, Batiste has not proved any "off the record" conversation between the trial judge and Cranford. Therefore, removal of the trial judge would be inappropriate.
¶14. Instead, the appropriate disposition for this case is to remand back to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing the trial judge to hear such evidence as is necessary to allow him to clear up any ambiguity and to determine if the alleged conversation did, in fact, take place "during trial," and, if it did, whether the conversation is alleged to have occurredon or off the record.
¶15. If the finding is that the conversation took place "on the record," recusal is unnecessary and there is no need for further action at the trial-court level. We would need only review the trial judge's findings in his denial of Batiste's PCR on the merits. But should the finding be that the alleged conversation took place "off the record" during the time that the trial was ongoing, the trial judge would be in a position to take such steps as he has previously recognized are necessary. While this matter may seem trivial to some, the trial judge himself recognized its importance and noted he would be "obliged to recuse" had the purported conversation...
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