Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 83-877
| Decision Date | 06 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-877,83-877 |
| Citation | 443 So.2d 136 |
| Parties | HARBOUR HOUSE PROPERTIES, INC., Appellant, v. ESTATE OF Pearl G. STONE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Kahn & Gutter and Jeffrey D. Michelson, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Bailey & Dawes and Jesse C. Jones, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
The question presented on appeal is whether the creditor made a sufficient showing of the elements of estoppel against the personal representative of an estate so as to excuse the creditor from the requirement of filing a timely claim against the estate.
During her life the decedent leased an apartment from Harbour House. She died on January 11, 1982, before the expiration of a substantial term of the lease. Notice of administration was commenced on February 25, 1982. After the personal representative was appointed, he brought the monthly rental payments to Harbour House current and continued to pay the rent as it accrued. Before the time for filing a claim against the estate, as required by section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) had expired, the personal representative and Harbour House entered into an agreement. Harbour House agreed, for a stated consideration, to find a successor tenant. A preamble to that written agreement expressly provided:
WHEREAS, the Landlord and Tenant agree that the Tenant still has the right, duty and obligation both to abide by the Original Lease and to submit an acceptable application to the Landlord in connection with the reletting of the Apartment and (emphasis supplied)
When the statutorily prescribed period for the presentation of a proper claim had expired, the personal representative ceased paying the rent as it accrued. It was then that the creditor filed a claim against the estate, in response to which the personal representative filed a motion to strike, asserting the claim was filed untimely. When the motion to strike came to be heard, the creditor argued that the personal representative had lulled him into a false sense of security and should therefore be estopped to claim a bar under the nonclaims statute. The probate judge permitted the creditor to file a response to the motion to strike. This motion attached a copy of the reletting agreement and recited the essential facts set forth above as a basis for permitting the late-filed claim against the estate. Ultimately, without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the personal representative's motion to strike, which precipitated this appeal.
It is obvious...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Musico v. Champion Credit Corp.
...not excuse a creditor from the filing requirement. Fla.Stat. Sec. 733.702(1) (1976 & Supp.1985); Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 443 So.2d 136 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983). An exception may be made on grounds of estoppel, but "there must, as a minimum, be some form of affirmati......
-
Estate of Read, In re
...hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Some of these cases are explicit. See, e.g., Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 443 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Grossman v. Selewacz, 417 So.2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); In re Estate of Gay, 294 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla......
-
Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read
...waived by its failure to object. We hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Accord, Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 443 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Picchione v. Asti, 354 So.2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Stern v. First National Bank, 275 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d DC......
-
Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz, 87-1333
...procedure which may be relaxed in the sound discretion of the probate court for good cause shown." Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 443 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (citing In re Jeffries' Estate, 136 Fla. 410, 181 So. 833 (1938) and Davis v. Evans, 132 So.2d 476, 482......