Hardesty v. Hamburg Tp.
| Decision Date | 01 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-1346.,05-1346. |
| Citation | 461 F.3d 646 |
| Parties | Joseph Carleton HARDESTY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HAMBURG TOWNSHIP, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Peter J. Osetek, Osetek & Associates, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants. Marcia L. Howe, Johnson, Rosati, LaBarge, Aseltyne & Field, Farmington Hills, Michigan, G. Gus Morris, Kupelian, Ormond & Magy, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
Peter J. Osetek Osetek & Associates, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants. Marcia L. Howe, Johnson, Rosati, LaBarge, Aseltyne & Field, Farmington Hills, Michigan, G. Gus Morris, Kupelian, Ormond & Magy, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellees.
Before: MARTIN, NORRIS, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORRIS, J., joined. MARTIN, J. (pp. 656-60), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Plaintiffs appeal the summary judgment for Defendants in this civil rights action alleging violation of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of all claims, but on different grounds.
On May 27, 2001, at 2:11 a.m., Officer Bullock arrested Julie Taylor, a minor, for drunk driving. Taylor told Bullock that she had been consuming alcohol with Joseph Hardesty at the Hardestys' home. Officer Sanderson went to the Hardesty residence and kept it under observation to ensure no other intoxicated minors attempted to drive away. After Bullock completed booking Taylor, he met Sanderson and Officer Garbarcik at the Hardesty home to investigate the situation. Shortly before Bullock arrived, Sanderson and Garbarcik approached the front door of the Hardesty residence. They pounded on the front door, but received no response.1 The officers then contacted Livingston County dispatch and dispatch telephoned the Hardestys' home, but nobody answered. The officers knew where Plaintiff Kenneth Hardesty worked and called his workplace but were unable to get in touch with him. Sanderson and Garbarcik believed someone was home because they had observed lights in the house go off as they approached the house. When there was no response at the front door or to the phone calls, the officers went around to the back of the house to try to contact the people inside. Bullock arrived on the scene in time to go around to the back of the house with Sanderson and Garbarcik.
The Hardestys have a deck on the back of their home. This deck has stairs leading up to it from the yard, and there is an entrance into the home from the deck. There are no pathways leading from the front yard or front door to the deck. The three officers went around the house and onto the deck and looked through the windows and sliding glass door into the house. The officers testified that they observed Ryan Adam Dean inside, lying on a couch, with blood on his hands and pants. The officers attempted to wake Dean by shining flashlights in his face and pounding on the window. The officers allege that Dean did not respond or even move and that he appeared to not be breathing. The officers contacted Sergeant DeBottis and advised him of the situation. DeBottis told the officers that they should enter the house to check on the well-being of Dean, but should do as little damage as possible entering the house.
The officers entered a car parked in the driveway and used a garage door opener, found therein, to enter the home. Two officers from the Pinckney Police Department arrived on the scene in time to enter the house with the Hamburg officers. All the officers entered the Hardesty residence through the garage without the permission of the owners or a warrant.
Inside the house, the officers found three males under the age of twenty-one-Plaintiff Joseph Hardesty and his friends Ryan Dean and Tim Brewer. Ryan Dean was found lying on the couch and did have blood on his hands, but was not in need of medical attention. The officers observed beer cans, some empty and some half full, and could smell alcohol on all the minors. The Hamburg officers administered a breath test on the minors and issued tickets for minor in possession of alcohol. Brewer's minor in possession case was dismissed after the state court ruled that the officers' entry into the Hardesty home was illegal. After that ruling, the charges against Joseph Hardesty were dismissed as well.
Joseph Hardesty and his father filed a § 1983 suit in federal district court against the five officers who entered the Hardesty home, Sergeant Debottis who instructed the Hamburg officers to enter the house, Hamburg Township, the Hamburg Police Chief, the Supervisor of Hamburg, two Hamburg trustees, the village of Pinckney, and the Pinckney Police Chief. All of the Hardestys' claims are based on the allegation that the officers' warrantless search of the Hardesty residence was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled that the state court decision regarding the legality of the search was not binding, the officers' actions were constitutional, and that even if they were not constitutional, qualified immunity immunized the officers from suit. Consequently, the district court granted Defendants' motions and dismissed all claims. Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal.
This court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir.2005); Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734 (6th Cir.2005); Valentine-Johnson v. Roche, 386 F.3d 800, 807 (6th Cir.2004). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Johnson, 398 F.3d at 873; Daniels, 396 F.3d at 734; Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 689 (6th Cir. 2004). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Johnson, 398 F.3d at 873; Daniels, 396 F.3d at 734; Valentine-Johnson, 386 F.3d at 807. Any direct evidence offered by the plaintiff in response to a summary judgment motion must be accepted as true. Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.2004). Nevertheless, the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original); accord Leadbetter, 385 F.3d at 689-90; Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir.2003).
Plaintiff Joseph Hardesty was charged with being a minor in possession of alcohol in state court. The state court granted his motion to suppress and dismissed the charge on the basis that the police officers' entrance onto the back deck of the Hardesty home was a constitutionally impermissible warrantless search. The state court reasoned that since the perceived medical emergency was not observed by the officers until after they entered the curtilage of the home, i.e., the back deck, what they saw while they were impermissibly within the curtilage could not be used to justify the entry into the home itself. The federal district court below held that it was not bound by the state court decision on the legality of the search because neither the defendants nor Plaintiff Kenneth Hardesty were parties to the state court litigation. On appeal, Joseph Hardesty argues that at least he is entitled to preclude the defendants from taking a position contrary to the ruling of the state court.
Federal courts give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments as those judgments would receive in the courts of the rendering state. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). "Under Michigan law, issue preclusion applies when 1) there is identity of parties across the proceedings, 2) there was a valid, final judgment in the first proceeding, 3) the same issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in the first proceeding, and 4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding." Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir.2001) (citing People v. Gates, 434 Mich. 146, 452 N.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Mich.1990)). The first element is met when the litigants were parties to a prior action or were privy to parties to a prior action. Id. None of the defendants were parties to the state court prosecution. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were in privity with the State of Michigan which prosecuted the minor-in-possession case. Plaintiffs cite a footnote in an Eighth Circuit case which indicates this argument would be valid under North Dakota claim preclusion law. See Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1369 n. 7 (8th Cir.1985). However, the cases applying Michigan law have all held that police officer defendants in a § 1983 case are not in privity with the prosecution of a related criminal case and do not have a personal stake in the outcome of the criminal case. See Von Herbert v. City of St. Clair Shores, 61 Fed.Appx. 133, 136 n. 1 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished); Burda Brothers, Inc. v. Walsh, 22 Fed.Appx. 423, 430 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished); Kegler v. City of Livonia, 1999 WL 133110, at *2 n. 2 (6th Cir.1999) (unpubl...
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