Hardison v. Skinner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-00119

• Decision Date: 25 September 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-00119
• Citation: 489 F.Supp.3d 536
• Parties: Gwendolyn Antee HARDISON v. Dale SKINNER, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

489 F.Supp.3d 536

Gwendolyn Antee HARDISON

v.Dale SKINNER, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-00119

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division.

Signed September 25, 2020

Allison Anne Jones, Downer Jones et al., Shreveport, LA, for Gwendolyn Antee Hardison.

Elmer Gray Noah, II, Justin Nolan Myers, Hammonds Sills et al., Monroe, LA, for Dale Skinner, School Board of Natchitoches Parish.

MEMORANDUM RULING

DAVID C. JOSEPH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 41] filed by Defendants, the Natchitoches Parish School Board ("NPSB") and Dale Skinner ("Skinner"), and a Motion to Strike Declaration of Linda Page (the "Motion to Strike") [Doc. 46] filed by Plaintiff, Gwendolyn Antee Hardison ("Hardison"). For reasons which follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Motion to Strike is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Hardison, an African American female, was employed by the NPSB as the Director of Federal Programs from November 13, 2003 until January 27, 2016 [Doc. 47-2 ¶ 2]. In this position, Hardison supervised the administration of various federal programs in Natchitoches Parish, including the Migrant Education Program ("MEP") [Doc. 1 ¶ 5].

Every three years, the Louisiana Department of Education ("LDOE") engages independent third-party consultants to interview families receiving financial aid through the MEP in order to ensure that the recipients satisfy the program's eligibility requirements [Doc. 41-1 ¶ 6]. In April of 2015, the LDOE's review of MEP recipient families in Natchitoches Parish revealed a high number of ineligible families receiving migrant assistance "due to the use of tactics and interview practices intended to qualify otherwise ineligible families, such as falsifying qualified work activities, using dates for ineligible moves and forging parent/guardian signatures" [Doc. 41-1 ¶¶ 7-8]. Consequently, the LDOE informed the School Board that it would conduct an audit of the NPSB's MEP records for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years [Doc. 41-4]. The audit revealed that over 60 percent of the families receiving financial aid were ineligible [Doc. 41-6 p.4], ultimately requiring the NPSB to reimburse the LDOE a total of $79,842.41 [Doc 41-1 ¶ 21].

On August 10, 2015, Skinner, the superintendent of the NPSB, placed Hardison on administrative leave with full pay and benefits pending completion of the investigation into mismanagement of the MEP [Doc. 47-2 ¶ 24]. Defendants allege that Skinner thereafter requested that the LDOE perform a complete audit of all federal programs under Hardison's administration in light of the apparent mismanagement of the MEP program [Doc. 60 ¶ 37]. Following the completion of this audit, the LDOE informed the NPSB of problems in other federal programs under Hardison's supervision [Doc. 41-1 ¶ 31]. On February 8, 2016, after consulting with legal counsel, Hardison decided to retire and submitted a formal letter of resignation through her attorney to the NPSB's Director of Personnel, Linda Page ("Page") [Doc. 41-3 ¶ 14]. The record does not indicate that Hardison made any allegations of discrimination at this time.

Prior to her placement on administrative leave, Hardison alleges that Skinner unfavorably treated her in the following manners: (1) he asked her if she was going to resign or be terminated from employment on at least five occasions; (2) he denied her the right to participate in internal audits; (3) he prevented her from attending staff meetings to discuss concerns with federal programs; (4) he failed to grant her request for additional staff; (5) he yelled at and humiliated her in front of other NPSB employees; and (6) he prevented her from accessing her work computer and communicating with other NPSB employees [Doc. 47-1 p.6-7]. Hardison alleges that other similarly situated non-minority employees did not experience such unfavorable treatment [Id. ].

Hardison initiated this action on January 31, 2018, to recover for racial and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")¹ and Louisiana's Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL")² [Doc. 1]. She further seeks recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983") and Louisiana's Teacher Tenure Law³ on the ground that Defendants constructively discharged her without due process of law [Id. ]. In addition, Hardison asserts claims under Louisiana state law for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation [Id. ].

Defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that Hardison's claims should be dismissed with prejudice. In support of their Motion, Defendants submitted the declarations of Linda Page [Doc. 41-3] and Superintendent Dale Skinner [Doc. 60]. In response, Hardison filed an Opposition [Doc. 47] supported by her own declaration [Doc. 47-3]. Additionally, Hardison filed the Motion to Strike, asserting that Page lacks personal knowledge with respect to many statements made in her declaration.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE

The Court will first address Hardison's Motion to Strike. Hardison moves the Court to strike substantial portions of Page's declaration based primarily on her perception that Page lacks personal knowledge regarding the subject matter asserted. Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to object to summary judgment evidence when the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.⁴ See Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., L.L.C. , 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017). ("[T]he new rule allows a party to object ‘that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible as evidence.’ "); Cutting Underwater Technologies USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co. , 671 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 2012) ("Prior to December 1, 2010, the proper method by which to attack an affidavit was by filing a motion to strike."). Accordingly, the Court treats the pending Motion to Strike as an objection to the relevant portions of the affidavit.

Rule 56 allows a party to use an affidavit to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Such affidavits, however, "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant ... is competent to testify on the matters stated." Id. 56(c)(4). The Fifth Circuit has held that an official title alone is sufficient to indicate a basis of personal knowledge when that title clearly identifies the official's sphere of responsibility and the facts stated in the affidavit are within that sphere. Cutting Underwater Technologies , 671 F.3d at 516 (quoting Rutledge v. Liab. Ins. Indus. , 487 F.Supp. 5, 7 (W.D. La. 1979) ).

In her declaration, Page articulates her job duties as Director of Personnel and demonstrates a direct involvement in the contested matters. Hardison has not provided any compelling reasons or evidence for the Court to disregard Page's testimony. Therefore, the Court overrules Hardison's objections and gives the statements made in Page's declaration the weight they are due.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the court determines "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-movant. Id. "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The motion for summary judgment should be granted if the non-moving party cannot produce sufficient competent evidence to support an essential element of its claim. Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Ga. , 431 F.3d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).

"In an employment discrimination case, [the Fifth Circuit] focus[es] on whether a genuine issue exists as to whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc. , 86 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, conclusory allegations, and speculation are insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden. Grimes v. Texas Dept. Of Mental Health and Mental Retardation , 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996). In response to a motion for summary judgment, it is therefore incumbent upon the non-moving party to present evidence – not just conjecture and speculation – that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of the protected characteristic in question. Id.

B. Title VII and LEDL Claims for Race and Gender Discrimination

Based on the alleged manners in which Skinner unfavorably treated her prior to her resignation, Hardison asserts that Defendants discriminated against her due to her race and gender in violation of Title VII and LEDL. Both Title VII and LEDL prohibit employers from discriminating based on "race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:332. As Title VII and LEDL share the same scope, claims under LEDL are analyzed under the Title VII framework and...