Harden v. State, 58786
| Decision Date | 26 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 58786,58786 |
| Citation | 547 So.2d 1150 |
| Parties | Owen Lee HARDEN v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Owen Lee Harden, Memphis, Tenn., pro se.
Mike Moore, Atty. Gen. by George W. Neville, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ.
Owen Lee Harden, a convicted and incarcerated felon, challenges the Mississippi State Parole Board's refusal to order him released on parole and argues specifically that Mississippi law vests him with a liberty interest in parole, entitling him to due process of law incident to his application for parole. The Circuit Court of Sunflower County denied Harden any relief. We affirm.
On February 22, 1985, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Yalobusha County, Mississippi, adjudged Harden guilty upon his plea of guilty of the felony of arson of a dwelling 1 and sentenced him to a term of twenty (20) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with six (6) years suspended. After serving forty-two (42) months in the Mississippi State Penitentiary, Harden applied to the Board for release on parole. By order of June 23, 1987, the Board denied parole, continued his application for a period of one year, citing as reasons "according to Section 47-7-17 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, not in the best interest of society."
On November 20, 1987, Harden filed in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County a petition denominated "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus". By reason of Miss.Code Ann. Secs. 99-39-3(1) and -5(1)(g) (Supp.1989), this application must be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. See Rule 22, Miss.Sup.Ct. Rules; McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 n. 2 (Miss.1989). In any event, Harden charged that he had been denied parole in violation of his right to due process of law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Circuit Court determined that Harden had no such due process right in the premises and dismissed the petition. Harden now appeals to this Court.
The case turns on whether Mississippi law creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the form of an expectation of parole. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) holds that the maintenance of a parole system in and of itself gives rise to no protected liberty interest in release on parole, but where state law provides that upon the meeting of one or more objective conditions a prisoner becomes entitled to parole, a protected liberty interest exists. Critical is the presence of the mandatory "shall" in the state's parole law or enforceable regulations in such a context that a presumption of entitlement to parole arises from satisfaction of the objective criteria. To like effect is Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987).
In relevant part, the Mississippi legislature has enacted as follows:
Sec. 47-7-3. Parole of prisoners; conditions; determination of tentative hearing date.
(1) Every prisoner who has been or may hereafter be convicted of any offense against the State of Mississippi, and is confined in the execution of a judgment of such conviction in the Mississippi State Penitentiary for a definite term or terms of one (1) year or over, or for the term of his or her natural life, whose record of conduct shows that such prisoner has observed the rules of the pentientiary, and who has served not less than one-fourth ( 1/4) of the total of such term or terms for which such prisoner sentenced, or, if sentenced to serve a term or terms of thirty (30) years or more, or, if sentenced for the term of the natural life of such prisoner, has served not less than ten (10) years of such life sentence, may be released on parole as hereinafter provided,.... [subject to exceptions not relevant here]. [Emphasis added]
The statutes further provide:
Sec. 47-7-17. Examination of offender's record; eligibility for parole.
Within one (1) year after his admission and at such intervals thereafter as it may determine, the board shall secure and consider all pertinent information regarding each offender, except any under sentence of death, including the circumstances of his offense, his previous social history, his previous criminal record, including any records of law enforcement agencies or of a youth court regarding that offender's juvenile criminal history, his conduct, employment and attitude while in the custody of the department, and the reports of such physical and mental examinations as have been made. The board shall furnish at least three (3) months' written notice to each such offender of the date on which he is eligible for parole.
Before ruling on the application for parole of any offender, the board may have the offender appear before it and interview him. No application for parole of a person convicted of a capital offense shall be considered by the board unless and until notice of the filing of such...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mackbee v. State
...State, 445 So.2d 798, 813 (Miss.1984); Davis v. State, 429 So.2d 262, 263 (Miss.1983). Grantham, 522 So.2d at 226. See Harden v. State, 547 So.2d 1150, 1152, (Miss.1989). There is one notably and empirically demonstrable exception to this premise. Persons sentenced as habitual offenders und......
-
Lanier v. State
...proof that Lanier's waiver was valid, the right to seek parole is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Harden v. State, 547 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Miss.1989). In Harden, this Court discussed whether parole is a constitutional right and The United States Court of Appeals for the Fif......
-
City of Durant v. Humphreys County Memorial Hospital/Extended Care Facility, 07-CA-59324
...interest does not generate a right, title or interest adequate that it enjoy due process protection. Compare, e.g., Harden v. State, 547 So.2d 1150, 1151-52 (Miss.1989); and Mississippi Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So.2d 257, 263 (Miss.1984). Such right to notice as Plaintiffs may have enjoyed w......
-
Moore v. Ruth
...of sound discretion, not of right, and that the Parole Board had broad discretionary authority regarding grants of parole, Harden v. State, 547 So.2d 1150 (Miss.1989); Davis v. State, 429 So.2d 262, 263 (Miss.1983), but that is not the point today. Moore has been granted parole, and the hea......